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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
November 27, 1985 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 2 
No. 85-499-CFX Oi(._ 
PAPASA . (students 
officials) 
v. ov 
ALLAIN 4X (state 
offici}i.~ · 
v ,,,,... -
Ceyt to CAS (Thornberry, R__; avley ~~ 
V Higginbotham)(J~ ~) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs argue the CAS erred in finding their 
-::::=... . 
challenge to Mississippi's school financing barred by the Eleventh 
--===: 
Amendment and "san Antonio Independent School District v. Rodr i-
quez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
- 2 -
formation of the State of Mississippi in 1817, ~ that 
1 
lands in the State should be surveyed, and that the sixteenth 
s ~ n of every thirty-six-section township should be 
granted to the State in perpetual trust for the support of public 
schools in the township. See 3 Stat. 348, 375 (1817). The prac-
tice of dedicating "Sixteenth Section" land to a "school lands 
---·· --------.__-......_ -- -· ---· - ------· -::,,_ 
trust" had been initiated when Congress had provided for survey ------------------------ ------ ---
ana sale of lands within the Northwest Territory, see Land Ordi-
nance of 1785, Laws of the United States 565 (1815), and was fol-
lowed, with variations, throughout most of the westward expansion. 
See generally~ rus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 522-528 (JUSTICE POW-o ____ ·:::::::. 
ELL dissenting) . The situation in Mississippi was coJfil)li g,g ted, 
C::::...--r 
however, by the fact that the Chickasaw Indian Nation owned a 
significant chunk of the northern part of the State. The Indians 
ceded their land to the United States by treaty in 18 3 2; in re-
turn, the United States promised to survey the land, sell it to 
private parties, and turn over the proceeds to the Chickasaw Na-
tion. Although the treaty specified that the Chickasaw Cession 
would be surveyed and sold "in the same manner and on the same 
terms as other public lands," no Sixteenth Section land was re-
served from the sale. 
~ his deficiency,~ ngress ~ authorized the 
selection and dedication of other unsold public land in the Chick-
asaw Cession, equal to and in 1 ieu of the unreserved Sixteenth 
, 
Sections. 5 Stat. 11, § 2 (1836). Subsequently, Congress ex-
pressly empowered Mississippi to sell the substitute lands for the 
support of public schools within the Chickasaw Cession. The State 
- 3 -
sold the lands and invested the proceeds in eight-percent loans to 
railroads. Unfortunately, the railroads were destroyed in the 
Civil War, and the State lost its entire investment. Since then, 
the Mississippi Legislature has annually appropriated funds to 
replace the interest on the lost investment, first at eight per-
cent and later at six percent. This money is paid each year to 
Chickasaw Cession counties for the support of their public 
schools. In 1980, the appropriation amounted to about eighty .. $tJ ti; ---
cents per student, as compared to an average of $31.25 per student ~~ 
-----=--------- ----------------- ~ 
paid~~ts in Mississippi counties outside th~ 7. ZS--
Chickasaw Cession. 
.I 
school officials and school boards in /~ Petrs are students, -----Chickasaw Cession counties. They filed suit in ND Miss. (Coleman, ~ __ ________, 
J. [CAS] ) against state and federal officials, challenging the - · --
level of state funding for their schools. Among other allega-
. ,--
t 1ons, the complaint charged: that various federal and state acts 
purporting to authorize the sale of Chickasaw Cession Sixteenth 
Section lands or substitute lands were void and unenforceable; 
that the federal and state defendants had breached trust obliga-
tions to Chickasaw Cession schools; and that the State violated 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by allotting counties in the Chickasaw Cession dispro-
portionately low school lands appropriations, thereby depriving 
schoolchildren in those counties of a minimally adequate educa-
• =::::::,, ~
tion. Petrs sought a wide range of relief, including a declara-
tory judgment invalidating the challenged land transfers, a con-
veyance of money or property of "equivalent income producing val-
- 4 -
ue" to the unlawfully alienated land, compensation for the inter-
est lost through imprudent trust management, and an injunction 
against further deprivations of their constitutional rights. They 
also requested class certification. 
The DC held the class certification motion in a ~ yance and 
then, accepting petrs' factual allegations as true, dismissed all 
--------------------------parts of the complaint. ------- The court held that the claims against 
the federal defendants were barred by laches, statutes of limita-
t ion, and sovereign immunity. 't'he appeal of those rulings was 
dismissed pursuant to a settlement. In a separate order, the DC -
dismissed th gainst the state defendants under the Elev-
enth Amendment and, indepenaently, under statutes of limitation. ___, v"' ~ 
The CA5 affirmed on the basis of the Eleventh Amendment. 
Although the suit was nominally brought against state officials, 
the court found that the 0-a ~ w~ he real par ::7 in intere~ 
because the complaint sought compensatory relief that, whether 
paid in the form of money or in the form of land, would be satis-
fied from the state treasury. This was true even of petrs' re-
quest for an injunction against further deprivation of their con-
stitutional rights, because the injunction sought would direct the 
defendants to provide petrs annual income equivalent to what the 
Chickasaw Cession schools would enjoy if the substitute lands had 
not been sold and the proceeds improperly invested. This amounted 
to equitable restitution of the sort condemned in Edelman v. Jor-
dan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974): the relief requestea would "re-
quire[] the payment of state funds, not as a necessary consequence 
of compliance in the future with a substantive federal-question 
- 5 -
determination, but as a form of compensation" for previous legal 
breaches. 
The CA5 acknowledged, however, that a constitutional com-------- -:;, plaint should not be dismissed simply because it "seeks one remedy 
rather' than another plainly appropriate one." Holt Civic Club v. 
Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 65 (1978). Here, the complaint could be 
read liberally to seek in the alternative a prospective, noncom-
pensatory remedy: rectifying present disparities between counties 
in school appropriations. But there was no unconstitutional dis-
parity to remedy. Petrs conceded they had not suffered an abso-
lute deprivation of educational opportunity. The funding dispari-
ty therefore constituted a \.,,-aenial of equal protection only if 
lacked a rational basis. See San Antonio Independent School Dis-_____ ____, 
trict v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Here, a rational basis 
could be found in Mississippi's structure of school finances. 
"With land values as a base and desired local administration of 
local schools, income differences are inevitable." Much of the 
income disparity was due simply to the fact that, as a result of 
his ~ nts, "there were no school lands in the Chickasaw 
Cession to be administered." The State, moreover, had alleviated 
that misfortune by annually appropriating funds for the Chickasaw 
Cession counties amounting to six percent of the lost railroad 
loans. These appropriations may not have made petr s whole for 
their loss, but in pursuing a remedial goal of this sort the State 
was not obligated to achieve complete success. 
Finally, the CA5 rejected petrs' arguments that the school 
board petrs were arms of the State and thus not subject to the 
- 6 -
Eleventh Amendment bar, and that Mississippi had impliedly waived 
its immunity by virtue of its participation in the school lands 
trusts. The court concluded that the school boards were not arms 
of the State, and that there had been no waiver because Congress 
had not clearly provided a private remedy applicable to the States 
for claims regarding Sixteenth Section trusts. 
3 • CONTENTIONS: Petrs argue that this case presents two 
significant and unsettled quest ions of federal law. First, the 
case presents the question how school lands trusts may be judi-
c ially enforced. 'T'he schoolchildren sought prospective, injunc-
tive relief, and the Court's recent cases provide little guidance 
for determining when such relief is available to enforce obliga-
tions under school lands trusts. In particular, it is unclear 
whether a State that breaches its obligations under a school lands 
trust is liable under the Contracts Clause. 
Second, petrs contend this case raises the question of the 
extent to which the Equal Protection Clause protects against de-
privation of a inimally adequate educatio. This Court has made 
clear that an absolute deprivation 
diate scrutiny, see Plyler v. Doe, 
of education triggers interme- U-VU--
d...<..~ 
4 5 7 U. S • 2 0 2 , 2 3 0 ( 19 8 2) , and -M- . 
r~ ~ 
that a mere inequality of funding will not trigger such scrutiny, 
see Rodriguez, supra. This case falls in doctrinal gap between 
those two holdings, because Chickasaw Cession schoolchildren are 
provided with an education, but petrs allege that it is not mini-
, 
mally adequate. Furthermore, even if the CA5 was correct to apply 
rational basis scrutiny, its version of this scrutiny differs from 
the rational basis scrutiny applied in cases such as Zobel v. 
- 7 -
/. 
Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 
U.S. --- (1985); Evans v. ~ity of Chicago, 689 F.2d 1286, 
1299-1300 (CA7 1982); and Park v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 654-655 
(CA9 1983). Each of those decisions "involved a detailed analysis 
of possible rationales for the legislation, and a detailed discus-
sion of the presence of, or lack of, logical fit between the pur-
ported reasons and the statutes at issue. " In this case, however, 





c---- -- ---was rationally related to the support of education; the court 
failed to examine whether a permissible state purpose was logical-
ly connected with "a decision by the state officials to divest the 
Chickasaw Cession schools of their sixteenth-sect ion lands, the 
effect of which is to deny the children of the Chickasaw Cession a 
minimally adequate education." 
Resps argue that petrs are ~ tled at most to the relief 
sought in the complaint. See ,-r'(ssissippi University for Women v. 
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 n. 7 (1982). The complaint in this case 
sought only "dollars or dirt" from the State, and that relief is 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, regardless whether it is pro-
/' 
spective or retroactive. See Edelman, supr~ oreover, any pen-
dant state law claims are also barred. See Pennhurst State School 
& Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 
4. DISCUSSION: The CA5's application of Edelman seems cor-
rect: petrs' suit is barred insofar as it seeks backward-looking 
- --~-----· relief, i.e., relief aimed at rectifying past wrongs. If petrs' -
complaint is understood to attack current funding disparities on 
their own merits, however, the "ancillary effect" that the re-
- 8 -
quested relief would have on the state treasury would be permissi-
ble as "an inevitable consequence" of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 
(1908). Edelman, 415 U.S., at 668. 
Moreover, the CA5 was correct to consider the prospective 
remedy of equalizing present funding disparities between Chickasaw 
Cession schools and schools elsewhere in Mississippi. In Hogan, 
supra, this Court refused to consider the legality of practices 
that were not challenged in petr's complaint, not challenged be-
fore this Court, and not encompassed in the holding of the court 
below. Hogan is inapplicable in this case, however, because 
petrs' complaint expressly alleged that current funding dispari-
ties violated the Equal Protection and nue Process Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by depriving Chickasaw Cession schoolchildren 
;;.;==-===-=::.::::::::::::::=============:: ' - -- -- ----------
of a "minimally adequate educatio ." See Petn App A-14. The CA5 r---------
e x press l y passed on the merits of that argument, and petrs press 
\ 
v-
the argument before this Court. The Court in Hogan in no way 
qualified its earlier statemen~ in Hcilt Civic Club, supra, that a 
constitutional complaint should not be dismissed simply because it 
"seeks one remedy rather than another plainly appropriate one." 
Consequently, the CA5 correctly examined whether prospective re-
lief might appropriately be awarded to cure the challenged defi-
ciency in funding. 
The CAS's resolution of that question appears to warrant cert 
for both of the reasons identified by petrs. 
, 
First, petrs are 
/ 
correct that this etween and Plyler v. Doe. 
was decided after extensive 
discovery and trial. See 411 U.S., at 6 n. 4. In refusing to 
- 9 -
apply heightened scrutiny in Rodriguez, the Court relied in part 
on the lack of evidence that the challenged funding disparity 
denied any children a basic education: 
The State repeatedly asserted ••• that it now as-
sures "every child in every school district an adequate 
education." No proof was offered at trial persuasively 
discrediting or refuting the State's assertion. 
[Thus, e]ven if it were conceded that some identifiable 
quantum of education is a constitutionally protectea 
prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of [ the rights 
to speak and to vote], we have no indication that the 
present levels of educational expenditures in Texas 
provide an education that falls short. Whatever merit 
appellees' argument might have if a State's financing 
system occasioned an absolute denial of educational 
opportunities to any of its children, that argument 
provides no bas~~~ f,~r finding an interference with fun-
damental rights were"only 1elative differences' in spend-
ing levels are involved and where -- as is true in the 
present case -- no charge fairly could be made that the 
system fails to provide each child with an opportunity 
to acquire the basic minimum skills necessary for the 
enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participa-
tion in the political process. 
411 U.S., at 24, 36-37 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Ro-
driguez thus left open the possibility that a failure to provide a 
minimally adequate education might trigger greater constitutional 
scrutiny. This possibility was also left open in Plyler v. Doe. 
The law struck down in Plyler effected an absolute denial of edu- ~ 
cation, but the Court described the constitutional evil in terms 
that arguably could also apply to the more limited allegations in 
this case: "By denying these children a basic education, we deny 
them the ability to live within the structure of our civic insti-
tutions, and foreclose any possibility that they will contribute 
in even the smallest way to the progress of. our Nat ion." 4 5 7 
U.S., at 223 (emphasis added). Whether denying a class of a chil-
dren a minimally adequate education suffices to trigger intermedi-
- 10 -
ate scrutiny thus seems an open question, and an important one. 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that intermediate 
scrutiny is unwarranted, petrs seem correct that the CAS's appli-
cation of intermediate scrutiny is troubling -- although not ex-
actly for the reasons identified by petrs. The CAS concluded that 
the funding disparities were rationally justified by the use of 
local land values as a funding base and by the desire for local 
control over schools. These are dubious justifications. Unlike 
Rodriguez, petrs in this case apparently do not challenge a State 
decision to leave to localities part of the responsibility for 
raising school revenues. In Rodriguez, there was no significant 
interdistrict disparity in the State's per-pupil contribution; the 
funding differences resulted from differences in the property 
taxes collected by each district. See 411 U.S., at 12-13. ~his 
The 
Sixteenth-Section lands, and the substitute lands in the Chickasaw 
Cession, were given to Mississippi, not to townships, and the 
payments from the school lands trusts are apparently paid each 
year by the State or its agents. If Mississippi were to equalize 
those payments in order to provide every child in the State with a 
minimum adequate education, it is hard to see how local autonomy 
would be undermined. To be sure, state funding would no longer be 
tied as tightly to local land values, or at least not to the value 
of local school lands trusts, but such a tie, in and of itself, 
, 
hardly seems a rational state goal, particularly when the State 
has itself lost the trust funds for a large group of its citizens. 
This is not to say, necessarily, that Mississippi's funding 
- 11 -
system lacks a rational basis. Because each Sixteenth Section was 
evidently set aside for the support of public education within 
that township, Mississippi may be legally obligated to channel all 
of the revenue stemming from a particular land grant to the area 
in which the land was set aside. Parts of petrs' argument sug-
gests that they assume this is so. But such a legal obligation is 
hardly apparent on the record now before the Court, and the lower 
courts made no findings along these lines. It may be that ~on-
gress intended the school lands trusts to be administered more 
flexibly, that by giving the land to the State, instead of direct-
ly to the localities, Congress meant to allow some pooling of risk 
in order to ensure that a basic education would be made available 
to all citizens of the State. These matters could obviously be 
pursued on remand if this Court decided that the CAS erred. 
The same is true of the alternative basis for the DC's judg-
ment, that the suit is time-barred. The CAS did not 
issue, and the DC's order is unenlightening. It seems 
,0111 s-reach this L n 
~~t 
unlikely,~ 
however, that a statute of limitations could bar a suit to remedy 5_/J... 
a continuing equal protection violation simply because the cause ·~ ~ 
of the violation was an event long passed. 
This case creates no sharp conflict among the circuits, and, 
~ ike t.fiodriguez and Myler, it "in significant aspects is sui ge-
~ 
neris." Rodriguez, 411 U.S., at 18. But the constitutional ques-
tions raised seem substantial, petrs' equal protection claim seems 
colorable, and the outcome of this suit could directly affect the 




5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend granting cert, limited to 
the second question presented by the petn-:--
There is a response. 
November 19, 1985 Sklansky opn in petn 
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85-499 Papasan v. Allain, Governor of Mississippi 
(CA5) 
(Argued Tuesday, April 22) 
MEMO TO MIKE: 
When you mentioned the complexity of this case 
Saturday, I had not looked at the briefs. Having done so 
now, I agree with your assessment - at least as to the 
inscrutable subject of "school land grants" to newly 
admitted states (going back to the Land Ordinance of 
1785), and the subsequent tortious history of the Chicasaw 
Cession's School Lands Trust. The lands at issue lie in 
northern Mississippi, 
Chicasaw Tribe. 
and formerly belonged to the 
As it took Judge Higginbotham (one of the ablest 
federal judges) some 17 typewritten pages to state the 
facts and the complaint, I will make no effort even to 
summarize the factual history of this case. I should read 
my dissenting opinion in Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S., 523, a 
case that did involve "school land' trusts". I do note 
that the particular problem in this case arises from the 
fact that the Chicasaw Indian Nation owned the land in 
northern Mississippi until 1832 when, pursuant to a 
2. 
treaty, the Chicasaws ceded this land to the United 
States. Un~ eaty, the land was to be sold to 
private parties, but unlike other government land sales, 
no portion was reserved for the "maintenance of public ------------
schools". Congress did attempt to remedy the omission by 
authorizing the selection of other unsold land that was to 
be "equal to" the customary reservation of what are called 
"sixteenth sections". 
occurred, 
Although I do not fully understand exactly 
the lands thus ~~ state of 
Mississippi for the use of schools was sold and the 
proceeds, as directed by the Mississippi legislature, were 
invested in bonds of a railroad that was destroyed in the 
Civil War. 
appropriated 
The Mississippi legislature 





investment, but apparently these appropriations have 
fallen far short of providing, for the counties at issue, 
a level of per pupil money comparable to that realized 
from school land trusts in other Mississippi counties. 
The petitioners are a curious conglomeration. ---- -They include the Superintendent of Education, other state 
officials responsible for administering the school system 
in Mississippi, and apparently all of the school trustees 
Jo 
in the northern Mississippi area here involved, together 
with various parents and children. The suitf is 
specifically against the State of Mississippi, its 
governor and other officials. In sum, the allegations are 
that respondents have breached their duties with respect 
to the federal trust funds provided for public education. 
This4f:t~ has resulted in less money being available for 
;\ 
the Chicasaw area schools than in other counties. 
Accordingly, as the result of this state action (or 
inaction), the Equal Protection Clause has been violated. 
The relief sought in the complaint is extensive 
and complicated. In substance, al though framed in 
prospective ~ ms and of seeking injunctive relief, ~ at 
the complainants want is a federal court to order the 
State of Mississippi and its appropriate officials to ----------- -
provide - for the indefinite future - funding comparable 
to that received by other counties that had the benefit of 
the customary "sixteenth Section" land grant. It is not 
clear to me whether the claim is for equality in dollars 
in accordance with the number of pupils in each county, or 
k pFn!;;;:':t other basis 
I\ 
The District Court dismissed the action, holding 
that all of the state action complained of was before the 
... 
expiration of any applicable statute of limitations, and 
that "any monetary relief was barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution." Citing my 
opinion in Pennhurst, the __!)z held that a federal court had 
~- ,,, ~ M ._ 5k no jurisdiction to award I\. ual ~~J relief for the 
future. Moreover, "the only possibly relief could come 
from a monetary award against the state treasury." As I 
read the opinion of CA5 affirming the DC, it is based 
primarily on the Eleventh Amendment, citing Edelman, 
:Eennhurst, and other cases. 
Petitioners, in a rather heated argument by 
obviously competent counsel, insist that only prospective 
injunctive relief requested is to prevent the continuation 
of conditions resulting from a breach of the Federal 
School Land Trust by state officials. In addition, it is 
argued that, as a result of state action, there has been a 
discriminatory denial of a "minimally adequate free public 
education to the Chicasaw Cession school children in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause". 
Interestingly, the Mississippi Secretary of State 
and Assistant Secretary of State are petitioners (rather 
than defendants). They have filed a brief (a red one) 
stating that they are the officials directly charged with 
5. 
the supervision of Mississippi's school land trusts, and 
that the Chicasaw Cession school children have not 
received the trust income to which they are entitled, that 
there has been a breach of trust and a denial of equal 
protection, and that the decisions below should be 
reversed. 
The state Attorney General has filed a brief on 
behalf of the State of Mississippi, the Governor and other 
respondents. The facts as found by CA5 are said to be 
correct. The actions 
~ 
complained of "took place over 130 
years ago" and were 
I\ ---------- "legal and proper, including the 
investment of the funds derived from the sale of land" -
even though those investments were wiped out by the Civil 
war. Respondents' primary position like that of CA5, is 
that this is a suit against the state, and that the public 
officials are sued only in their official rather than 
their personal capacities. Accordingly, the suit is 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Moreover, since there 
is no "absolute denial of a public education to any 
petitioner", there is no constitutional violation. Citing 
my opinion in San Antonio School District. The Attorney 
General also states that §212 of the Mississippi 





funds appropriated by the state for these Chicasaw Cession 
districts. I do not recall any mention of this in CA5's 
opinion and it may not be in the record. 
My intuitive and tentative judgment is that we 
should affirm. It does appear that there is a substantial 
inequality among school districts in Mississippi resulting 
from the history outlined in CA5's opinion, and that the 
state has not chosen to assure equal per pupil funding. 
All of this is unfamiliar to me, as we had no school land 
grants in Virginia or indeed as I recall in the 
original 13 states. In Virginia the schools are funded 
primarily at the local level by city and county taxes. In 
addition, the largest of all of the state appropriations 
is for public education. In Virginia differences in the 
actual payments to counties are justified in special 
circumstances. For example, in some of the southwest 
mountainous counties, to attract teachers it is necessary 
to pay better salaries. Of course, the Virginia situation 
is not relevant. 
I will certainly be interested in your views, 
Mike, but do not think it is necessary to write a full 
bench memo. As I found out in dictating this, the case 
,.,,., ,,,• 
7. 
has so many factual and historical ramifications that it 
is not easy to be brief. 
VI--' 
My overall reaction that although a possibly 
'\ 
justiciable issue is present, that should be denied on 
Eleventh Amendment grounds. Realistically, this should be 
viewed as a political issue, and left to the legislative 
and executive branches of the state to resolve. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Mike 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
April 21, 1986 
No. 85-499 Papasan v. Allain 
Date: April 21, 1986 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Does the State of Mississippi's unequal funding of pub-
lic education, whereby some counties receive 80 4:, per student per 
year while other counties receive $31. 25 per student per year, 
violate the Equal Protection Clause? 
If there is an Equal Protection Clause is violated, is 
the,relief sought barred by the Eleventh Amendment? 
DISCUSSION 
page 2. 
'Ihe Equal Protection Claim 
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court made clear that mere funding dispar-
ities constitute a denial of equal protection only if they lack a 
rational basis. Plyler v. Doe involved an absolute deprivation 
of education, which the Court said triggered intermediate scruti-
ny. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). In this case, there is not the 
absolute deprivation of Plyler. Petrs' allegation (binding on ----this Court given the procedural posture) is that they have been 
I ~, 
deprived of a minimall_ adequate education. In Rodriguez the 
Court left open the possibility that denial of "an opportunity to 
acquire the basic minimum skills necessary for the enjoyment of 
the rights of speech and of full participation in the political 
process," 411 U.S., at 36-37, might trigger greater constitution-
al scrutiny. Bu~nly applied intermediate scrutiny to an 
ab~l ~onal opportunity. I think after Plyler 
that the most that can be said for a claim of deprivation of a 
'~inimally adequate education" is that it is entitled to interme-
diate scrutiny. I also think there are important reasons why the 
better course is to test such a claim under the rational basis 
standard. I do not think there is any judicially manageable ---standard for determining what constitutes a "minimally adequate 
education." It would be disastrous if the 
given free reign to impose the latest--often 
wha~ is essential to an adequate education. 
federal courts were ( 
erroneous--notion of ) 
The lack of a judi-
cially mana standard leads me to conclude that if a state 
educational system exists, and receives~ funding, a claim of 
page 3. 
disparate funding should be tested under 
It . \l.. 
the rational basis 
standard. That is the same test, after all, that the Court ap-
plies to other state and federal payments involving important 
social programs. See Bowen v. Owens, No. 84-1905. ________, 
In addition, petrs' claim is de minimus. Almost all 
rounties in the state receive overall funding of over $1000, some~~ 
receive over $2000, ~ l ~ o~d b f the counties in the Chicka-
1\ '. - --· --------
saw session. 
If the rational basis test is applied to the State's 
disparate funding, I believe that its historical rationale is a 
satisfactory explanation. 
'fue Eleventh Amendment Argument 
My tentative conclusion is that the Eleventh Amendment 
is not a bar to all the relief sought in this case. To the ex-- -
tent that petrs are seeking a court order requiring the relevant 
state officials to cease disparate funding of education in viola-
tion of federal law, they seek permissible future injunctive re-----------------------------
lief under Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). I intend to 
devote a little more thought and research to the state's argument 
that because the basis of the claim is unequal funding, as op-
posed to some other violation, that the case directly implicates 
the state treasury in a way that the Eleventh Amendment forbids. 
'fue Breach of Fiduciary Duty Argument 
Petrs argue that the State has violated its trust duties 
imposed on it by Congress as a condition to entrance to the 
Union. This argument is independent of any equal protection ar-




state law. Resps argue that because of the origin of the trust, 
federal law applies. My tentative conclusion is that, despite 
the orig in of the trust, state law controls. ---- Only those land grants intended to benefit the Indian tribes have involved a 
"federal trust law." I think it would not be a helpful precedent 
to hold that the federal grant of "section sixteen" lands 
throughout the western states resulted in a uniquely "federal" 
trust obligation. 
CONCLUSION 
I recommend affirming the CAS. 
·~· 
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84-499 PaEasan v. Mtasissippi 
D ar Ctd ~1:: 
t hot;>e that Byron wr i te,3 t ii s "fuzzy• cane in a way 
that we can 1oln. lf not, twill bP q~ad to try rn 1 hand at 
a disc;ent. 
In rny vie\.r it ;_f:i ~ " on-C;P!l .. ", 11 n 1~y first vote 
was to OlG. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
CHAMBERS 01' 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'cONNOR 
Jnvrtutt Otltltrt ttf tltt ~ittlt Jtldt.tr 
Jht$1fington. ~. <It• 2llffe'*~ 
May 30, 1986 
No. 85-499 Papasan v. Allain 
Dear Byron, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
-
June 2, 1986 
85-499 Papasan v. Mississippi 
Dear Byron: 
As 1 was in dissent in this case, in due time 1 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
,Su:p-rtm.t <ltltlttt of !:qt Jtm±tb .Stahe 
'Dlas!rmghtn. ~- <lt- 21lp~~ 
/ 
June 11, 1986 
Re: No. 85-499-Papasan v. Allain 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your opinion concurring in part, 





cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~fflU ~o:ttrl '1f tlrt ~h .ibdtg 
.iulfi:nghttt. J. ~- 2.ll.;i'l, 
Re: No. 85-499, Papasan v. Mississippi 
Dear Byron: 
June 1 , 1986 
V 
For now, I shall wait to see what Lewis has to say 
in his dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
lfp/ss 06/19/86 CABl SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
'1'0: Cabell DATE: June 19, 1986 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
85-499 Papasan v. ~ississippi 
ln thinking about the dreadful complaint in this 
case, what would you think of characterizing it as follows: 
"One rarely sees a complaint as unfocused and fa-
cially frivolous as the one filed by petitioners." 
Perhaps you can improve on this sentence without 
making it too flamboyant. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
lfp/ss 06/19/86 CABl SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Cabell DATE: June 19, 1986 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
85-499 Papasan v. Mississippi 
In thinking about the dreadful complaint in this 
case, what would you think of characterizing it as follows: 
"One rarely sees a complaint as unfocused and fa-
cially frivolous as the one filed by petitioners." 
Perhaps you can improve on this sentence without 
making it too flamboyant. 
L • .F.P., Jr. 
ss 
jtUFtmt Cf}gun 1tf tlft ~ttb .ttatt• 
••Jtin¼lhtn. ~- Cf}. 211.;i,.~ 
CHAM!IE RS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 20, 1986 
Re: 85-499 - Papasan v. Allain 
Dear Bill: 





Copies to the Conference 
', ,. 
CMAM!IERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.l'iqtftmt (1+4tUrl d tltt ~ttittb ~taus 
-.uJtiqton. ,. (1+. 2.llffe~, 
June 20, 1986 
Re: 85-499 - Papasan v. Allain 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in Parts I, and III of your 
opinion. Frankly, I could also join Part II(C), but 
since I am joining what Bill Brennan has written, it 









Rider A, p. 1 (Papasan) 
Memo to Cabell: 
The second sentence in our 
difficult for a slow reader like me. 
it substantially as follows: 
opinion is a bit 
I suggest we change 
Statistics from the State Board of Education show the 
statewide ranking of school districts in terms of 
expenditures per pupil. The Chickasaw Cession districts, 
in this ranking, are scattered widely among the state's 
154 school districts. Moreover, far from bei.ng a 
"critical element of school funding in Mississippi", as 
alleged by petitioners, the Cession lands account account 
for less than one and a half percent of overall funds 
provided for schools. See Tables A and B, ante, p. 7-13. 
.i1t.JJUtttt Clf 1turi 1tf t4t ~th ,jtzdtg 
jht1tftittghnt. ~- C!f. 2llffe~~ 
C HAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 24, 1986 
Re: 85-499 - Papasan v. Allain 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
lfp/ss 06/25/86 PA SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Cabell DATE: June 24, 1986 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
85-499 Papasan v. Mississippi 
The changes you have made for a third draft -
particularly the "riders" - are excellent. 
I regret to say, however, that I believe further 
changes are necessary. A rereading (more closely) of 
BRW' s opinion persuades me that we have not met "fairly 
and squarely" the Court's position and reasoning. You 
were right in reminding me that the Court does not 
consider the "minimally adequate education" question, and 
indeed states it is unnecessary to consider it. P. 19. 
Rather, the Court reduces the equal protection issue (as 
your riders recognize) to the sole claim that the funding 
for the Sixteenth Section Lands is invalid. The Court's 
reasoning is along the following lines: The Sixteenth 
Section and Lieu Lands funds are distributed by the State; 
that absent a rational basis for the "disparities" in the 
distribution, there would be a denial of equal protection. 
(See particularly p. 20-22). 
The Court distinguishes Rodriguez on the ground 
that the differential financing among districts in that 
case was traceable to local real estate taxation, while in 
this case the complaint alleges that the State itself 
"divides State resources unequally among school 
districts." (p. 22). On remand, the courts below will be 
required only to consider whether there is a rational 
basis for this State action. I think the Court is dead 
wrong. 
The allegations of the complaint upon which the 
Court bases its equal protection holding are as follows: 
"[T]he state is distributing the income from 
the Sixteenth Section Lands or from Lieu Lands 
or funds unequally among the school districts, 
to the detriment to the Chickasaw Cession 
schools and their students." P. 21. 
The Court, in discussing these allegations, and 
in distinguishing Rodriguez, apparently holds that "a 
state decision to divide state resources unequally among 
school districts" would be invalid in the absence of it 
meeting the rationale basis standard of the Equal 
Protection Clause, pp. 21,22. On two grounds, the Court is 
wrong. First as you have ably demonstrated the 
"differential financing" here is de minimis, and no facts 
are alleged in support of the claim that this state action 
has adversely affected "schools and their students" in the 
state of Mississippi. Secondly, and perhaps more 
fundamentally, I do not believe the Equal Protection 
-~~fU1...~~f~~c~ 
Clause properly may be applied /\ to the decisi6n df state 
authorities with respect to the allocation of state funds 
among school district~ he needs of districts vary, and 
a state must have discretion to take these needs into 
consideration. It so happens in this case that the minor 
disparity would not in any event give rise to a 
constitutional violation. Moreover, the Court cites no 





lfp/ss 06/24/86 Papasan 
PAPR SALLY-POW 
What about adding a response to Justice White along the 
following lines: 
The Court's response to this dissent is that 
petitioners "have limited themselves to challenging 
discrimination in the Sixteenth Section" ~ ~ 
Therefore, the Court "decline[s] the dissent's invitation 
to look at school receipts overall." Ante, n. 17, at 22. 
The Court finds this a comzsnient way te ignorr the 
~~~ 
facts (.see tables I ana rr attaeRs~ 
the funding of public education in the state of 
~t- 1e,.b~ A ~ B..) aJ 
Mississippi) l-t1 ~e.Iy, a!! -shown e.bo·v1~ T.e Cout=t 
-J-tm.,....., 
'\ 
bases its equal protection analysis on ~s tf:i.a.fi one and a 
2. 
half percent of the overall funds provided for public 
school education in the state. The funding ~i~ Gtrl.cR"cr-
many states, depending upon local ad valoren taxes, and 
other district sources. See Table II. See also San 
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, at -- The 
Equal Protection Clause, at least in the context of a 
state funding of schools, is concerned with substance, not 
with th ariations of funding among the 
~ 
districts. This variation~ is evident among the Chickasaw 
Cession District~ some of which have per pupil 
. s 
expenditure in excess of the state average and others are 
I\ 
below the average. See Table A. 
CCC 
No. 85-499, Papasan v. Allain 
Attached is a copy of the latest draft of your dis-
sent, not yet circulated, with some minor modifications in 
answer to Justice White's changes. I would like your reac--
tion to these additional changes, and then I will incorporate 
them into a new second draft that I will then circulate. 
Your dissent remains largely unchanged, except to 
amplify the point that here, like in Rodriguez, the ad valo-
rem taxes account for the differences 1n the school funding, 
and these taxes are set at the local level. I have not stat-
ed the point as baldly (or boldly) in the dissent as I have 
here because we have only aggregate, and not district-by-
district, figures to support the assertion. I recommend 
keeping the Rodriguez argument in a footnote for the same 
reason, and also because it is true that the only difference - ------. between Texas and Mississippi (the Sixteenth Section funds) 
is precisely the difference petitioners are complaining of in 
their admittedly myopic complaint, thus possibly leaving law 
review er i tics to charge that the Rodriguez argument simply 
restates the question without answering it). I nevertheless 
think that the Rodriguez argument is worth making: (i) your -interpretation of Rodriguez, as its author, should be aired: 
~nd (ii) after one has cleared away any muddied waters, it is 
~ 
clear that the differences here are largely the result of 
page 2. 
that are, under Rodriguez, no basis for an EP 
cla 
June 24, 1986: 12:15 PM Cabell Circ. Mem. 
.,, 
lfp/ss 06/25/86 PA SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Cabell DATE: June 24, 1986 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
85-499 Papasan v. Mississippi 
The changes you have made for a third draft -
particularly the "riders" - are excellent. 
I regret to say, however, that I believe further 
changes are necessary. A rereading (more closely) of 
BRW' s opinion persuades me that we have not met "fairly 
and squarely" the Court's position and reasoning. You 
were right in reminding me that the Court does not 
consider the "minimally adequate education" question, and 
indeed states it is unnecessary to consider it. P. 19. 
Rather, the Court reduces the equal protection issue (as 
your riders recognize) to the sole claim that the funding 
for the Sixteenth Section Lands is invalid. The Court's 
reasoning is along the following lines: The Six teen th 
Section and Lieu Lands funds are distributed by the State~ 
that absent a rational basis for the "disparities" in the 
distribution, there would be a denial of equal protection. 
(See particularly p. 20-22). 
2. 
The Court distinguishes Rodriguez on the ground 
that the differential financing among districts in that 
case was traceable to local real estate taxation, while in 
this case the complaint alleges that the State itself 
"divides State resources unequally among school 
districts." (p. 22). On remand, the courts below will be 
required only to consider whether there is a rational 
basis for this State action. I think the Court is dead 
wrong. 
The allegations of the complaint upon which the 
Court bases its equal protection holding are as follows: 
"[T]he state is distributing the income from 
the Sixteenth Section Lands or from Lieu Lands 
or funds unequally among the school districts, 
to the detriment to the Chickasaw Cession 
schools and their students." P. 21. 
The Court, in discussing these allegations, and 
in distinguishing Rodriguez, apparently holds that "a 
state decision to divide state resources unequally among 
school districts" would be invalid in the absence of it 
meeting the rationale basis standard of the Equal 
Protection Clause, pp. 21,22. On two grounds, the Court is 
wrong. First as you have ably demonstrated the 
"differential financing" here is de minimis, and no facts 
3. 
are alleged in support of the claim that this state action 
has adversely affected "schools and their students" in the 
state of Mississippi. Secondly, and perhaps more 
fundamentally, I do not believe the Equal Protection 
Clause properly may be applied to the decision of state 
authorities with respect to the allocation of state funds 
among school districts. The needs of districts vary, and 
a state must have discretion to take these needs into 
consideration. It so happens in this case that the minor 
disparity would not in any event give rise to a 
constitutional violation. Moreover, the Court cites no 





JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
i\ttprtmt Q1onrl of tlt.t ~b ~tat.ts 
._ul{ington. ~- Q1. 2D.;iJl., 
Re: No. 85-499, Papasan v. Allain 
Dear Bill: 
June 26, 1986 
Although I, too, am writing separately, would you 
please join me in your separate writing in this case. 
Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
=A 
.inprmu <qouri d ut~ 1btUth ~talte 
._.ite.lfington. ~- <q. 2.llffeJl.~ 
CHAM!l~S 01' 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
Re: No. 85-499, Papasan v. Allain 
Dear Bill: 
Although I, too, am writing separately, would you 
please join me in your separate writing in this case. 
Justice Brennan 




85-499 Papasan v. Mississippi (Mike) 
BRW for the Court 5/5/86 
1st draft 5/30/86 
2nd draft 6/24/86 
3rd draft 6/25/86 
Joined by SOC 5/30/86 
JPS joins Parts I, and III 6/20/86 
WJB concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part 
1st draft 6/11/86 
2nd draft 6/16/86 
3rd draft 6/23/86 
4th draft 6/24/86 
5th draft 6/27/86 




1st draft 6/20/86 
2nd draft 6/27/86 
3rd draft 6/30/86 
Joined by WHR 6/24/86 
CJ 6/24/86 
HAB concurring in part and dissenting in part 
1st draft 6/27/86 
LFP will dissent 6/2/86 
HAB awaiting dissent 6/16/86 
HAB will write separately 6/26/86 
\ 
.....___ __ _ 
To: The Chief Justice 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1986] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, we consider the claims of school officials and J 
schoolchildren in 23 Northern Mississippi counties that they /L. ~ 
are being unlawfully denied the economic benefits of public 
1
,... ~ .. _ , /1. . 
school lands granted by the United States to the State of Mis- ...., ~ - J/ ~ 
sissippi well over 100 years ago. Specifically, we must de-
termine to what extent these claims are barred by the Elev- ~ ~ ~-
enth Amendment and, with respect to those claims that are c~ ~ 
not barred, if any, wh~ ber the complaint is sufficient to / 
withstand a motion to-dismiss for failure t o state-aclaim~ t...u-,_L,,l, ~ ~~------· ~---- - .. ------.. 
I ~ ~ 
The history of public school lands in the United States ~ 
stretches back over 200 years. 1 Even before the ratification 
of the Constitution, the Congress of the Confederation initi- -----
1 Although this case comes to us on a motion to dismiss under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), we are notpreclude m' our review of the 
complaint from taking notice of items in the- ublic record , such as docu-
mentation of the history of theMississippi and other school lands grants. 
The historical facts recited here comprise in large part the factual allega-
tions of the complaint and are not disputed by the parties; the parties dis-
agree only on the legal significance of these facts. 
2 
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ated a practice with regard to the Northwest Territory 2 
which was followed with most other public lands that eventu-
ally became States and were admitted to the Union. In par-
ticular, the Land Ordinance of 1785, which provided for the 
survey and sale of the Northwest Territory, "reserved the lot 
No. 16, of every township, for the maintenance of public 
schools within the said township ... " 1 Laws of the United 
States 565 (1815). 3 In 1802, when the eastern portion of the 
Northwest Territory became what is now the State of Ohio, 
Congress granted Ohio the lands that had been previously re-
served under the 1785 Ordinance for the use of public schools 
in the State. 2 Stat. 175. 4 
' The Northwest Territory, obtained by the United States by virtue of 
cessions of western land claims from the original 13 States, included the 
land south of Canada, north of the Ohio River, east of the Mississippi 
River, and west of the original States. P. Gates, History of Public Land 
Law Development 72 (1968). 
3 The Land Ordinance of 1785 initiated a land-surveying practice that 
was first applied to the Northwest Territory but that was applied to all ter-
ritories acquired by the United States thereafter. 
"At the point where the Ohio River crosses the Pennsylvania border, a 
north-south line-a principal meridian-was to be run and a base line west-
ward-the geographer's line-was to be surveyed; parallel lines of longi-
tude and latitude were to be surveyed, each to be 6 miles apart, making for 
townships of 36 square miles or 23,040 acres. . . . Each township was to 
be divided into lots of one mile square containing 640 acres." P. Gates, 
supra note 2, at 65. 
Each of these one-square-mile lots was called a "section," so the section 
numbered sixteen, reserved for the public schools, was the "Sixteenth 
Section." 
' The precise reasons for this practice are somewhat unclear, but it 
seems likely that they were a combination of an overall practice of encour-
aging education, a congressional desire to accelerate the disposition of 
western lands at a higher price, and a policy of trying to put the public-
lands States on some sort of a par with the original States in terms of tax-
able property since federal land, a large portion of the new States, was not 
taxable by them. See generally Andrus v. Utah, 446 U. S. 500, 522, 523 
(1980) (POWELL, J., dissenting); P. Gates, supra note 2, at 288-289; B. 
Hibbard, A History of the Public Land Policies 309-311 (1939). 
85-499-0PINION 
PAP ASAN v. MISSISSIPPI 3 
Following the Ohio example of reserving lands for the 
maintenance of public schools, "'grants were made for com-
mon school purposes to each of the public-land States admit-
ted to the Union. Between the years of 1802 and 1846 the 
grants were of every section sixteen, and, thereafter, of sec-
tions sixteen and thirty-six. In some instances, additional 
sections have been granted."' Andrus v. Utah, 446 U. S. 
500, 506, n. 7 (1980) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 240 
U. S. 192, 198 (1916) (footnotes omitted)). Thus, the basic 
I 
Ohio example has been followed with respect to all but a few 
of the States admitted since then. Id., at 522-523, n. 4 
(POWELL, J., dissenting). In addition to the school lands 
designated in this manner, Congress made provision for 
townships in which the pertinent section or sections were not 
available for one reason or another. Thus, Congress gener-
ally indemnified States for the missing designated sections, 
allowing the States to select lands in an amount equal to and 
in lieu of the designated but unavailable lands. See, e. g., 4 
Stat. 179 (1826). See generally Andrus v. Utah, 446 U. S., 
at 507-508; Morrison, 240 U. S., at 200-202. 
Although the basic pattern of school lands grants was gen-
erally consistent from State to State in terms of the reserva-
tion and grant of the lands, the specific provisions of the 
grants varied by State and over time. See generally B. 
Hibbard, A History of the Public Land Policies 314-318 
(1939). For example, in Indiana and Alabama, the school 
lands were expressly granted to the inhabitants of the town-
ships directly. See 3 Stat. 290 (1816) (Indiana); 3 Stat. 491 
(1819) (Alabama). 5 In most of the other grants before 1845, 
the school lands were given instead to the States but were 
explicitly designated to be for the use of the townships in 
which they lay. See, e.g., 2 Stat. 234 (1803) (Mississippi); 3 
• At least in Alabama, however, this technical grant of the lands to the 
inhabitants of each township was apparently interpreted as vesting legal 
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Stat. 375 (1817) (same); 5 Stat. 58 (1836) (Arkansas). The 
Michigan grant in 1836, on the other hand, was simply "to the 
State for the use of schools." See 5 Stat. 59. After 1845, 
the type of grant used in Michigan, granting the lands to the 
State for the use of its schools generally, became the norm. 
See, e. g., 9 Stat. 58 (1846) (Wisconsin); 11 Stat. 383 (1859) 
(Oregon). Finally, the most recent grants are phrased not 
as outright gifts to the States for a specific use but instead as 
express trusts. These grants also are stated to be to the 
States for the support of the schools in those States gener-
ally. In addition, though, under these grants the State is 
specifically designated a trustee, there are explicit restric-
tions on the management and disposition of the lands in trust, 
and the Federal Government expressly retains an ongoing 
oversight responsibility. See, e. g., 36 Stat. 574 (1910) (Ari-
zona and New Mexico). 
The history of the school lands grants in Mississippi gener-
ally follows the pattern thus described. In 1978, Congress 
created the Mississippi Territory, which included what is now 
about the southern third of the States of Mississippi and Ala-
bama. Stat. 549. In 1803, Congress provided for the sale 
and survey of all Mississippi Territory lands to which Indian 
title had been extinguished but excepted "the section number 
sixteen, which shall be reserved in each township for the sup-
port of schools within the same." 2 Stat. 233-234. In 1804, 
the Mississippi Territory was extended northward to the 
southern boundary of Tennessee. 2 Stat. 305. Two years 
later, Congress authorized the selection of lands in lieu of un-
available Sixteenth Sections in the Territory. 2 Stat. 401 
(1806). Eventually, in 1817, Mississippi was admitted as a 
State, and a further Land Sales Act provided for the survey 
and sale of those lands in the northern part of the new State 
that had not been covered by the 1803 Act. The 1817 Act 
provided that these lands were to be "surveyed and divided 
in the manner provided by law for the surveying of the other 
public lands of the United States in the Mississippi territory;" 
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thus, the Act required that "the section No. 16 in each town-
ship . . . shall be reserved for the support of schools therein." 
3 Stat. 375 (1817). The Sixteenth Section lands and lands se-
lected in lieu therof were granted to the State of Mississippi. 
See Lambert v. State, 211 Miss. 129, 137 (1951). 
f 
By their own terms, however, these Acts did not apply to ~ t /. ~ J /. ~" 
the lands in northern Mississippi that were held by the C~ -
asaw In ·~ on, an area essentially comprising what"'"'\ r-t> , 
cam e to be the northern 23 counties in the State. This land ~ 
was held by the Chickasaws until 1832, when it was ceded to 
the United States by the Treaty of Pontotoc Creek. 7 Stat. 
381. Although that Treaty provided that the land would be 
surveyed and sold "in the same manner and on the same 
terms and conditions as the other public lands," id., at 382, no r iA-tJ I b, 1:-l_. 
Sixteenth Section lands were · reserved from sale. City"oT° 
Corin v. ertson, 1ss. , 1 1 . In 1836, Con- $~~ 
gress attempted to remedy this oversight by providing for 
the reservation of lands in lieu of the Sixteenth Section lands 
and for the vesting of the title to these lands "in the State of 
Mississippi, for the use of schools within [the Chickasaw Ces-
sion] in said State." 5 Stat. 116. These Chickasaw Cession 
Lieu Lands, some 174,555 acres, App. at 36, were selected 
and given to the State. In 1856, however, with authority ex-
pressly given by Congress, 10 Stat. 6 (1852), th~ State Legis-
lature sold these lands and invested the proceeds, appi-oxi-
mate1y$1,047;330, App. at 36, in 8% loans to the State's 
railroads. 1856 Miss. Laws Ch. L VI. These railroads and 
the State's investment in them, unfortunately, were subse-
quently destroyed during the Civil War and never replaced. 
From these historical circumstances, the current practice 
in Mississippi with regard to Sixteenth Section lands has 
evolved directly. Under state law, these lands, which are 
still apparently held in large part by the State, "constitute 
property held in trust for the benefit of the public schools and 
mus~ such." Miss. Code Ann. §29-3-1(1) 
(Supp. 1985). In providing for the operation of these trusts, 
6 
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the Legislature has retained the historical tie of these lands 
"----~ 
to particulartowns ips in terms of bot rus a m1~stration 
ancl._~eneifcI~ y-stetus.- · Tnus:-the tatehas delegated the 
management of this property to local school boards through-
out the State: Where Sixteenth Section lands lie within a 
school district or where Lieu Lands were originally appropri-
ated for a township that lies within a school district, the 
board of education of that district has "control and jurisdic-
tion of said school trust lands and of all funds arising from any 
disposition thereof heretofore or hereafter made." Id. In 
this respect, the board of education is "under the general su-
pervision of th~ school land commissioner." Id. 6 Further, 
the State has, by statute, set forth certain prescriptions for 
the management .of these lands. See generally Miss. Code 
Ann. §§ 29-3-1 to 29-3-135. Most important for purposes of 
this case, however, is Miss. Cod~ which 
provides: 
"All expendable fu:Q_ds derived from sixteenth section or 
lieu lands shall Ee credited to the school districts of the 
township in wh1c such sixteen section lands may be 
located, or to which any sixteenth sections lieu lands 
may belong. Such funds shall not be expended except 
for the purpose o~ n of t e e uca le c il ren of 
the school district to which ~ wise 
may be provided by law." 
Consequently, all proceeds from Sixteenth Section and Lieu 
Lands are allocated directly to the specific township in which 
these lands are located or to which those lands apply. With 
respect to the Chickasaw Cession counties, to which no lands 
now belong, the State Legislature has for over 100 years paid 
"interest" on the lost prfnc1pa acquir~ose 
la~ the forrif~ iations to the Chickasaw 
6 Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 7-11-4, effective January l , 1980, the 
words "school land commissioner" mean "secretary of state." See Miss. 
Code Ann. § 29-3-1 (note) (Supp. 1985). 
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Cession schools. Originally, the rate was 8%, but since 1890 
the rate has been 6%. See Miss. Const. Art. III, § 212 
(1890). The annual amount until 1985 was $62,191. App. at 
37. 
The result of this dual treatment has for many years been a 
dis2._a.9.~y in the level of school funds from Sixteenth Section 
lands t at are available to the Chickasaw Cession schools as 
compared to the schools in the remainder of the State. In 
1984, for example, the legislative appropriation for the Chick-
asaw Cession resulted in an estimated average per pupil in-
come relative to the Sixteenth Section substitute appropria-
1 
tion of $.63 per pupil. The average Sixteenth Section 
income in the rest of the State, in comparison, was estimated 
to be $75.34 per pupil. App. at 44. 7 It is this disparity 
which gave rise to the present action. 
In 1981, the petitioners, local school officials and schoolchil-
dren from the Chickasaw Cession, filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi 
against the respondents, an assortment of state officials, 
challenging the disparity in Sixteenth Section funds. The 
petitioners' complaint traced the history of public school 
lands in Mississippi; characterizing as illegal several of the 
actions that resulted in there being now no Sixteenth Section 
lands in the Chickasaw Cession area. In particular, the peti-
tioners asserted that the sale of the Chickasaw Cession 
school lands and unwise investment of the proceeds from that 
7 In 1985, while this case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the State 
Legislature passed a statute providing for increased Sixteenth Section 
appropriations for the Chickasaw Cession schools. 1985 Miss. Laws 27 
Ch. XXIII. Under this statute, $1 million was to be appropriated for this 
purpose in 1985, and this amount was to increase by $1 million each year 
until it reached a maximum of $5 million for the fiscal year 1989-1990 and 
thereafter. Even so, the offices of the Mississippi State Auditor and See-
l 
retary of State estimated in 1984 that additional funds of over $7 million 
would be required to bring the Chickasaw Cession funding to the level of 
the average Sixteenth Section funding in the rest of the State on a per-
pupil basis. App. at 38. 
8 
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sale in the 1850's had abrogated the State's trust obligation to 
hold those lands for the benefit of Chickasaw Cession school-
children in perpetuity. The result of these actions, said the 
petitioners, was the disparity between the financial support 
available to the Chickasaw Cession schools and other schools 
in the State, which disparity in turn allegedly deprived the 
Chickasaw Cession schoolchildren of a minimally adequate 
level of education and of the equal protection of the laws. 
Based on these allegations, the petitioners sought various 
forms of relief for breach of the trust regarding the Chicka-
saw Cession Sixteenth Section lands and for denial of equal 
protection. 8 Specifically, the complaint sought a declaration 
that the state legislation purporting to implement the sale of 
the Chickasaw Cession school lands was void and unenforce-
able; the establishment by legislative appropriation or other-
wise of a fund in a suitable amount to be held in perpetual 
trust for the benefit of Plaintiffs; or in the alternative making 
available to Plaintiffs lieu lands of the same value as the origi-
nal Chiskasaw Cession Sixtenth Section lands. 
The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding the 
claims barredbythe applicable statute of limitations and by 
the Ele,venth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
ThevCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 756 F. 
2d 1087 (1985), agreeing that the relief requested in the com-
plaint was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Noting 
that a federal court should not dismiss a constitutional com-
plaint because it "seeks one remedy rather than another 
plainly appropriate one." Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 
439 U. S. 60, 65 (1978), however, the Court of Appeals 
8 The complaint also alleged a denial of due process, unconstitutional im-
pairment of contractual obligations, a taking without just compensation, 
and a Ninth Amendment claim. Of these additional claims, the petitioners 
press only the contract-clause claim here. Since this claim is in all essen-
tial respects the same as the petitioners' trust claim for Eleventh Amend-
ment purposes, our disposition of the trust claim, infra, governs this claim 
as well. 
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deemed the Equal Protection claim to assert a current ongo-
ing and disparate distribution of state funds for the support 
of local schools, the remedy for which would not be barred by ) 
the Eleventh Amendment. Even so, it found dismissal of 
the complaint to be proper since such differential funding was 
not unconstitutional under the Co~SanAnto-
nio Independent Sc ool odriguez, 411 U. S. 1 
(1973). 9 
We granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1985), and now va-
cate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for 
further proceedings. 
II 
We first consider whether the Eleventh Amendment bars 
the petitioners' claims and required dismissal of the 
complaint. 
A 
The Amendment provides: 
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects 
of any Foreign State." 
This lan~e expressly encompasses only suits brought 
against a State by -te-;'but th"iseourt 
longagolie!cI1,hat the Amendment bars suits against a State 
by citizens of that same State as well. See Hans v. Louisi-
ana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890). "[l]n the absence of consent a suit 
in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is 
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh 
9 In their complaint, the petitioners also sought relief from various fed-
eral officials, alleging breach of a promise to fund the Chickasaw Cession 
trust and failure to keep the State of Mississippi from wasting the trust 
assets. The District Court dismissed these claims as barred by sovereign 
immunity, !aches, and the statutes of limitations. The petitioners' appeal 
from this dismissal was itself dismissed by joint stipulation. Thus, no is-
sues involving the federal defendants remain in the case. 
10 
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Amendment." Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman, 465 U.-S:-- 89, 100 (1984). 10 This bar exists 
whether the relief sought is legal or equitable. Id., at 
100-101. 
Where the State itself or one of its agencies or depart-
ments is not named as defendant and where a State official !§ 
named instead, the Elevent11--A:mtffi€1~uit status of the suit is 
le~forward. x parte You 209 U. S. 123 (1908), 
held that a suit to enJ · nconstitutional a state official's 
action was not barred by the Amendment. This holding was 
based on a determination that an unconstitutional state en-
actment is void and that any action by a state official that is 
purportedly authorized by that enactment cannot be taken in 
an official capacity since the state authorization for such ac-
tion is a nullity. As the Court explained in Young itself: 
"If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to en-
force be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the offi-
cer proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict 
with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he 
is in that case stripped of his official or representative 
character and is subjected in his person to the conse-
quences of his individual conduct. The State has no 
power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility 
to the supreme authority of the United States." Id., at 
159-160. 
Thus, the official, although acting in his official capacity, may 
be sued in federal court. See also Pennhurst, supra, 465 
U. S., at 102, 105; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 692 
(1978). 
Young, however, does not insulate from Eleventh Amend-
ment challenge every suit in which a state official is the 
named defendant. In accordance with its original rationale, 
10 A State may consent to be sued in federal court. Clark v. Barnard, 
108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883). Here, however, it is clear that Mississippi has 
expressly declined such consent. See 1984 Miss. Laws ch. 495, § 3(4). 
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Y our;r applies onJy_ where the underlying authQrization upon 
whic the named officialactsis asserted to be illegar. See 
Cory v. ~ . ( 2). does not orec ose an 
Eleventh Amendment challenge where the official action is 
asserted to be illegal as a matter of state law alone. See 
Pennhurst, supra, 465 U. S., at 104-106. In such a case, 
federal supremacy is not implicated because the state official 
is acting contrary to state law only. 
We have also described certain types of cases that formally 
meet the Young requirements of a state official acting incon-
sistently with federal law but that stretch that case too far 
and would upset the balance of federal and state interests 
that it embodies. Young's applicability has been tailored to 
conform as precisely as possible to those specific situations in 
which it is "necessary to permit the federal courts to vindi-
cate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to 'the 
supreme authority of the United States."' Pennhurst, 
supra, 465 U. S., at 105 (quoting Young, supra, 209 U. S., at 
160). Consequently, Young has been focused on cases in 
which a violation of federal law by a state . official is ongoing 
as opposed to cases in which federal law has been violated at 
one time or over a period of time in the past, as well as on 
cases in which the relief against the state official directly 
ends the violation of federal law as opposed to cases in which 
that relief is intended indirectly to encourage compliance 
with federal law through deterrence or directly to meet 
third-party interests such as compensation. As we have 
noted, "Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of 
federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in 
assuring the supremacy of that law. But compensatory or 
deterrence interests are insufficient to overcome the dictates 
of the Eleventh Amendment." Green v. Mansour, --
U.S. - , - (1985). 
Relief that in essence serves to compensate a party injured 
in the past by an action of a state official in his official capac-
ity that was illegal under federal law is barred even when the 
12 
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state official is the named defendant. 11 This is true if the re-
lief is expressly denominated as damages. See, e. g., Ford 
Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 (1945). 
It is also true if the relief is tantamount to an award of dam-
ages for a past violation of federal law, even though styled as 
something else. See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, supra, --
U. S., at-; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 664-668 
(1974). On the other hand, relief that serves directly to 
bring an end to a present violation of federal law is not barred 
by the Eleventh Amendment even though accompanied by a 
substantial ancillary effect on the state treasury. See 
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 289-290 (1977); 
Edelman, supra, 415 U. S., at 667-668. 
For Eleventh Amendment purposes, the line between per-
mitted and prohibited suits will of ten be in~ dif-
ference e ween e ype of relief barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment and that permitted under Ex parte Young will 
not in many instances be that between day and night." 
Edelman, supra, 415 U. S., at 667. Compare, e.g., Quern 
v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), with Green v. Mansour, 
supra. In discerning on which side of the line a particular 
case falls, we look to the substance rather than to the form of 
the relief sought, see, e.g., Edelman, supra, 415 U. S., at 
668, and will be guided by the policies underlying the decision 
in Ex parte Young. 
B 
Petitioners claim that the federal grants of school lands to 
the State of Mississippi created a p~al!rust, with the 
State as trustee, for the benefit of fne puoHcschools. Rely-
ing on Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U. S. 295 
(1976), and Lassen v. Arizona, 385 U. S. 458 (1967), the peti-
tioners contend that "[s]chool lands trusts impose specific 
burdens and obligations on the states, as well as the state of-
11 When a state official is sued and held liable in his individual ca£_acity, 
however, even damages may be awarded. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 
u. s. 232, 237-238 (1974). 
I 
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ficials who act as trustees, which include preserving the cor-
pus, maximizing income, and, where the corpus is lost or con-
verted wrongfully, continuing the payment of appropriate 
income indefinitely." Brief for petitioners, at 13. The idea 
that this last obligation exists is gleaned not from any prior 
judicial construction of school lands grants but instead from 
alleged federal common law rules that purportedly govern 
such trusts. The petitioners rely on this asserted continuing 
obligation in contending that they seek only a prospective, in-
junctive remedy, permissible under Ex parte Young, requir-
ing state officials to meet that continuing federal obligation 
by providing the Chickasaw Cession schools with appropriate 
trust income. 
To begin with, it is not at all clear that the s.chool lands 
grants to Mississi pi created a binding trust. The respond---. .,._---~--....----::----:~ 
ents, in act, conten that the school lands were given to the 
State in fee simple absolute and that no binding federal ob-
ligation was imposed. See Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 U. S. 
168 (1913); Cooperv. Roberts, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 173 (1856). 12 
12 Even if there was a binding trust, the petitioners point to no authority 
relating specifically to school lands trusts in support of their contention 
that the obligation to pay income continues even though the trust corpus 
has been lost. See Brief for Petitioners, at 24-28. In addition, even their 
assertion that such an obligation should be imposed as a matter of common 
law is unsupported. It may be true that a trust beneficiary is not normally 
time-barred from suing a trustee for breach of trust and loss of the corpus 
until such time as the trustee expressly repudiates the trust. See, e.g., 
Benedict v. New York, 250 U. S. 321, 327 (1918). But this does not mean 
that there is a continuing affirmative obligation on the part of the trustee 
with respect to the trust corpus and income as opposed to merely liability 
for a past breach of trust that may still be acted upon. 
The Restatement, for example, seems to adopt the latter view: 
"If a trust is created and the whole of the trust property ceases to exist, 
the trustee no longer holds anything in trust. In such a case the trustee is 
under a personal liability to the beneficiary if he committed a breach of 
trust in causing or allowing the trust property to cease to exist, or if he sold 
the trust property to himself or lent trust funds to himself, being permitted 
to do so by the terms of the trust. In such a case if the trustee should be 
14 
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But even if petitioners' legal characterization is accepted, 
their trust claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 
The distinction between a continuing obligation on the part of 
the trustee and an ongoing liability for past breach of trust is 
essentially a formal distinction of the sort we rejected in 
Edelman. There, the Court of Appeals had upheld an 
award of "equitable restitution" against the state official, re-
quiring the payment to the plaintiff class of "all AABD bene-
fits wrongfully withheld." 415 U. S., at 656. We found, to 
the contrary, that the "retroactive award of monetary relief 
. . . is in practical effect indistinguishable in many aspects 
from an award of damages against the State." Id., at 668. 
The characterization in that case of the legal wrong as the 
continuing withholding of accrued benefits is very similar to 
the petitioners' characterization of the legal wrong here as 
the breach of a continuing obligation to comply with the trust 
obligations. We discern no substantive difference between a 
not-yet-extinguished liability for a past breach of trust and 
the continuing obligation to meet trust responsibilities as-
serted by the petitioners. In both cases, the trustee is re-
quired, because of the past loss of the trust corpus, to use its 
own resources to take the place of the corpus or the lost in-
come from the corpus. Even if the petitioners here were 
seeking only the payment of an amount equal to the income 
from the lost corpus, 13 such payment would be merely a sub-
insolvent the beneficiary is not entitled to priority over the general credi-
tors of the trustee. This does not mean, however, that he owes no duties 
to the beneficiary except the duties which a debtor owes to his creditor, or 
a tortfeasor to the person he has wronged. He is still in a fiduciary rela-
tion to the beneficiary. He cannot properly purchase the interest of the 
beneficiary without making full disclosure of all circumstances known to 
him affecting the transaction, and the transaction must be fair, or the bene-
ficiary can set it aside." Restatement Second of the Law of Trusts, 194, 
§ 74 comment c (1959) (citations omitted). 
13 In fact, the petitioners sought not merely such income but also restora-
tion of the trust corpus and the award of past income not received and in-
terest on that income. App. at 28-29. 
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stitute for the return of the trust corpus itself. That is, con-
tinuing payment of the income from the lost corpus is essen-
tially equivalent in economic terms to a one-time restoration 
of the lost corpus itself: It is in substance the award, as con-
tinuing income rather than as a lump sum, of "'an ace.rued 
monetary liability."' Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 
289 (1977) (quoting Edelman, supra, 415 U. S., at 664. 
Thus, we hold that the petitioners' trust claim, like the claim 
we rejectea in Edelman, may not besustained. 
C 
The Court of Appeals held, however, that petitioners' 
equal protection claim was ~t ba~d by t~e ~eventh 
Amendment. We a e with t at ruling. T e complaint 
asserted: 
"By their aforesaid past, present and future deprivations 
of and to Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff class of the use and 
benefits of their Sixteenth Section Lands, while at the 
same time granting to and securing to all other school 
districts and school children in the State of Mississippi in 
perpetuity the use and benefit of their Sixteenth Section 
Lands, the State Defendants have deliberatel~en-
tionally, purposefully, and with ~ to Plain-
tiffs an t e aint1 c"""a_s_s-.-t_e_e~q-u""'ar-rotecticm of the 
laws rnv10 at10n o their righ secure by the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States." App. at 20. 
The petitioners also alleged that these same actions denied 
them "their rights to an interes~~ly ~deg~ate 
level of education, or re sonab e opportunity therefor," id., 
at 21, while assuring such right to the other schoolchildren in 
the State. Thus the complaint a~g~d -~ £!_'e@_ent ~dis~rit~ in 
the distribution of the benefits from the State's Sixteenth 
Section ands.~--~~ "- __ .,___ ~ ·i--- --, This ongoing constitutional violation-the unequal distri-








a remed ma;y: ~m~1 y be ashio-n ~ Young. ~ ~ 
may be that the current 1sparity resultsa1rectly from the /J 
same actions_ in the past that are the subject of the ~etition- , ~ · ·· - ~ ~ 
ers' trust claims, but the essence of the equal protect10n alle-
gation is th present disparit in the distribution o t e bene-~~ 
fits ~asse s an not the past actions of the State. 
A~ this cu1'rerit disparity, even a remedy / 
that might require the expenditure of state funds, would en-
sure "'compliance in the future with a substantive federal-
question determination'" rather than bestow an award for ac-
crued monetary liability. Milliken, supra, 433 U. S., at 289 
(quoting Edelman, supra 415 U. S., at 668). This claim is, 
in fact, in all essential respects the same as the equal protec-
tion claim for which relief was approved in Milliken. Conse-
quently, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Elev-
enth Amendment would not bar relief necessary to correct a 
current violation of the Equal Protection Clause and that this 
claim was not properly be dismissed on this basis. 14 
III 
The question remains whether the petitioners' equal pro-
tection claim, although not barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment, is legally insufficient and was properly dismissed for 
failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We 
are bound for the purposes of this review to take the well-
pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true. Miree 
v. DeKalb County, 433 U. S. 25 (1977); Kugler v. Helfant, 
421 U.S. 117 (1975); Scheuerv. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); 
"The respondents contend that the petitioners have not sued any state 
officials who could grant the relief requested, see Brief for Respondents 
17-19. We note, however, that respondent Secretary of State is, by state 
statute, responsible for "general supervision" of the administration by the 
local school officials of the Sixteenth Section and Lieu Lands. See Miss. 
Code Ann. § 29-3-1(1). To the extent that the respondent Secretary of 
State is acting in a manner that violates the Equal Protection Clause, such 
actions may be enjoined under Young. 
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Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319 (1972); Gardner v. Toilet Goods 
Ass'n, 387 U. S. 167 (1957). Construing these facts and rel-
evant facts obtained from the public record in the light most 
favorable to the petitioners, we must ascertain whether they 
state a claim on which relief could be granted. 
A 
In Rodriguez, supra, the Court upheld against an equal 
protection challenge Texas' system of financing its public 
schools, under which funds for the public schools were de-
rived from two main sources. Approximately half of the 
funds came from the Texas Minimum Foundation School Pro-
gram, a state program aimed at guaranteeing a certain level 
of minimum education for all children in the State. Id., at 9. 
Most of the remainder of the funds came from local sources-
in particular local property taxes. Id., n. 21. As a result of 
this dual funding system, most specifically as a result of dif-
ferences in amounts collected from local property taxes, "sub-
stantial interdistrict disparities in school expenditures [were] 
found . . . in varying degrees throughout the State." Id., at 
15. 
In examining the equal protection status of these dispari-
ties, the Court declined to apply any heightened scrutiny 
based either on wealth as a suspect classification or on educa-
tion as a fundamental right." As to the latter, the Court rec-
ognized the importance of public education but noted that 
education "is not among the rights afforded explicit protec-
tion under our Federal Constitution." Id., at 35. The 
Court did not, however, foreclose the possibility "that some 
identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally pro-
tected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either [the 
right to speak or the right to vote]." Id., at 36. 15 Given the 
1
• Instead, the Court noted: 
"[W]e have no indication that the present levels of education expendi-
tures in Texas provide an education that falls short [of such a hypothesized 
constitutional prerequisite]. Whatever merit appellees' argument might 
have if a State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educa-
18 
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absence of such radical denial of educational opportunity, it 
was concluded that the State's school financing scheme would 
be constitutional if it bore "some rational relationship to a le-
gitimate state purpose." Id., at 44. 
Applying this standard, the dual Texas system was 
deemed reasonably structured to accommodate two separate 
forces: 
"'the desire by members of society to have educational 
opportunity for all children, and the desire of each family 
to provide the best education it can afford for its own 
children.' ... While assuring a basic education for every 
child in the State, it permits and encourages a large 
measure of participation in and control of each district's 
schools at the local level." Id., at 49 (quoting J. Cole-
man, Foreword to G. Strayer & R. Haig, The Financing 
of Education in the State of New York vii (1923)). 
Given this rational basis, the Court concluded that the mere 
"happenstance" that the quality of education might vary from 
district to district because of varying property values within 
the districts did not render the system "so irrational as to be 
invidiously discriminatory." Id., at 55. In particular, the 
Court found that "any scheme of local taxation-indeed the 
very existence of identifiable local governmental units-re-
quires the establishment of jurisdictional boundaries that are 
inevitably arbitrary." Id., at 54. 
Almost ten years later, the Court again considered the 
equal protection status of the administration of the Texas 
public schools-this time in relation to the State's decision 
not to expend any state funds on the education of children 
tional opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no basis 
for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only relative dif-
ferences in spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the 
present case-no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to pro-
vide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimum skills nec-
essary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in 
the political process." Id., at 36-37. 
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who were not "legally admitted" to the United States. 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202 (1982). The Court did not, how-
ever, measurably change the approach articulated in Rodri-
guez. It reiterated that education is not a fundamental right 
and concluded that undocumented aliens were not a suspect 
class. Id., at 223-224. Nevertheless, it concluded that the 
justifications for the discrimination offered by the State were 
"wholly insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these 
children, the State, and the Nation." Id., at 230. 
B 
The complaint in this case asserted not simply that the pe-
titioners had been denied their right to a minimally adequate 
education but also that such a right was fundamental and that 
because that right had been infringed the State's action here 
should be reviewed under strict scrutiny. App. at 20. As 
Rodriguez and Plyler indicate, this Court has not yet defini-
tively settled the questions whether a minimally adequate 
education is a fundamental right and whether a statute al-
leged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be ac-
corded heightened equal protection review. 
Nor does this case require resolution of these issues. Al-
though for the purposes of this motion to dismiss we must 
take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we 
are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a 
factual allegation. See, e. g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F. 2d 
713, 723 (CA7 1981), aff'd on other grounds -- U. S. --
(1983). See generally 2A Moore's Federal Practice 12-64, 
and n. 6. Petitioners' allegation that, by reason of the fund-
ing disparities relating to the Sixteenth Section Lands, they 
have been deprived of a minimally adequate education is just 
such an allegation. Petitioners do not allege that schoolchil-
dren in the Chickasaw Counties are not taught to read or 
write; they do not allege that they receive no instruction on 
even the educational basics; they allege no actual facts in sup-
port of their assertion that they have been deprived of a mini-
20 
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mally adequate education. As we see it, we are not bound to 
credit and may disregard the allegation that petitioners have 
been denied a minimally adequate education. 
Concentrating instead on the disparities in terms of Six-
teenth Section Lands benefits that the complaint in fact al-
leged and that are documented in the public record, we are 
persuaded that the Court of Appeals properly determined 
that Rodriguez dictates the applicable standard of review. 
The differential treatment alleged here constitutes an equal 
protection violation only if it is not rationally related to a le-
gitimate state interest. 
Applying this test, the Court of Appeals concluded that, 
historical roots aside, the essence of the petitioners' claim 
was an attack on Mississippi's system of financing public edu-
cation. And it reasoned that the inevitability of disparities 
in income derived from real estate managed and administered 
locally, as in Rodriguez, supplied a rationale for the dispari-
ties alleged. We are unpersuaded, however, that Rodriguez 
resolves the equal protection question in favor of the State. 
The allegations of the complaint are that the State is distrib-
uting the income from Sixteenth Section lands or from lieu 
lands or funds unequally among the school districts, to the 
detriment of the Chickasaw Cession schools and their stu-
dents. The Sixteenth Section and Lieu Lands in Mississippi 
were granted to and held by the State itself. Under state 
law, these lands "constitute property held in trust for the 
benefit of the public schools and must be treated as such," 
Miss. Code Ann. § 29-3-1(1), but in carrying out the trust, 
the State has vested the management of these lands in the 
local school boards throughout the State, under the supervi-
sion of the Secretary of State, and has credited the income 
from these lands to the "school districts of the township in 
which such sixteenth section lands may be located, or to 
which any lieu lands may belong," such income to be used for 
the purpose of educating the children of the school district or 
as otherwise may be provided by law. Miss. Code Ann. 
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§ 29-3-109. This case is therefore very different from Ro-
driguez, where the differential financing available to school 
districts was traceable to school district funds available from 
local real estate taxation, not to a state decision to divide 
state resources unequally among school districts. The ratio-
nality of the disparity in Rodriguez, therefore, which rested 
on the fact that funding disparities based on differing local 
wealth were a necessary adjunct of allowing meaningful local 
control over school funding, does not settle the constitutional-
ity of disparities alleged in this case, and we differ with the 
Court of Appeals in this respect. 
Nevertheless, the question remains whether the variations 
in the benefits received by school districts from Sixteenth 
Section or Lieu Lands are, on the allegations in the complaint 
and as a matter of law, rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest. We believe, however, that we should not pursue 
this issue here but should instead remand the case for further 
proceedings. Neither the Court of Appeals nor the parties 
have addressed the Equal Protection as we think it is posed 
by this case: Given that the State has title to assets granted 
to it by the Federal Government for the use of the state's 
schools, does the Equal Protection Clause permit it to dis-
tribute the benefit of these assets unequally among the school 
districts as it now does? 
A crucial consideration in resolving this issue is whether 
the federal law requires the State to allocate the economic 
benefits of school lands to schools in the townships in which 
those lands are located. If, as a matter of Federal law, the 
State has no choice in the matter, whether the complaint 
states an equal protection claim depends on whether the fed-
eral policy is itself violative of the Clause. If it is, the State 
may properly be enjoined from implementing such policy. 
Contrariwise, if the Federal law is valid and the State is 
bound by it, then it provides a rational reason for the funding 
disparity. Neither the Courts below nor the parties have 
22 
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addressed the equal protection issue in these terms. 16 An-
other possible consideration in resolving the equal protection 
issue is that school lands require management and that the 
16 As to this question, we make only the following observations. The 
starting point of any consideration of this question must be the federal 
grants themselves, for it is clear that the interest transferred to the State 
depends on the federal laws that transferred that interest. See California 
ex rel. State Lands Commission v. United States, 457 U. S. 273, 279 (1982) 
(quoting Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10, 22 (1935). 
If the federal law provided for the transfer of an absolute fee interest, the 
lands are owned outright by the State. On the other hand, if the federal 
law created a trust with the State as trustee, the State is bound to comply 
with the terms of that trust. 
Each of these possible conclusions finds some support in this Court's 
prior cases. In Cooper v. Roberts, 59 U. S. (18 How.) 173, 181-182 (1855), 
for example, the Court approved the sale of school lands granted to the 
State of Michigan even where Congress had not expressly authorized such 
a sale, stating that "the grant is to the State directly, without limitation of 
its power, though there is a sacred obligation imposed on its public faith." 
The Court adopted this same reasoning in Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 U. S. 
168 (1914), in which the Court approved the application of Alabama's ad-
verse possession laws to school lands against an argument that the State's 
interest could not be extinguished in that manner under the terms of the 
grant and that when the lands were no longer used for the support of the 
schools title would revert to the United States. Relying on Cooper, the 
Court concluded that "[t]he gift to the State is absolute, although, no 
doubt, as said in Cooper, 'there is a sacred obligation imposed on its public 
faith.' But that obligation is honorary .... " Id., at 173-174 (citations 
omitted). See also Stuart v. Easton, 170 U. S. 383, 394 (1898) cited by the 
Court in Schmidt, 232 U.S., at 174) ("'the mere expression of a purpose 
will not of an by itself debase a fee'") (quoting Kerlin v. Campbell, 15 
Penn. St. 500 (1851)). Thus, the Court's interpretations of some of the 
earlier grants conceived of those grants as conveying a fee interest to the 
States. See also Brooks v. Koonce, 275 U. S. 486 (1927) (per curiam), 
aff'g Sloan v. Blythevill Special School Dist. No. 5, 273 S. W. 397 (Ark. 
1925) (relying on Cooper and Schmidt to dismiss challenge by local school 
board to use of proceeds from local Sixteenth Section lands for the benefit 
of the State at large). 
On the other hand, cases interpreting more recent grants have found an 
explicit trust obligation, although it is worth noting that none of these 
grants included a provision similar to that at issue here; they provided for 
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state has assigned this task to the individual districts in 
which the lands are located, subject to supervision by the 
state. The significance, if any, in equal protection terms of 
this allocation of duties in justifying assigning the income ex-
lands for the general benefit of the schools in the State. However, in 
Ervien v. United States, 251 U. S. 41 (1919), for example, the Court up-
held a lower court decision enjoining as a breach of trust any use by the 
New Mexico Public Lands Commissioner of Sixteenth Section proceeds for 
a purpose other than one of the purposes enumerated in the grant. Thus, 
the Court held that under these circumstances the phrase "breach of trust" 
meant "that the United States, being the grantor of the lands, could impose 
conditions upon their use, and have the right to exact the performance of 
the conditions." Id., at 48. More recently, the Court in Lassen v. Ari-
zona Hwy. Dept., 385 U. S. 458, 460-461 (1967), interpreted and enforced 
the terms of the Arizona school lands grant, noting that "[t]he grant in-
volved here . .. expressly requires the Attorney General of the United 
States to maintain whatever proceedings may be necessary to enforce its 
terms." See also Alamo Land & Cattle Co., Inc. v. Arizona, 424 U. S. 
295 (1976). 
Thus that the Court has indicated that some school lands grants did not 
create express trust and has held that other grants did create such trusts, 
although it has never enforced a provision such as the provision at issue 
here. The Court has never discussed the relationship between these two 
sets of cases, but it is possible that any variation in results stems from the 
facts that the terms of the grants have varied over time. See Lassen, 
supra, 385 U. S., at 460. Thus, it could be that the earlier grants did give 
the grantee States absolute fee interests, while the later grants created ac-
tual enforceable trusts. On the other hand, it may be that the petitioners 
are correct in asserting that the substance of all of these grants is the 
same. See S. Rep. No. 454, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20 (1910) (referring 
to express trust provisions in New Mexico and Arizona Enabling Act as 
"nothing new in principle," noting that "[f]or many years it has been the 
custom to specify the purposes for which grants of lands are made to in-
coming states and to place express restrictions upon the mode of disposing 
of them"). Or perhaps they are all properly viewed as being in the nature 
of "a 'solemn agreement' which in some ways may be analogized to a con-
tract between private parties." Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S., at 507. Per-
haps, then, the conditions of the grants are still enforceable by the United 
States, although possibly not by third parties. This may be the case even 
though the federal defendants disavowed this position below, arguing that 
Cooper and Schmidt control and that our recent cases are distinguishable 
24 
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elusively to those who perform the management function and 
none of it to those districts that have no lands to manage is a 
matter that is best addressed by the lower courts in the first 
instance. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is af-
firmed insofar as it affirmed the dismissal of petitioners' 
breach of trust and related claims. With respect to the af-
firmance of the District Court's dismissal of the equal protec-
tion claim, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated 
and the case is remanded to that court for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
because they involve express trusts. See, e. g. , Reply Brief of Federal 
Defendants in the District Court, at 60-62. 
.. 
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JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, we consider the claims of school officials and 
schoolchildren in 23 Northern Mississippi counties that they 
are being unlawfully denied the economic benefits of public 
school lands granted by the United States to the State of Mis-
sissippi well over 100 years ago. Specifically, we must de-
termine to what extent these claims are barred by the Elev-
enth Amendment and, with respect to those claims that are 
not barred, if any, whether the complaint is sufficient to 
withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
I 
The history of public school lands in the United States 
stretches back over 200 years. 1 Even before the ratification 
of the Constitution, the Congress of the Confederation initi-
..., '\ 'Although this case comes to us on a motion to dismiss under Federal 
_,..... ':,.,- Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), we are not precluded in our review of the 
~ complaint from taking notice of items in the public record, such as docu-
A ~ • 7 mentation of the history of the Mississippi and other school lands grants. ~j, J ~ The historical facts recited here comprise in large part the factual allega-
/1 /i tJ,J ~ tions of the complaint and are not disputed by the parties; the parties dis-
r1 ~ ~ agree only on the legal significance of these facts. 
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ated a practice with regard to the Northwest Territory 2 
which was followed with most other public lands that eventu-
ally became States and were admitted to the Union. In par-
ticular, the Land Ordinance of 1785, which provided for the 
survey and sale of the Northwest Territory, "reserved the lot 
No. 16, of every township, for the maintenance of public 
schools within the said township. . . . " 1 Laws of the United 
States 565 (1815). 3 In 1802, when the eastern portion of the 
Northwest Territory became what is now the State of Ohio, 
Congress granted Ohio the lands that had been previously re-
served under the 1785 Ordinance for the use of public schools 
in the State. 2 Stat. 175. 4 
Following the Ohio example of reserving lands for the 
maintenance of public schools, "'grants were made for com-
' The Northwest Territory, obtained by the United States by virtue of 
cessions of western land claims from the original 13 States, included the 
land south of Canada, north of the Ohio River, east of the Mississippi 
River, and west of the original States. P. Gates, History of Public Land 
Law Development 72 (1968). 
3 The Land Ordinance of 1785 also initiated a land-surveying practice 
that was first applied to the Northwest Territory but that was applied to 
all territories acquired by the United States thereafter: 
"At the point where the Ohio River crosses the Pennsylvania border, a 
north-south line-a principal meridian-was to be run and a base line west-
ward-the geographer's line-was to be surveyed; parallel lines of longi-
tude and latitude were to be surveyed, each to be 6 miles apart, making for 
townships of 36 square miles or 23,040 acres. . . . Each township was to 
be divided into lots of one mile square containing 640 acres. " Id., at 65. 
Each of these one-square-mile lots was called a "section," so the section 
numbered 16, reserved for the public schools, was the "Sixteenth Section." 
' ' The precise reasons for this practice are somewhat unclear, but it 
seems likely that they were a combination of an overall practice of encour-
aging education, a congressional desire to accelerate the disposition of 
western lands at a higher price, and a policy of trying to put the public-
lands States on some sort of a par with the original States in terms of tax-
able property since federal land, a large portion of the new States, was not 
taxable by them. See generally Andrus v. Utah, 446 U. S. 500, 522, 523 
(1980) (POWELL, J., dissenting); P. Gates, supa n. 2, at 288-289; B. 
Hibbard, A History of the Public Land Policies 309-311 (1939). 
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mon school purposes to each of the public-land States admit-
ted to the Union. Between the years of 1802 and 1846 the 
grants were of every section sixteen, and, thereafter, of sec-
tions sixteen and thirty-six. In some instances, additional 
sections have been granted."' Andrus v. Utah, 446 U. S. 
500, 506-507, n. 7 (1980) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 
240 U. S. 192, 198 (1916) (footnotes omitted)). Thus, the 
basic Ohio example has been followed with respect to all but a 
few of the States admitted since then. 446 U. S. , at 
522-523, n. 4 (POWELL, J., dissenting). In addition to the 
school lands designated in this manner, Congress made provi-
sion for townships in which the pertinent section or sections 
were not available for one reason or another. Thus, Con-
gress generally indemnified States for the missing designated 
sections, allowing the States to select lands in an amount 
equal to and in lieu of the designated but unavailable lands. 
See, e.g., Ch. 83, 4 Stat. 179 (1826). See generally Andrus 
v. Utah, supra, at 507-508; Morrison, supra, at 200-202. 
Although the basic pattern of school lands grants was gen-
erally consistent from State to State in terms of the reserva-
tion and grant of the lands, the specific provisions of the 
grants varied by State and over time. See generally B. 
Hibbard, A History of the Public Land Policies 314-318 
(1939). For example, in Indiana and Alabama, the school 
lands were expressly granted to the inhabitants of the town-
ships directly. See 3 Stat. 290 (1816) (Indiana); 3 Stat. 491 
(1819) (Alabama). 5 In most of the other grants before 1845, 
the school lands were given instead to the States but were 
explicitly designated to be for the use of the townships in 
which they lay. See, e. g., 2 Stat. 233-234 (1803) (Missis-
sippi); 3 Stat. 375 (1817) (same); 5 Stat. 58 (1836) (Arkansas). 
The Michigan grant in 1836, on the other hand, was simply 
5 At least in Alabama, however, this technical grant of the lands to the 
inhabitants of each township was apparently interpreted as vesting legal 
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"to the State for the use of schools." See 5 Stat. 59. After 
1845, the type of grant used in Michigan, granting the lands 
to the State for the use of its schools generally, became the 
norm. See, e.g., 9 Stat. 58 (1846) (Wisconsin); 11 Stat. 383 
(1859) (Oregon). Finally, the most recent grants are 
phrased not as outright gifts to the States for a specific use 
but instead as express trusts. These grants also are stated 
to be to the States for the support of the schools in those 
States generally. In addition, though, under these grants 
the State is specifically designated a trustee, there are ex-
plicit restrictions on the management and disposition of the 
lands in trust, and the Federal Government expressly retains 
an ongoing oversight responsibility. See, e. g., 36 Stat. 574 
(1910) (Arizona and New Mexico). 
The history of the school lands grants in Mississippi gener-
ally follows the pattern thus described. In 1798, Congress 
created the Mississippi Territory, which included what is now 
about the southern third of the States of Mississippi and Ala-
bama. 1 Stat. 549. In 1803, Congress provided for the sale 
and survey of all Mississippi Territory lands to which Indian 
title had been extinguished but excepted "the section number 
sixteen, which shall be reserved in each township for the sup-
port of schools within the same." 2 Stat. 233-234. In 1804, 
the Mississippi Territory was extended northward to the 
southern boundary of Tennessee. 2 Stat. 305. Two years 
later, Congress authorized the selection oflands in lieu of un-
available Sixteenth Sections in the Territory. 2 Stat. 401 
(1806). Eventually, in 1817, Mississippi was admitted as a 
State, and a further Land Sales Act provided for the survey 
and sale of those lands in the northern part of the new State 
that had not been covered by the 1803 Act. The 1817 Act 
provided that these lands were to be "surveyed and divided 
in the manner provided by law for the surveying of the other 
public lands of the United States in the Mississippi territory;" 
thus, the Act required that "the section No. 16 in each town-
ship . . . shall be reserved for the support of schools therein." 
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3 Stat. 375 (1817). The Sixteenth Section lands and lands se-
lected in lieu therof were granted to the State of Mississippi. 
See Lambert v. State, 211 Miss. 129, 137, 51 So. 2d 201, 203 
(1951). 
By their own terms, however, these Acts did not apply to 
the lands in northern Mississippi that were held by the Chick-
asaw Indian Nation, an area essentially comprising what 
came to be the northern 23 counties in the State. This land 
was held by the Chickasaws until 1832, when it was ceded to 
the United States by the Treaty of Pontitoc Creek. 7 Stat. 
381. Although that Treaty provided that the land would be 
surveyed and sold "in the same manner and on the same 
terms and conditions as the other public lands," id., at 382, no 
Sixteenth Section lands were reserved from sale. City of 
Corinth v. Robertson, 125 Miss. 31, 57, 87 So. 464, 465-466 
(1921). In 1836, Congress attempted to remedy this over-
sight by providing for the reservation of lands in lieu of the 
Sixteenth Section lands and for the vesting of the title to 
these lands "in the State of Mississippi, for the use of schools 
within [the Chickasaw Cession] in said State." 5 Stat. 116. 
These Chickasaw Cession Lieu Lands, some 174,555 acres, 
App. 36, were selected and given to the State. In 1856, 
however, with authority expressly given by Congress, 10 
Stat. 6 (1852), the state legislature sold these lands and in-
vested the proceeds, approximately $1,047,330, App. 36, in 
8% loans to the State's railroads. 1856 Miss. Laws, ch. 56. 
These railroads and the State's investment in them, unfortu-
nately, were subsequently destroyed during the Civil War 
and never replaced. 
From these historical circumstances, the current practice 
in Mississippi with regard to Sixteenth Section lands has 
evolved directly. Under state law, these lands, which are 
still apparently held in large part by the State, "constitute 
property held in trust for the benefit of the public schools and 
must be treated as such." Miss. Code Ann. § 29-3-1(1) 
(Supp. 1985). In providing for the operation of these trusts, 
6 
85-499-OPINION 
PAP ASAN v. MISSISSIPPI 
the legislature has retained the historical tie of these lands to 
particular townships in terms of both trust administration 
and beneficiary status. Thus, the State has delegated the 
management of this property to local school boards through-
out the State: Where Sixteenth Section lands lie within a 
school district or where Lieu Lands were originally appropri-
ated for a township that lies within a school district, the 
board of education of that district has "control and jurisdic-
tion of said school trust lands and of all funds arising from any 
disposition thereof heretofore or hereafter made." Ibid. In 
this respect, the board of education is "under the general su-
pervision of the state land commissioner." Ibid. 6 Further, 
the State has, by statute, set forth certain prescriptions for 
the management of these lands. See generally Miss. Code 
Ann. §§ 29-3-1 to 29-3-135 (Supp. 1985). Most important 
for purposes of this case, however, is Miss. Code Ann. 
§ 29-3-109 (Supp. 1985), which provides: 
"All expendable funds derived from sixteenth section 
or lieu lands shall be credited to the school districts of 
the township in which such sixteenth section lands may 
be located, or to which any sixteenth sections lieu lands 
may belong. Such funds shall not be expended except 
for the purpose of education of the educable children of 
the school district to which they belong, or as otherwise 
may be provided by law." 
Consequently, all proceeds from Sixteenth Section and Lieu 
Lands are allocated directly to the specific township in which 
these lands are located or to which those lands apply. With 
respect to the Chickasaw Cession counties, to which no lands 
now belong, the state legislature has for over 100 years paid 
"interest" on the lost principal acquired from the sale of those 
lands in the form of annual appropriations to the Chickasaw 
6 Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 7-11-4, effective January 1, 1980, the 
words "state land commissioner" mean "secretary of state." See note fol-
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Cession schools. Originally, the rate was 8%, but since 1890 
the rate has been 6%. See Miss. Const., Art. 8, § 212. The 
annual amount until 1985 was $62,191. App. 37. 
The result of this dual treatment has for many years been a 
d~ in the level of school funds from Sixteenth Section 
lands that are available to the Chickasaw Cession schools as 
compared to the schools in the remainder of the State. In 
1984, for example, the legislative appropriation for the Chick-
asaw Cession resulted in an estimated average per pupil in-
come relative to the Sixteenth Section substitute appropria-
tion of $.63 per pupil. The average~nth Section 
income in the rest of the State, in comparison, was estimated 
to be $75. 34 per pupil. Id., at 44. 7 It is this disparity which 
gave rise to the present action. 
In 1981, the petitioners, local school officials and schoolchil-
dren from the Chickasaw Cession, filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi 
against the respondents, an assortment of state officials, 
challenging the disparity in Sixteenth Section funds. The 
petitioners' complaint traced the history of public school 
lands in Mississippi, characterizing as illegal several of the 
actions that resulted in there being now no Sixteenth Section 
lands in the Chickasaw Cession area. In particular, the peti-
tioners asserted that the sale of the Chickasaw Cession 
school lands and unwise investment of the proceeds from that 
sale in the 1850's had abrogated the State's trust obligation to 
7 In 1985, while this case was penqing in the Court of Appeals, the State 
Legislature passed a statute providing for increased Sixteenth Section 
appropriations for the Chickasaw Cession schools. 1985 Miss. Laws, 
House Bill No. 6, ch. 23. Under this statute, $1 million was to be appro-
priated for this purpose in 1985, and this amount was to increase by $1 mil-
lion each year until it reached a maximum of $5 million for the fiscal year 
1989-1990 and thereafter. Even so, the offices of the Mississippi State 
Auditor and Secretary of State estimated in 1984 that additional funds of 
over $7 million would be required to bring the Chickasaw Cession funding 
to the level of the average Sixteenth Section funding in the rest of the 
State on a per-pupil basis. App. 38. 
8 
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hold those lands for the benefit of Chickasaw Cession school-
children in perpetuity. The result of these actions, said the 
petitioners, was the disparity between the financial support 
available to the Chickasaw Cession schools and other schools 
in the State, which disparity in turn allegedly deprived the 
Chickasaw Cession schoolchildren of a minimally adequate 
level of education and of the equal protection of the laws. 
Based on these allegations, the petitioners sought various 
forms of relief for breach of the trust regarding the Chicka- · 
saw Cession Sixteenth Section lands and for denial of equal 
protection. 8 Specifically, the complaint sought a declaration 
that the state legislation purporting to implement the sale of 
the Chickasaw Cession school lands was void and unenforce-
able; the establishment by legislative appropriation or other-
wise of a fund in a suitable amount to be held in perpetual 
trust for the benefit of plaintiffs; or in the alternative making 
available to plaintiffs lieu lands of the same value as the origi-
nal Chickasaw Cession Sixteenth Section lands. 
The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding the 
claims barred by the applicable statute of limitations and by 
the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Papasan 
v. United States, 756 F. 2d 1087 (1985), agreeing that the re-
lief requested in the complaint was barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment. Noting that a federal court should not dismiss 
a constitutional complaint because it "seeks one remedy 
rather than another plainly appropriate one," Holt Civic 
Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U. S. 60, 65 (1978), however, the 
Court of Appeals deemed the equal protection claim to assert 
8 The complaint also alleged a denial of due process, unconstitutional im-
pairment of contractual obligations, a taking without just compensation, 
and a Ninth Amendment claim. Of these additional claims, the petitioners 
press only the contract-clause claim here. Since this claim is in all essen-
tial respects the same as the petitioners' trust claim for Eleventh Amend-
ment purposes, our disposition of the trust claim, infra, at 9-15, governs 
this claim as well. 
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a current ongoing and disparate distribution of state funds 
for the support of local schools, the remedy for which would 
not be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Even so, it 
found dismissal of the complaint to be proper since such dif-
ferential funding was not unconstitutional under the Court's 
decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Ro-
driguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). 9 
We granted certiorari, 474 U. S. -- (1985), and now va-
cate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for 
further proceedings. 
II 
We first consider whether the Eleventh Amendment bars 
the petitioners' claims and required dismissal of the 
complaint. 
A 
The Amendment provides: 
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects 
of any Foreign State." 
This language expressly encompasses only suits brought 
against a State by citizens of another State, but this Court 
long ago held that the Amendment bars suits against a State 
by citizens of that same State as well. See Hans v. Louisi-
ana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890). "[l]n the absence of consent a suit 
in_ which the State or one of its agencies or departments is 
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh 
Amendment." Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
9 In their complaint, the petitioners also sought relief from various fed-
eral officials, alleging breach of a promise to fund the Chickasaw Cession 
trust and failure to keep the State of Mississippi from wasting the trust 
assets. The District Court dismissed these claims as barred by sovereign 
immunity, !aches, and the statutes of limitations. The petitioners' appeal 
from this dismissal was itself dismissed by joint stipulation. Thus, no is-
sues involving the federal defendants remain in the case. 
10 
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Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 100 (1984). 10 This bar exists 
whether the relief sought is legal or equitable. Id., at 
100-101. 
Where the State itself or one of its agencies or depart-
ments is not named as defendant and where a state official is 
named instead, the Eleventh Amendment status of the suit is 
less straightforward. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), 
held that a suit to enjoin as unconstitutional a state official's 
action was not barred by the Amendment. This holding was 
based on a determination that an unconstitutional state en-
actment is void and that any action by a state official that is 
purportedly authorized by that enactment cannot be taken in 
an official capacity since the state authorization for such ac-
tion is a nullity. As the Court explained in Young itself: 
"If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to en-
force be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the offi-
cer proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict 
with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he 
is in that case stripped of his official or representative 
character and is subjected in his person to the conse-
quences of his individual conduct. The State has no 
power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility 
to the supreme authority of the United States." Id., at 
159-160. 
Thus, the official, although acting in his official capacity, may 
be sued in federal court. See also Pennhurst, supra, at 102, 
105; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 692 (1978). 
Young, however, does not insulate from Eleventh Amend-
ment challenge every suit in which a state official is the 
named defendant. In accordance with its original rationale, 
Young applies only where the underlying authorization upon 
10 A State may consent to be sued in federal court. Clark v. Barnard, 
108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883). Here, however, it is clear that Mississippi has 
expressly declined such consent. See 1984 Miss. Gen. Laws, ch. 495, 
§ 3(4). 
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which the named official acts is asserted to be illegal. See 
Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85 (1982). And it does not foreclose 
an Eleventh Amendment challenge where the official action 
is asserted to be illegal as a matter of state law alone. See 
Pennhurst, supra, at 104-106. In such a case, federal su-
premacy is not implicated because the state official is acting 
contrary to state law only. 
We have also described certain types of cases that formally 
meet the Young requirements of a state official acting incon-
sistently with federal law but that stretch that case too far 
and would upset the balance of federal and state interests 
that it embodies. Young's applicability has been tailored to 
conform as precisely as possible to those specific situations in 
which it is "necessary to permit the federal courts to vindi-
cate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to 'the 
supreme authority of the United States."' Pennhurst, 
supra, at 105 (quoting Young, supra, at 160). Conse-
quently, Young has been focused on cases in which a violation 
of federal law by a state official is ongoing as opposed to cases 
in which federal law has been violated at one time or over a 
period of time in the past, as well as on cases in which the 
relief against the state official directly ends the violation of 
federal law as opposed to cases in which that relief is in-
tended indirectly to encourage compliance with federal law 
through deterrence or directly to meet third-party interests 
such as compensation. As we have noted: "Remedies de-
signed to end a continuing violation of federal law are neces-
sary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the suprem-
acy of that law. But compensatory or deterrence interests 
are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh 
Amendment." Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. --, --
(1985) (citation omitted). 
Relief that in essence serves to compensate a party injured 
in the past by an action of a state official in his official capac-
ity that was illegal under federal law is barred even when the 
12 
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state official is the named defendant. 11 This is true if the re-
lief is expressly denominated as damages. See, e. g., Ford 
Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U. S. 
459 (1945). It is also true if the relief is tantamount to an 
award of damages for a past violation of federal law, even 
though styled as something else. See, e. g., Green v. 
Mansour, supra·, at--; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 
664-668 (1974). On the other hand, relief that serves di-
rectly to bring an end to a present violation of federal law is 
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment even though ac-
companied by a substantial ancillary effect on the state treas-
ury. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 289-290 
(1977); Edelman, supra, at 667-668. 
For Eleventh Amendment purposes, the line between per-
mitted and prohibited suits will of ten be indistinct: "[T]he dif-
ference between the type of relief barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment and that permitted under Ex parte Young will 
not in many instances be that between day and night." 
Edelman, supra, at 667. Compare, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 
440 U. S. 332 (1979), with Green v. Mansour, supra. In dis-
cerning on which side of the line a particular case falls, we 
look to the substance rather than to the form of the relief 
sought, see, e. g., Edelman, supra, at 668, and will be guided 
by the policies underlying the decision in Ex parte Young. 
B 
Petitioners claim that the federal grants of school lands to 
the State of Mississippi created a perpetual trust, with the 
State as trustee, for the benefit of the public schools. Rely-
ing on Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U. S. 295 
(1976), and Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Arizona Highway 
Dept., 385 U. S. 458 (1967), the petitioners contend that 
"[s]chool lands trusts impose specific burdens and obligations 
on the states, as well as the state officials who act as trust-
11 When a state official is sued and held liable in his individual capacity, 
however, even damages may be awarded. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 
u. s. 232, 237-238 (1974). 
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ees, which include preserving the corpus, max1m1zmg in-
come, and, where the corpus is lost or converted wrongfully, 
continuing the payment of appropriate income indefinitely." 
Brief for Petitioners 13. The idea that this last obligation 
exists is gleaned not from any prior judicial construction of 
school lands grants but instead from alleged federal common 
law rules that purportedly govern such trusts. The petition-
ers rely on this asserted continuing obligation in contending 
that they seek only a prospective, injunctive remedy, permis-
sible under Ex parte Young, requiring state officials to meet 
that continuing federal obligation by providing the Chicka-
saw Cession schools with appropriate trust income. 
To begin with, it is not at all clear that the school lands 
grants to Mississippi created a binding trust. The respond-
ents, in fact, contend that the school lands were given to the 
State in fee simple absolute and that no binding federal ob-
ligation was imposed. See Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 U. S. 
168 (1914); Cooper v. Roberts, 18 How. 173 (1856). 12 But 
12 Even if there was a binding trust, the petitioners point to no authority 
relating specifically to school lands trusts in support of their contention 
that the obligation to pay income continues even though the trust corpus 
has been lost. See Brief for Petitioners 24-28. In addition, even their 
assertion that such an obligation should be imposed as a matter of common 
law is unsupported. It may be true that a trust beneficiary is not normally 
time-barred from suing a trustee for breach of trust and loss of the corpus 
until such time as the trustee expressly repudiates the trust. See, e.g., 
Benedict v. New York City, 250 U. S. 321, 327 (1919). But this does not 
mean that there is a continuing affirmative obligation on the part of the 
trustee with respect to the trust corpus and income as opposed to merely 
liability for a past breach of trust that may still be acted upon. 
The Restatement, for example, seems to adopt the latter view: 
"If a trust is created and the whole of the trust property ceases to exist, 
the trustee no longer holds anything in trust. In such a case the trustee is 
under a personal liability to the beneficiary if he committed a breach of 
trust in causing or allowing the trust property to cease to exist, or if he sold 
the trust property to himself or lent trust funds to himself, being permitted 
to do so by the terms of the trust. In such a case if the trustee should be 
insolvent the beneficiary is not entitled to priority over the general credi-
tors of the trustee. This does not mean, however, that he owes no duties 
14 
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even if petitioners' legal characterization is accepted, their 
trust claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The 
distinction between a continuing obligation on the part of the 
trustee and an ongoing liability for past breach of trust is es-
sentially a formal distinction of the sort we rejected in 
Edelman. There, the Court of Appeals had upheld an 
award of "equitable restitution" against the state official, re-
quiring the payment to the plaintiff class of "all AABD bene-
fits wrongfully withheld." 415 U. S., at 656. We found, to 
the contrary, that the "retroactive award of monetary relief 
. . . is in practical effect indistinguishable in many aspects 
from an award of damages against the State." Id., at 668. 
The characterization in that case of the legal wrong as the 
continuing withholding of accrued benefits is very similar to 
the petitioners' characterization of the legal wrong here as 
the breach of a continuing obligation to comply with the trust 
obligations. We discern no substantive difference between a 
not-yet-extinguished liability for a past breach of trust and 
the continuing obligation to meet trust responsibilities as-
serted by the petitioners. In both cases, the trustee is re-
quired, because of the past loss of the trust corpus, to use its 
own resources to take the place of the corpus or the lost in-
come from the corpus. Even if the petitioners here were 
seeking only the payment of an amount equal to the income 
from the lost corpus, 13 such payment would be merely a sub-
stitute for the return of the trust corpus itself. That is, con-
tinuing payment of the income from the lost corpus is essen-
to the beneficiary except the duties which a debtor owes to his creditor, or 
a tortfeasor to the person he has wronged. He is still in a fiduciary rela-
tion to the beneficiary. He cannot properly purchase the interest of the 
beneficiary without making full disclosure of all circumstances known to 
him affecting the transaction, and the transaction must be fair, or the bene-
ficiary can set it aside." Restatement (Second) of Trusts§ 74, Comment c, 
p. 194 (1959) (citations omitted). 
13 In fact, the petitioners sought not merely such income but also restora-
tion of the trust corpus and the award of past income not received and in-
terest on that income. App. 28-29. 
., 
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tially equivalent in economic terms to a one-time restoration 
of the lost corpus itself: It is in substance the award, as con-
tinuing income rather than as a lump sum, of "'an accrued 
monetary liability."' Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S., at 289 
(quoting Edelman, 415 U. S., at 664. Thus, we hold that 
the petitioners' trust claim, like the claim we rejected in 
Edelman, may not be sustained. 
C 
The Court of Appeals held, however, that petitioners' 
equal protection claim was not barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment. We agree with that ruling. The complaint 
asserted: 
"By their aforesaid past, present and future depriva-
tions of and to Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff class of the use 
and benefits of their Sixteenth Section Lands, while at 
the same time granting to and securing to all other 
school districts and school children in the State of Missis-
sippi in perpetuity the use and benefit of their Sixteenth 
Section Lands, the State Defendants have deliberately, 
intentionally, purposefully, and with design denied to 
Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff class the equal protection of 
the laws in violation of their rights secured by the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States." App. 20. 
The petitioners also alleged that these same actions denied 
them "their rights to an interest in a minimally adequate 
level of education, or reasonable opportunity therefor," id., 
at 21, while assuring such right to the other schoolchildren in 
the State. Thus the complaint alleged a present disparity in 
the distribution of the benefits from the State's Sixteenth 
Section lands. 
This ongoing constitutional violation-the unequal distri-
bution by the State of the benefits of the State's school 
lands-is precisely the type of continuing violation for which 
a remedy may permissibly be fashioned under Young. It 
16 
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may be that the current disparity results directly from the 
same actions in the past that are the subject of the petition-
ers' trust claims, but the essence of the equal protection alle-
gation is the present disparity in the distribution of the bene-
fits of state-held assets and not the past actions of the State. 
A remedy to eliminate this current disparity, even a remedy 
that might require the expenditure of state funds, would en-
sure "'compliance in the future with a substantive federal-
question determination'" rather than bestow an award for ac-
crued monetary liability. Milliken, supra, at 289 (quoting 
Edelman, supra, at 668). This claim is, in fact, in all essen-
tial respects the same as the equal protection claim for which 
relief was approved in Milliken. Consequently, we agree 
with the Court of Appeals that the Eleventh Amendment 
would not bar relief necessary to correct a current violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause and that this claim may not 
properly be dismissed on this basis. 14 
III 
The question remains whether the petitioners' equal pro-
tection claim, although not barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment, is legally insufficient and was properly dismissed for 
failure to state a claim. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). 
We are bound for the purposes of this review to take the 
well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true. 
Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U. S. 25 (1977); Kugler v. 
Helfant, 421 U. S. 117 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 
232 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319 (1972); Gardner v. 
1
• The respondents further contend that the petitioners have not sued 
any state officials who could grant the relief requested, see Brief for Re-
spondents Allain et al. 17-19. We note, however, that respondent Secre-
tary of State is, by state statute, responsible for "general supervision" of 
the administration by the local school officials of the Sixteenth Section and 
Lieu Lands. See Miss. Code Ann. § 29-3-1(1) (Supp. 1985). To the ex-
tent that the respondent Secretary of State is acting in a manner that vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause, such actions may be enjoined under Ex 
parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). 
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Toilet Goods Assn., 387 U. S. 167 (1957). Construing these 
facts and relevant facts obtained from the public record in the 
light most favorable to the petitioners, we must ascertain 
whether they state a claim on which relief could be granted. 
A 
In Rodriguez, the Court upheld against an equal protection 
challenge Texas' system of financing its public schools, under 
which funds for the public schools were derived from two 
main sources. Approximately half of the funds came from 
the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program, a state pro-
gram aimed at guaranteeing a certain level of minimum edu- ~ 
caJ!®,for all chilaren in the State. 411 U. S., at 9. Most of 
the remainder of the funds came from local sources-in par-
ticular local property taxes. Id., at 9, n. 21. As a result of ~ 
this dual funding system, most specifically as a result of dif- hi-.. 
ferences in amounts collected from local property taxes, "sub-
stantial interdistrict disparities in school expenditures [ were] ::/. ~ 
found ... in varying degrees throughout the State." Id., at 
15. 
In examining the equal protection status of these dispari-
ties, the Court declined to apply any heightened scrutiny 
based either on wealth as a suspect classification or on educa-
tion as a fundamental right. As to the latter, the Court rec-
ognized the importance of public education but noted that 
education "is not among the rights afforded explicit protec-
tion under our Federal Constitution." Id., at 35. The 
Court did not, however, foreclose the possibility "that some 
identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally pro-
tected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either [the 
right to speak or the right to vote]." Id., at 36. 15 Given the 
10 Instead, the Court noted: 
"[W]e have no indication that the present levels of educational expendi-
tures in Texas provide an education that falls short [of such a hypothesized 
constitutional prerequisite]. Whatever merit appellees' argument might 
have if a State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educa-
tional opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no basis 
18 
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absence of such radical denial of educational opportunity, it 
was concluded that the State's school financing scheme would 
be constitutional if it bore "some rational relationship to a le-
gitimate state purpose." Id., at 44. 
Applying this standard, the dual Texas system was 
deemed reasonably structured to accommodate two separate 
forces: 
"'[t]he desire by members of society to have educational 
opportunity for all children, and the desire of each family 
to provide the best education it can afford for its own 
children.' 
. . . While assuring a basic education for every child in J 
the State, it permits and encourages a large measure of 
participation in and control of each district's schools at 
the local level." Id., at 49 (quoting J . Coleman, Fore-
word to G. Strayer & R. Haig, The Financing of Educa-
tion in the State of New York vii (1923)). 
Given this rational basis, the Court concluded that the mere 
"happenstance" that the quality of education might vary from 
districtto district bec~ f_~ ng"_Q!'o~ values within 
the districts did not render the system "so irrational as to be 
invidious~'4Ilu. S., at 55. In particu-
lar, the Court found that "any scheme of local taxation-in-
deed the very existence of identifiable local governmental 
units-requires the establishment of jurisdictional bound-
aries that are inevitably arbitrary." Id., at 53-54. 
Almost 10 years later, the Court again considered the 
equal protection status of the administration of the Texas 
public schools-this time in relation to the State's decision 
not to expend any state funds on the education of children 
for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only relative dif-
ferences in spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the 
present case-no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to pro-
vide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimum skills nec-
essary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in 
the political process." 411 U. S., at 36-37. 
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who were not "legally admitted" to the United States. 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202 (1982). The Court did not, how-
ever, measurably change the approach articulated in Rodri-
guez. It reiterated that education is not a fundamental right 
and concluded that undocumented aliens were not a suspect 
class. Id., at 223-224. Nevertheless, it concluded that the 
justifications for the discrimination offered by the State were 
"wholly insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these 
children, the State, and the Nation." Id., at 230. 
B 
The complaint in this case asserted not simply that the pe-
titioners had oeen denied their right to a minimally adequate 
ed~ation but also thatsuc~l and that 
because that right had been infringed the State's action here 
should be reviewed under strict scrutiny. App. 20. As Ro-
driguez and Plyler indicate, this Court has not yet defini-
tively settled the questions whether a minimally ade uate 
education is a 'tundamental right' an whether a statute al-
lege to dis~reymfrTnge that right should be ac-
corded heightened equal protection review. ~ ~ 
Nor does this case require resolution of these issues. Al-
though for t e purposes o t 1s motion to dismiss we must /4.e<~L-(__ 
take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we 
are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a 
factual allegation. See, e. g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F. 2d 
713, 723 (CA7 1981), aff'd on other grounds 460 U. S. 325 
(1983). See generally 2A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Fed-
eral Practice. 
12.07, p. 12-64, and n. 6 (1985). Petitioners' allegation 
that, by reason of the funding disparities relating to the Six-
teenth Section Lands, they have been deprived of a mini-
mally adequate education is jl!st such J!l!_ all~ation. Peti-
tioners do not allege that schoolchildren in the Chickasaw 
Counties are not taught to read or write; they do not allege 
that they receive no instruction on even the educational ba-
20 
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sics; they allege ~~ac~ual fac~ s,UPE_O~o~i~s~ertion 
tha~ey-!1av~ d~i~..Qf__a l!!iJ1l!!!cillX ~egu~. ~~­
.ti®, As we see it, we are not bound to credit and may disre-
gard the allegation that petitioners have been denied a mini-
mally adequate education. 
Concentrating instead on the disparities in terms of Six-
teenth Section Lands benefits t~complaint in fact al-
leged and that are documented in the public record, we are 
persuaded that the Court or Appeals properly determined 
that Rodriguez dictates t~ applicable standard of review. 
The'
1
differential treatment' alle ed here constitutes an equal 
pr~ only if 1t 1s not rationally relate to a e-
gitimate state interest. 
Applying this test, the Court of Appeals concluded that, 
historical roots aside, the essence of the petitioners' claim 
was an attack on Mississippi's system of financing public edu-
cation. And it reasoned that the inevitability of disparities 
in income derived from real estate managed and administered 
locally, as in Rodriguez, supplied a rationale for the dispari-
ties alleged. To begin with, we disagree with the Court of 
Appeals' apparent understanding of the crux of the petition-
ers' claim. As we read their complaint, the petitioners do 
not challenge the overall organization of the-"M'.ississi i pub-
lic s~noo1 _En~ am. ns ea , e1r c allenge is re-
stricteatoone aspect of that program: The Sixteenth Section 
and Lieu Lands funding. All of the alle ations in the com-
plaint center around disparities in the distribution of these 
particular ~ ne ts, an no al egations concernmg disparm es 
in otherptiblic school funding programs are included. 
Consequently, this is a very different claim than the claim 
made in Rodriguez. In Rodriguez, the contention was that 
the Sta~ 's overall sy_stem of funding was unconstitutionally 
discriminatory. There, the Court examined the basic struc-
ture of that system and concluded that it was rationally re-
lated to a legitimate state purpose. In reaching that conclu-
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resulting from differences in local taxes were acceptable be-
cause related to the state goal of allowing a measure of eff ec-
tive local control over school funding levels. Rodriguez did 
not, however, purport to validate all funding variations that 
might result from a State's public school funding decisions. 
It held merely that the variations that resulted from allowing 
local control over local property tax funding of the public 
schools were constitutionally permissible in that case. 16 
Here, the petitioners' claim goes neither to the overall I 
funding system nor to the local ad valorem component of that 
system. Instead, it goes solely to the Sixteenth Section and 
Lieu Lands portion oftl'ie--sta es pub 1c c fun ing. 
,An , as to th~sua ed that Rodriguez re-
solves the equal protection question in favor of the State. 
The allegations of the complaint are that the State is distrib-
uting the income from Sixteenth Section lands or from lieu 
lands or funds l!EequallY, among the s districts, to th 
detrime f e Chickasaw Cessio schoo and their stu-
dents. The Sixteent ect1on an 1eu ands in 
were granted to and held by the State itself. Under state 
law, these lands "constitute property held in trust for the 
benefit of the public schools and must be treated as such," 
Miss. Code Ann. § 29-3-1(1) (Supp. 1985), but in carrying out 
the trust, the State has vested the management of these 
lands in the local school boards throughout the State, under 
the supervision of the Secretary of State, and has credited 
the income from these lands to the "school districts of the 
township in which such sixteenth section lands may be lo-
cated, or to which any sixteenth section lieu lands may be-
16 JUSTICE POWELL contends that the fact that the overall system of 
school financing here is similar to that approved by the Court in Rodriguez 
provides "yet another reason" to dismiss the petitioners' claims. Post, at 
5, n. 6. Rodriguez, however, merely upheld the overall structure of 
Texas' public school financing and the component of that system allowing 
for variations in fundings due to local taxation. We do not read Rodriguez I 
as validating all disparities that might occur in a system that has an overall 
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long," such income to be used for the purpose of educating 
the children of the school district or as otherwise may be pro-
vided by law. Miss. Code Ann. § 29-3-109 (Supp. 1985). 
This case is therefore very different from Rodriguez, where 
the differential financing' ava1 al:i e o sc ioolaistricts was i,,... ~ ~ ~ 
traceable to school district funds available from local real es- ( ;' ~
tate taxation, not to a state d ci~n to divide state reso rces 
unequally amon~l districts. The rationality of the dis-~ 
pa~ ~guez, therefore, which rested on the fact that t?-c-o /-
funding disparities based on differing local wealth were a nee- ~ ~ k.. 
essary adjunct of allowing meaningful local control over 
school funding, does not settle the constitutionality of dispari-~ 
ties alleged in this case, and we differ with the Court of Ap- ~ ~~J 
peals in this respect. 11 1 - 7 
Nevertheless, the question remains whether the variations 
in the benefits received by school districts from Sixteenth 
Section or Lieu Lands are, on the allegations in the complaint 
and as a matter of law, rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest. We believe, h~ we should not pursue 
11 JUSTICE POWELL asserts that any discrepancies in Sixteenth Section 
and Lieu Lands funding cannot be unconstitutional because "the Sixteenth 
Section payments are an insignificant part of the total payments from all 
sources made to Mississippi's school districts." Post, at 4. Thus, Jus-
TICE POWELL seems to envision that some sort of threshold level of effect 
in terms of overall school revenues is necessary before the Equal Protec-
tion Clause's strictures become binding. The petitioners, however, have 
limited themselves to challenging discrimination in the Sixteenth Section 
and Lieu Lands funding program. This program is in fact separated from 
other sources of public school funding by the State itself in administration, 
see Miss. Code Ann. § 29-3-1 et seq. (Supp. 1985), and for accounting pur-
poses, see, e.g., Mississippi State Department of Education, 1986 Annual 
Report of the State Superintendent of Public Education 48. Nor is there 
any indication that the levels of benefits received from the school lands are 
in any manner correlated to funds received from other sources. See, e. g., 
Miss. Code Ann. § 37-19-1 et seq. (Supp. 1985). Cf. post, at 5, n. 5. In 
this situation, we decline the dissent's invitation to look at school receipts 
overall. We also decline to append to the general requirements of an equal 
protection cause of action an additional threshold effects requirement. 
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this issue here but should instead remand the case for further 
proceedings. Neither the Court of Appeals nor the parties 
have addressed the equal protection issue as we think it is 
posed by this case: Given that the State has title to assets 
granted to it by the Federal Government for the use of the 
State's schools, does the Equal Protection Clause permit it to 
distribute the benefit of these assets unequally among the 
school districts as it now does? 
A crucial consideration in resolving this issue is whether 
the federal l~ires !,h~ §te!,e to allocate the economic 
benefits ofschool lanclsto scnools in the townships in which 
those lands are located. If, as a matter of federal law, the 
State has no choice in the matter, whether the complaint 
states an equal protection claim depends on whether the fed-
eral policy is itself violative of the Clause. If it is, the State 
may properly be enjoined from implementing such policy. 
Contrariwise, if the federal law is valid and the State is 
bound by it, then it provides a rational reason for the funding 
disparity. Neither the courts below nor the parties have ad-
dressed the equal protection issue in these terms. 18 Another 
18 As to this question, we make only the following observations. The 
starting point of any consideration of this question must be the federal 
grants themselves, for it is clear that the interest transferred to the State 
depends on the federal laws that transferred that interest. See California 
ex rel . State Lands Commission v. United States, 457 U. S. 273, 279 (1982) 
(citing Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10, 22 (1935). 
If the federal law provided for the transfer of an absolute fee interest, the 
lands are owned outright by the State. On the other hand, if the federal 
law created a trust with the State as trustee, the State is bound to comply 
with the terms of that trust. 
Each of these possible conclusions finds some support in this Court's 
prior cases. In Cooper v. Roberts, 18 How. 173, 181-182 (1856), for exam-
ple, the Court approved the sale of school lands granted to the State of 
Michigan even where Congress had not expressly authorized such a sale, 
stating that "the grant is to the State directly, without limitation of its 
power, though there is a sacred obligation imposed on its public faith." 
The Court adopted this same reasoning in Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 U. S. 
168 (1914), in which the Court approved the application of Alabama's ad-
24 
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possible consideration in resolving the equal protection issue 
is that school lands require management and that the State 
has assigned this task to the individual districts in which the 
verse possession laws to school lands against an argument that the State's 
interest could not be extinguished in that manner under the terms of the 
grant and that when the lands were no longer used for the support of the 
schools title would revert to the United States. Relying on Cooper, the 
Court concluded that "[t]he gift to the State is absolute, although, no 
doubt, as said in Cooper, 'there is a sacred obligation imposed on its public 
faith.' But that obligation is honorary ... .'' 232 U. S., at 173-174 (cita-
tions omitted). See also Stuart v. Easton, 170 U. S. 383, 394 (1898) (cited 
by the Court in Schmidt, supra, at 174) ("'the mere expression of a pur-
pose will not of and by itself debase a fee'") (quoting Kerlin v. Campbell, 
15 Pa. St. 500 (1850)). Thus, the Court's interpretations of some of the 
earlier grants conceived of those grants as conveying a fee interest to the 
States. See also Brooks v. Koonce, 275 U. S. 486 (1927) (per curiam), 
aff'g Sloan v. Blytheville Special School Dist. No. 5, 169 Ark. 77, 273 
S. W. 397 (1925) (relying on Cooper and Schmidt to dismiss challenge by 
local school board to use of proceeds from local Sixteenth Section lands for 
the benefit of the State at large). 
On the other hand, cases interpreting more recent grants have found an 
explicit trust obligation, although it is worth noting that none of these 
grants included a provision similar to that at issue here; they provided for 
lands for the general benefit of the schools in the State. However, in 
Ervien v. United States, 251 U. S. 41 (1919), for example, the Court up-
held -a lower court decision enjoining as a breach of trust any use by the 
New Mexico Public Lands Commissioner of Sixteenth Section proceeds for 
a purpose other than one of the purposes enumerated in the grant. Thus, 
the Court held that under these circumstances the phrase "breach of trust" 
meant "that the United States, being the grantor of the lands, could impose 
conditions upon their use, and have the right to exact the performance of 
the conditions." Id., at 48. More recently, the Court in Lassen v. Ari-
zona ex rel. Arizona Highway. Dept., 385 U. S. 458, 460-461 (1967), inter-
preted and enforced the terms of the Arizona school lands grant, noting 
that "[t]he grant involved here ... expressly requires the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States to maintain whatever proceedings may be neces-
sary to enforce its terms." See also Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 
424 u. s. 295 (1976). 
Thus that the Court has indicated that some school lands grants did not 
create express trust and has held that other grants did create such trusts, 
although it has never enforced a provision such as the provision at issue 
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lands are located, subject to supervision by the State. The 
significance, if any, in equal protection terms of this alloca-
tion of duties in justifying assigning the income exclusively to 
those who perform the management function and none of it to 
those districts that have no lands to manage is a matter that 
is best addressed by the lower courts in the first instance. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is af-
firmed insofar as it affirmed the dismissal of petitioners' 
breach of trust and related claims. With respect to the af-
firmance of the District Court's dismissal of the equal protec-
tion claim, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, 
and the case is remanded to that court for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
here. The Court has never discussed the relationship between these two 
sets of cases, but it is possible that any variation in results stems from the 
facts that the terms of the grants have varied over time. See Lassen, 
supra, at 460. Thus, it could be that the earlier grants did give the 
grantee States absolute fee interests, while the later grants created actual 
enforceable trusts. On the other hand, it may be that the petitioners are 
correct in asserting that the substance of all of these grants is the same. 
See S. Rep. No. 454, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 18-20 (1910) (referring to ex-
press trust provisions in New Mexico and Arizona Enabling Act as "noth-
ing new in principle," noting that "[f]or many years it has been the custom 
to specify the purposes for which grants of lands are made to incoming 
states and to place express restrictions upon the mode of disposing of 
them"). Or perhaps they are all properly viewed as being in the nature of 
"a 'solemn agreement' which in some ways may be analogized to a contract 
between private parties." Andrus v. Utah, 446 U. S., at 507. Perhaps, 
then, the conditions of the grants are still enforceable by the United 
States, although possibly not by third parties. This may be the case even 
though the federal defendants disavowed this position below, arguing that 
Cooper and Schmidt control and that our recent cases are distinguishable 
because they involve express trusts. See, e. g., Reply Brief for Federal 
Defendants in No. 81-90 (ND Miss), pp. 60-62. 
I. 
.,. 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Memorandum 
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Memo to Cabell: 
Rider A, p. 1 (Papasan) 
The second sentence in our opinion is a bit 
difficult for a slow reader like me. I suggest we change 
it substantially as follows: 
MS's. 
Statistics from ehe State Board of Education show the 
statewide ranking of school districts in terms of 
expenditures per pupil. Vhe - Chickasaw Cession districts, 
-- - ~ 
· n this ranki !l.9.. are scattered widely among the s tate's 
. ' 
154 school districts. Moreover, far from being a 
"er i tical element of school funding in Mississippi", as 
alleged by petitioners, the Cession lands account aeeo.ant 
for less than one and a half percent of overall funds 
provided for schools.l//see Tables A and B, :::l;t:-p. 7-13.
1 
• 
, ' ... 
lfp/ss 06/20/86 
PAPS SALLY-POW 
Rider A, p. 5 (Papasan) 
Petitioner's equal protection claim relates only to the 
alleged disparity of 16th Section payments in the 
Chickasaw districts as compared with 16th Section payments 
in other districts. 
Cabell: 
I think it would be helpful to repeat in this 
paragraph that the only equal protection claim relates to 
the 16th Section payments, and not to the way the state 
and federal funds are disbursed, or to the fact that ad 
valor em taxes ( leveled locally) also vary. My language 
above is not as precise as it might be, and I am sure you 
can improve it. 
lfp/ss 06/27/86 Rider A, p. 5 (Papasan) 
PAPS SALLY-POW 
Footnote 
As occurs in many states, variations in total 
funding among many districts in Mississippi may vary 
depending upon local ad valorem taxes and other district 
sources. See Table B, see also San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49 (1973). The 
variations resulting from local funding may well be 
greater in many counties than the alleged "disparity" 
relied on in this case. 
Cabell: Present footnote 5 also makes the foregoing 
point. I dictated the above before looking at present 5. 
2. 
I suggest you combine the two. The revised footnote may 
very well simply substitute for present n. 5. 
lfp/ss 06/26/86 Rider A, p. 4 (Papasan) 
PAP4 SALLY-POW 
It is alleged - and here accepted as true - that there is 
a disparity between the payments from the Sixteenth 
Section Lands in the Chocktaw districts and the payments 
from the state of Mississippi's trust fund to Chickasaw 
districts. 4 The Court further reads the complaint as 
alleging that this unequal distribution of such funds acts 
"to the detriment of the Chickasaw Cession schools and 
their students", ante, at 21. The complaint contains no 
factual allegations other than this disparity in support 
of its conclusion as to the detriment to these schools and 
their students. There simply is no basis for believing a 
detriment could ever be proved. As shown in Table A, the 
total per pupil expenditures in petitioners' school 
2. 
districts are comparable to, and in some cases higher 
than, the statewide average. Moreover, the Sixteenth 
Section payments - as the figures in Table A demonstrate 
beyond argument - are an insignificant part of the total 




Yet, in the end the only alleged denial of Equal 
Protection is with respect to the funding in the Chickasaw 
Cession school districts. As noted above, 
these funds are onl 1-1/2% of overall 
supra, at 1, 
funding for 
elementary and secondary schools within the State. 
PAPA2 
See Miss. Code Ann. §§37-19-3 and 37-19-5 (Supp. 1985); 
Tran. Oral Arg. 32. Discrepancies from Sixteenth Section 
lands are frequently offset in part or entirely by ad 
valorem taxes. See Annual Report, supra
1
, at 94-98 
(listing revenue receipts by local sources). 
.. -
PAPA6 s 
It is alleged - and here accepted as true - that there is 
a disparity between the payments from the Sixteenth 
Section Lands in the Chocktaw districts and the payments 
from the state of Mississippi's trust fund to Chickasaw 
districts. 1 The Court further reads the complaint as 
alleging that this unequal distribution of such funds acts 
"to the detriment of the Chickasaw Cession schools and 
their students," ante, at 21. The complaint contains no 
factual allegations other than this disparity in support 
of the conclusion, nor is there any basis for believing a 
detriment could ever be proved. As shown in Table A, the 
various per pupil expenditures in petitioners' school 
districts are comparable to, and in some cases higher 
than, the average for districts within the Chocktaw area. 
And the Sixteenth Section payments - as the figures in 
Table B demonstrate beyond argument - are an insignificant 
part of the total payments from all sources made to 
Mississippi's school districts. 
The Court does not question these data. It 
instead states that petitioners "have limited themselves 
to challenging discrimination in the Sixteenth Section" 
program, and, relying on that limitation, "decline[s] the 
2. 
dissent's invitation to look at school receipts overall." 
Ante , .p . 1 7 , at 2 2 . The Court thereby ignores the 
undisputed facts concerning the funding of public 
education in the State of Mississippi, and instead bases 
its equal protection analysis on 1-1/2% of the overall 
funds provided for public secondary and elementary schools 
in the State. The funding among districts in Mississippi 
may vary, as it does in many states, depending upon local 
ad valorem taxes and other district sources. See Table B; 
see also San Antonio School District v. Rodriuez, 411 
U.S. 1, 49 (1973). The Equal Protection Clause, at least 
in the context of a state funding of schools, is concerned 
with substance, not with the de minimus variations of 
funding among the districts. 
PAPA3 
taxes, which are levied by, and vary among, the local 
school districts, account for over two-thirds. See Table 
B, infra. Mississippi's financing system, like that of 
Texas, "[w]hile assuring a basic education for every child 
in the State, . . . permits and encourages a large measure 
of participation and control of each district's schools at 
the local level." Rodriguez, 411 U.S., at 49. 
MORENEW 
The complaint characterizes this disparity as an "unjust, 
inequitable and unconstitutional deprivation of the rights 
~ 
of the children of the Chickasaw Cession counties~ App. 
2. 
FLUBBUP 
I also note that Mississippi has taken numerous 
steps to ensure the adequacy of the most important single 
factor in education: the quality of the teachers. The 
State has established a Commission on Teacher and 
Ad . . 9'-m1n1strat.-. Education to oversee the training, 
certification, and evaluation of public school teachers 
throughout Mississippi. Miss. Code Ann. §37-3-2. There 
is a guaranteed minimum for teachers' salaries that may be 
augmented by the local districts, §§37-19-7 and 37-19-15, 
a scale of pay increases based on tenure and merit, §37-
19-7, a guarantee of no reduction in any local supplements 
to salary, §37-19-11, a set of minimum standards for 
teachers' competency, §37-19-9, and a requirement that all 
teachers employed after July 1, 1975, take the "national 
teachers examination," §37-19-13. 
PJI.PAl 
Yet, in the end the only alleged denial of Equal 
Protection is with respect to the funding in the Chickasaw 
Cession school districts. As noted above, 
these funds are only 1-1/2% of overall 
supra, at 1, 
funding fJ 




See Miss. Code Ann. §§37-19-3 and 37-19-5 {Supp. 1985); 
Tran. Oral Arg. 32. Discrepancies from Sixteenth Section 
lands are frequently offset in part or entirely by ad 
valor em taxes. See Annual Report, supra, at 94-98 
{listing revenue receipts by local sources). 
As the Court remands this case for further 
consideration of the alleged violation of the Equal 
Protection violation, I emphasize that even under the 
Court's holding the State need prove only that the 
d istr ibut ion of funds among school district bears some 
rational relation to a legitimate state end. See Zobel v. 
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 { 19 8 2) : "When a state 
distributes benefits unequally, the distinctions it makes 
are subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Generally, a law will 
survive that scrutiny if the distinction it makes 







factors to be considered on remand, 
ante, at 24-25, that 




taxes, are levied by, and vary among, the local 
school districts, account for over two-thirds. See Table 
B, infra. Mississippi's financing system, like that of 
Texas, "[w]hile assuring a basic education for every child 
in the State, . . . per mi ts and encourages a large measure 
of participation and control of each district's schools at 
1( 
the local level." 411 U.S., at 49. 
I also note that Mississippi has taken numerous steps 
to ensure the adequacy of the most important single factor 
in education: the quality of the teachers. The State has 
established a Commission on Teacher and Administrative 
Education to oversee the training, certification, and 
evaluation of public teachers throughout Mississippi. 
Miss. Code Ann. §37-3-2. There is a guaranteed minimum 
for teachers' salaries that may be augmented by the local 
districts, §§37-19-7 and 37-19-15, a scale of pay 
increases based on tenure and merit, §37-19-7, a guarantee 
of no reduction in any local supplements to salary, §§37-
19-11, a set of minimum standards for teachers' 
competency, §37-19-9, and a requirement that all teachers 





The Court\ ~ ill not give these figures 
It states that petitioners "have limited themselves to 
challenging discrimination in the Sixteenth Section" 
/4-t 
program, and, relying on that limitation, "decline[s] the 
I\ 
dissent's invitation to look at school receipts overall." 
Ante , n. 1 7 , at 2 2 . The Court thereby ignores the 
undisputed facts concerning the funding of public 
education in the State of Mississippi, see Tables A and B, 
infra, and instead bases its equal protection analysis on 
one-and-a-half percent of the overall funds provided for 
public secondary and elementary schools in the State. The 
funding among districts in Mississippi may vary, as it 
does in many states, depending upon local ad valorem taxes 
and other district sources. See Table II; see also San 
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, at 411. The 
Equal Protection Clause, at least in the context of a 
state funding of schools, is concerned with substance, not 
with the de minimus variations of funding among the 
districts. r The figures I discuss below show petitioners' ~ 
-










Assuming {fo r the sake of argumen1 that the petitioners 
complaint can be characterized as claiming "that the State 
is distributing the income from Sixteenth Section lands or 
from lieu lands or funds unequally among the 
districts, to the detriment of the Chickasaw Cessio 
) 
schools and their students," ante, at 21, * the minute 
effect of these disparaties cannot possible have a 
detrimental ef feet on the Chickasaw Cession schools o 
students. 
* See App. 20-22. Paragraph 52 of the complaint 
alleges deprivation of a property right to the Sixteen 
Section Lands; the Court dismisses this claim in part II, 
ante. Paragraph 54 (there apparently is no paragraph 53) 
~ ~ I.. alleges deprivation of "a fundamental right or interest 
f + ... in a minimally adequate level of education;" the Court 
( 
dismisses this claim as well. Ante, at 19. Paragraph 55, 
the final paragraph of the equal protection claims, 
alleges an "invidious discrimination" worked against a 
"disfavored class" through the "den[ial of] certain 
fundamental rights described elsewhere herein;" this claim 
·-. 
2. 
presumably fails for the same reasons as those in ,r,r 52 
and 54. 
JUSTICE POWELL: App. attached for your reference. I would 




~ '{~-., f"W. ' ~ 4 ;, ·· /; r 
Lr_,,, therefore cannot belie~ 
1 
that, to quote the Court's 
characterization of the remaining claim, the unequal 
distribution of the relevant funds acts "to the detriment 
of the Chickasaw Cession schools and their students." 





See Miss. Code Ann. §§37-19-3 and 37-19-5 (Supp. 1985): 
Tran. Oral Arg. 32. Discrepancies from Sixteenth Section 
lands are frequently offset in part or entirely by ad 
valorem taxes. See Annual Report, supra, at 94-98 
(listing revenue receipts by local sources). 
'' 
PAPA3 
taxes, which are levied by, and vary among, the local 
school districts, account for over two-thirds. See Table 
B, infra. Mississippi's financing system, like that of 
Texas, "[w]hile assuring a basic education for every child 
in the State, . . . permits and encourages a large measure 
of participation and control of each district's schools at 
the local level." 411 U.S., at 49. 
I w~ also note that Mississippi has taken numerous 
steps to ensure the adequacy of the most important single 
factor in education: the quality of the teachers. The 











throughout Mississippi. Miss. Code Ann. §37-3-2. There 
is a guaranteed minimum for teachers' salaries that may be 
augmented by the local districts, §§37-19-7 and 37-19-15, 
a scale of pay increases based on tenure and merit, §37-
19-7, a guarantee of no reduction in any local supplements 
to salary, §§37-19-11, a set of minimum standards for 
teachers' competency, §37-19-9, and a requirement that all 
teachers employer after July 1, 1975 take the "national 
teachers examination," §37-19-13. 
PAPA4 
The Court will not give these figures their due. 
It states that petitioners "have limited themselves to 
challenging discrimination in the Sixteenth Section" 
program, and, relying on that limitation, "decline[s] the 
dissent's invitation to look at school receipts overall." 
Ante , n. 1 7 , at 2 2 . The Court thereby ignores the 
undisputed facts concerning the funding of public 
education in the State of Mississippi, see Tables A and B, 
infra, and instead bases its equal protection analysis on 
one-and-a-half percent of the overall funds provided for 
public secondary and elementary schools in the State. The 
funding among districts in Mississippi may vary, as it 
does in many states, depending upon local ad valorem taxes 
and other district sources. See Table II; see also San 
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, at 411. The 
Equal Protection Clause, at least in the context of a 
state funding of schools, is concerned with substance, not 
with the de m1n1mus variations of funding 















From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: __ , ~/_2._c~(_.f_ /, ____ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-499 
B. H. PAPASAN, SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCA-
TION, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. WILLIAM A. ALLAIN, 
GOVERNOR OF MISSISSIPPI, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[June -, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The . public record refutes petitioners' equal protection 
claims. Statistics from the State Board of Education show 
not only that the allegedly deprived Chickasaw Cession dis-
tricts in fact fall throughout a ranking of expenditures per pu-
pil, but also that funds from Sixteenth Section lands, far from 
being "a critical element of school funding in Mississippi," Pe-
tition 4, account for less than one-and-a-half percent of over-
all receipts. I therefore find no basis for the belief that peti-
tioners could prove that students in Chickasaw Cession 
districts have been denied a minimally adequate education 
and I do not believe that petitioners have asserted an equal 
protection claim that can survive a motion to dismiss under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 1 
I 
A brief procedural history is helpful in putting this litiga-
tion in perspective. Petitioners include a group of county 
school boards, superintendents of education, and individual 
school children, all residing in the Chickasaw Cession coun-
1 I agree with the Court that the bulk of petitioners' claims are barred by 
the Eleventh Amendment. I also agree that a continuing disparity in the 
distribution of State funds would constitute a violation of equal protection 
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ties in North Mississippi. In June 1981, petitioners sued nu-
merous federal and state officials, attacking the difference 
between, on the one hand, payments from Sixteenth Section 
lands in other school districts (the "Chocktaw area") and, on 
the other hand, payments from the State of Mississippi's 
trust fund to Chickasaw Cession counties in place of income 
from the Chickasaw school lands. 
The complaint recounted alleged "illegalities" as far back as 
the Northwest Ordinance of 1785. It sought to have various 
federal statutes that "purport to authorize, validate or con-
firm" sales of the Sixteenth Section lands declared "unlawful, 
void and unenforceable, including but not limited to (a) the 
Act of July 4, 1936; (b) the Act of May 19, 1852; (c) the Act of 
March 3, 1857; (d) any other acts of Congress having said ef-
fect." App. 16 (citations omitted). 
The complaint also alleged that both the federal and state 
defendants had breached perpetual and binding obligations of 
"an express/constructive trust": the Federal defendants by 
permitting the State to breach the trust through various stat-
utes (e. g., the Northwest Ordinance), and the State defend-
ants by unlawfully selling the relevant properties and by ill-
advisedly investing the proceeds of that sale. The complaint 
further alleged violations of due process by denial of "free ap-
propriate education" and~f relevance to the case as it 
stands before this Court-violations of equal protection by 
disparate distribution of certain funds and by infringing upon 
the "fundamental rights" of "a suspect class" to "a minimally 
adequate level of education." Finally, the complaint alleged 
impairment of obligation of contract and taking without just 
compensation. 
Petitioners sought wide-ranging relief, including convey-
ance to them of properties or money of a value equivalent to 
that of the relevant Sixteenth Section lands and compensa-
tion for the income from 1832 to present that petitioners 
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"could have been receiving ... if such lands had been subject 
to prudent use and management." Petitioners also sought to 
obtain new lands as substitution for those lost, "which may 
include offshore oil, gas and other mineral rights." Petition-
ers additionally sought to "enjoin" and "direct" the defend-
ants to establish "a fund or funds of such value" as was neces-
sary to provide "hereafter" and ''in perpetuity'' annual 
income to Chickasaw Cession school districts. Finally, peti-
tioners demanded that the defendants take other steps to 
"[e]liminate and compensate and for the future guarantee and 
protect plaintiffs and the plaintiff class against . . . denials 
and deprivations of their rights to due process of law and to 
the equal protection of the laws." 2 
The District Court held that the claims against the Federal 
Government were barred by sovereign immunity, laches, and 
statutes of limitations. This order was not appealed. In a 
separate order, the District Court held that any monetary 
remedy was barred by the Eleventh Amendment-a holding 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court today. I 
agree with this disposition. I also would not reach the issues 
raised by allegations of the denial of "a minimally adequate 
level of education." I do not, however, agree with the 
Court's holding that petitioners' equal protection allegations 
regarding the disparate distribution of funds present a claim 
of sufficient substance to survive a motion to dismiss under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
II 
The Court begins the discussion of petitioners' equal pro-
tection claim, ante, at 16-24, by aclmowledging that it is ap-
propriate for the Court to take notice of ''relevant facts ob-
tained from the public record in the light most favorable to 
the petitioners." ante, at 17. The most recent figures avail-
able from the State Board of Education of Mississippi, 3 read 
1 One rarely sees a complaint that aaa 11111Rf11Nllie ewee19 iP. iie allege i~ Q.$ ~Wc&f'~ in th 
eiene attd hae., r.wn, 1eqtteeee fer dt1191ieaei.e remedies. ol\~o.~ o:n.l o.s cl"'i>'"" 
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in such a light, fatally undercut petitioners' equal protection 
claims. Even though it is alleged-and here accepted as 
true-that there is a disparity between payments from Six-
teenth Section lands in the Chocktaw districts and payments 
from the State of Mississippi's trust fund to Chickasaw Ces-
sion counties, 4 the total per pupil expenditures in petitioners' 
school districts are comparable to, and in some cases higher 
than, the State-wide average. These figures also show that 
the Sixteenth Section payments are an insignificant part of 
the total payments from all sources made to Mississippi's 
school districts. 
The "Table of School Finances," appended to this dissent, 
shows that Chickasaw Cession school districts are in fact dis-
tributed throughout a financial ranking of all the State's 
school districts, whether the measure used is "Current Ex-
penditure per Pupil," "Current Expenditure per Pupil for In-
structional Cost," or "Current Expenditure per Pupil less 
Transportation." Specifically, the Table shows that the 
State-wide average per pupil expenditure was $1965. 78, of 
which $1,261.09 went towards "instructional cost." All but 
six of the 39 school districts within the Chickasaw Cession 
districts spent within $300 of the per pupil average expendi-
ture; all but two spent within $200 of the average per pupil 
instructional expenditure. The per pupil expenditure was 
over $1400 in the Chickasaw district with the lowest per pupil 
expenditure, and over $2400 in the Chickasaw district with 
the highest expenditure. In the light of these figures of ex-
penditures per pupil, I cannot believe that $74. 71-the al-
leged difference between the average per pupil payment from 
'The Court states that this disparity is $75.34 versus $.63. The Court 
of Appeals and the Petition for Certiorari give the relevant figures as 
$31.25 and $.80. 756 F. 2d, at 1091; Petition 4. The former figures are 
derived from an unaudited aggregation of reports by individual school dis-
tricts that was presented in a November 1984 report on the Chickasaw 
Cession Districts from the State Auditor and the Secretary of State. App. 
35. As this is case arose from a 12(b)(6) motion, I use the disparity most 
favorable to the plaintiffs: $7 4. 71. 
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Sixteenth Section lands and the average per pupil payment 
from the State's trust fund in place of the Chickasaw school 
lands-is a violation of equal protection under the rational re-
lation standard. 5 
Although the figures of expenditures per pupil are fatal to 
petitioners' claims, a second set of statistics provides an addi-
tional reason to conclude that the equal protection claim 
should not survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6). As shown in the table "Receipts for Public 
Schools," also appended to this dissent, payments from Six-
teenth Section Lands in 1984-1985 accounted for less than 2% 
of total "Receipts for Public Schools" throughout the State. 
These Sixteenth Section payments are dwarfed by income 
from State and Federal funds of over $752,000,000 (totaling 
75% of "Receipts for Public Schools"). Variations over 
school districts of such a small part of the total receipts is an 
insufficient allegation to support a claim of a violation of the 
equal protection clause in the provision of education for the 
children of the Chickasaw Cession districts. 6 
5 The State distributes its funds equally throughout the Mississippi's 
school districts on the basis of "teacher unit[s]." Tran. Oral Arg. 32. It 
therefore may be that discrepancies from Sixteenth Section lands are offset 
in part or entirely by ad valorem taxes. 
5 There is yet another reason to dismiss petitioner's claims. The sys-
tem of financing Mississippi's public schools bears a substantial similarity 
to the financing arrangement in the State of Texas upheld by this Court. 
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). In Rodri-
guez, almost half of the revenues for funding elementary and secondary 
schools came from a large state-funded program designed to provide a 
basic minimal education in every school. Each school district then would 
supplement state funds-and some federal aid-through an ad valorem tax 
on property within its jurisdiction. Similarly, Mississippi provide each 
district with funds to support a "minimum program of education." See 
Miss. Code Ann., tit. 37, ch. 19. These funds constitute virtually half of 
the receipts for public schools; federal funds constitute another 18%. Of 
the remaining receipts for Mississippi's school districts, ad valorem taxes 
account for over two-thirds. 
6 
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III 
Petitioners' claims of a denial of a constitutionally adequate 
minimal education cannot survive a motion under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) in the light of the random distribution of 
Chickasaw Cession districts throughout the State-wide 
rankings of various expenditures per pupil and the insignifi-
cance of the Sixteenth Section funds relative to the total re-
ceipts for education. Accordingly, I dissent. 
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TABLE OF SCHOOL FINANCESt 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Natchez Adams 2,131.22 33 1,253.67 73 2,018.70 31 
Alcorn 1,694.89 132 1,270.49 63 1,585.03 129 
Corinth 1,947.49 64 1,274.92 61 1,862.16 53 
Amite 2,331.43 11 1,454.17 18 2,057.52 28 
Attala 2,109.59 36 1,298.66 48 1,936.06 40 
Kosciusko 1,877.64 88 1,104.12 139 1,727.96 90 
Benton 2,121.78 35 1,338.89 38 1,952.98 38 
Bolivar #1 * 2,082.64 39 1,339.85 36 2,012.20 34 
Bolivar #2 * 2,769.62 4 1,804.24 2 2,699.23 3 
Bolivar #3 * 1,943.55 66 1,264.60 68 1,873.11 51 
Bolivar #4 * 1,793.43 110 1,182.67 106 1,722.98 91 
Bolivar #5 * 2,027.20 45 1,309.88 45 1,956.74 37 
Bolivar #6 * 1,657.08 136 1,173.85 116 1,586.61 128 
Calhoun 1,770.32 115 1,199.18 95 1,656.17 11 
Carroll 2,014.44 51 1,295.68 49 1,821.73 69 
Chickasaw 2,158.73 29 1,438.50 21 1,901.76 47 
Houston 1,797.93 108 1,233.84 80 1,681.46 105 
Okolona 1,635.52 143 1,106.77 137 1,565.18 132 
Choctaw 1,935.99 70 1,309.67 46 1,787.92 77 
Claiborne 4,085.75 1 2,066.37 1 3,799.88 1 
Enterprise * 1,729.02 123 1,143.75 128 1,538.66 136 
Quitman Cons * 1,813.05 106 1,129.16 133 1,622.30 120 
Clay 2,307.56 13 1,482.73 13 2,161.68 13 
West Point 1,844.88 97 1,198.97 96 1,733.96 89 
Coahoma Co 2,414.77 10 1,514.98 6 2,236.92 10 
Clarksdale 1,918.05 77 1,255.92 72 1,891.53 49 
Copiah 2,168.89 28 1,162.03 122 2,064.60 25 
Hazlehurst 1,771.68 114 1,190.21 99 1,660.59 110 
Covington 1,912.97 70 1,290.85 50 1,782.63 79 
Desoto 1,565.04 148 1,021.31 150 1,467.48 146 
Forrest 2,019.63 48 1,352.53 34 1,841.33 60 
Hattiesburg 2,215.47 25 1,465.32 15 2,145.72 14 
Petal 1,701.54 129 1,182.13 108 1,595.90 124 
•·. 
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TABLE OF SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Franklin 2,298.67 15 1,514.75 7 2,121.11 21 
George 1,474.78 153 982.08 152 1,341.92 154 
Greene 2,056.05 42 1,278.69 58 1,834.67 65 
Grenada 1,764.73 116 1,175.11 114 1,644.66 114 
Hancock 1,750.66 119 1,011.95 151 1,566.13 131 
Bay St Louis 1,981.82 56 1,165.33 119 1,905.05 46 
Harri.son 1,860.89 92 1,264.10 69 1,758.84 83 
Biloxi 2,251.56 18 1,411.45 24 2,163.00 12 
Gulfport 2,496.19 8 1,457.45 17 2,433.81 7 
Long Beach 1,920.58 74 1,257.30 71 1,843.01 59 
Pass Christian 2,965.97 2 1,628.06 3 2,874.13 2 
Hinds 1,918.64 76 1,215.27 87 1,796.81 73 
Jackson 2,429.77 9 1,422.73 22 2,293.98 9 
Clinton 1,813.93 105 1,178.70 110 1,702.73 101 
Holmes 1,854.79 95 1,223.53 85 1,713.49 94 
Durant 1,553.46 151 1,155.74 125 1,553.37 133 
Humphreys 2,132.20 32 1,193.35 97 1,959.88 36 
Itawamba 1,905.92 80 1,156.48 124 1,749.66 85 
Jackson 2,243.31 20 1,364.81 33 2,113.99 23 
Moss Point 1,878.90 87 1,249.54 75 1,796.95 71 
Ocean Springs 1,920.67 73 1,269.80 64 1,852.01 58 
Pascagoula 2,538.68 6 1,494.00 11 2,458.17 5 
East Jasper "'2,010.43 52 1,265.89 66 1,836.99 64 
West Jasper 1,866.24 89 1,244.61 79 1,693.61 103 
Jefferson 2,066.22 41 1,351.06 35 1,861.66 54 
Jefferson Davis 1,928.49 72 1,275.72 60 1,749.29 86 
Jones 1,719.42 125 1,170.06 117 1,551.87 134 
Laurel 2,639.67 5 1,590.71 4 2,581.89 4 
Kemper 2,096.15 38 1,339.34 37 1,868.72 52 
Lafayette 1,698.47 130 1,109.42 136 1,530.26 137 
Oxford 2,226.94 24 1,514.00 8 2,118.55 22 
Lamar 1,506.98 152 971.37 153 1,382.92 153 
Lumberton Line "' 1,601.57 145 1,182.43 107 1,601.07 122 
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TABLE OF SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) ( 1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Lauderdale 1,641.60 138 1,084.88 143 1,485.10 143 
Meridian 2,136.57 31 1,398.45 26 2,064.38 26 
Lawrence 1,980.57 57 1,193.35 98 1,840.85 62 
Leake 1,720.38 124 1,132.06 132 1,574.13 130 
Lee 1,694.48 133 1,162.81 120 1,587.20 127 
Nettleton Line * 1,457.55 154 1,097.67 141 1,444.60 149 
Tupelo 2,199.64 27 1,337.87 39 2,137.07 16 
Leflore 2,148.73 30 1,384.79 29 2,022.71 30 
Greenwood 2,245.93 19 1,459.97 16 2,215.51 11 
Lincoln 1,590.44 146 1,076.05 145 1,441.20 150 
Brookhaven 2,031.92 44 1,416.07 23 1,920.57 43 
Lowndes 1,640.09 140 1,060.41 147 1,517.19 140 
Columbus 2,106.33 37 1,383.49 30 2,018.05 33 
Madison 2,125.62 34 1,301.47 47 1,912.65 45 
Canton 1,697.55 131 1,213.84 90 1,639.48 117 
Ridgeland 1,814.86 103 1,150.59 127 1,704.57 100 
Marion 2,272.92 16 1,494.76 10 2,061.49 27 
Columbia 2,240.43 23 1,448.23 19 2,132.43 18 
Marshall 1,684.23 134 1,201.21 94 1,524.60 139 
Holly Springs 1,975.64 59 1,232.12 82 1,860.84 55 
Monroe 1,706.16 127 1,112.07 135 1,546.87 135 
Aberdeen 1,890.98 83 1,245.80 78 1,796.93 72 
Amory 1,840.11 98 1,283.43 53 1,764.71 81 
Montgomery 2,022.40 47 1,213.96 89 1,856.00 57 
Winona 2,005.07 53 1,401.42 25 1,945.24 39 
Neshoba 1,638.19 141 1,162.39 121 1,502.41 141 
Philadelphia 1,913.78 78 1,319.95 42 1,832.34 67 
Newton 1,920.07 75 1,185.90 105 1,719.76 93 
Newton Sep 1,945.74 65 1,249.46 76 1,831.42 68 
Union Sep 1,740.87 121 1,143.63 129 1,646.80 113 
Noxubee 1,939.99 69 1,289.94 51 1,749.23 87 
Oktibbeha 1,897.03 82 1,337.68 40 1,759.97 82 
Starkville 1,965.92 62 1,252.02 74 1,879.25 50 
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TABLE OF SCHOOL FINANCE~Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Narih Panola * 1,864.61 90 1,215.43 86 1,705.72 99 
South Panola * 1,637.45 142 1,100.87 140 1,478.59 145 
Pearl River 1,562.46 149 966.38 154 1,418.22 152 
Picayune 1,752.85 118 1,190.01 101 1,672.13 106 
Poplarville 1,862.97 91 1,190.15 100 1,707.74 96 
Perry 2,311.91 12 1,371.84 31 2,111.50 24 
Richton 1,886.43 85 1,174.43 115 1,719.79 92 
North Pike * 1,630.22 144 1,114.71 134 1,480.55 144 
South Pike * 1,858.62 94 1,265.60 67 1,707.35 98 
McComb 1,941.21 68 1,223.67 84 1,858.82 56 
Pontotoc 1,775.64 113 1,134.82 131 1,630.30 118 
Pontotoc Sep 1,643.80 137 1,064.43 146 1,461.72 147 
Prentiss 1,884.35 86 1,316.58 43 1,756.40 84 
Baldwyn 1,859.39 93 1,206.28 92 1,783.64 78 
Booneville 1,887.23 84 1,282.05 55 1,792.72 74 
Quitman 1,988.47 55 1,335.45 41 1,893.71 48 
Rankin 1,556.15 150 1,043.08 148 1,427.91 151 
Pearl 1,711.80 126 1,151.38 126 1,594.58 125 
Scott 1,737.36 122 1,213.54 91 1,600.68 123 
Forest 1,827.34 101 1,287.52 52 1,711.70 95 
Anguilla Line * 2,018.96 49 1,187.61 103 1,921.95 42 
Sharkey Issaquena * 2,016.35 50 1,246.07 77 1,841.20 61 
Simpson 1,819.91 102 1,260.84 70 1,698.56 102 
Smith 1,941.22 67 1,232.87 81 1,739.71 88 
Stone 1,989.77 54 1,215.14 88 1,833.56 66 
Sunflower 1,978.77 58 1,283.18 54 1,840.10 63 
Drew 2,039.51 43 1,385.51 28 1,933.45 41 
Indianola 1,640.99 139 1,178.18 111 1,589.70 126 
E. Tallahatchie * 1,928.67 71 1,273.27 62 1,788.65 76 
W. Tallahatchie * 1,847.13 96 1,269.31 65 1,707.58 97 
Tate 1,786.61 112 1,176.14 112 1,648.01 112 
Senatobia 1,743.53 120 1,189.10 102 1,671.48 107 
N arih Tippah * 1,829.20 100 1,175.58 113 1,671.22 108 
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TABLE OF SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA COBt in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
South Tippah * 1,757.42 117 1,185.98 104 1,612.25 121 
Tishomingo 1,968.02 61 1,157.67 123 1,819.53 70 
Iuka 1,577.18 147 1,078.86 144 1,456.91 148 
Tunica 1,809.43 107 1,092.64 142 1,661.67 109 
Union 1,658.56 135 1,104.20 138 1,527.78 138 
New Albany 2,073.07 40 1,367.04 32 1,985.33 35 
Walthall 1,797.02 109 1,279.93 56 1,622.85 119 
Warren 1,951.95 63 1,166.91 118 1,791.93 75 
Vicksburg 2,209.59 26 1,388.60 27 2,128.96 19 
Hollandale * 1.898.37 81 1,313.56 44 1,778.27 80 
Leland * 2,261.80 17 1,498.17 9 2,141.71 15 
Western Line * 2,243.11 21 1,472.29 14 2,123.03 20 
Greenville 1,974.31 60 1,279.45 57 1,918.06 44 
Wayne 1,790.77 111 1,135.49 130 1,642.63 115 
Webster 1,834.83 99 1,225.69 83 1,688.89 104 
Wilkinson 2,304.75 14 1,442.19 20 2,137.07 17 
Louisville 1,814.22 104 1,181.68 109 1,639.88 116 
Coffeeville * 2,241.05 22 1,278.55 59 2,028.25 29 
Water Valley * 1,705.38 128 1,040.79 149 1,492.57 142 
Yazoo 2,845.92 3 1,490.19 12 2,333.34 8 
Holly Bluff * 2,500.03 7 1,524.17 5 2,448.57 6 
Yazoo City 2,023.38 46 1,205.28 93 2,018.31 32 
Statewide Average 1,965.78 1,261.09 1,842.94 
Chickasaw Average 1,853.52 
Chocktaw Average 1,992.92 
• County Office receipts/expenditures prorated to consolidated districts by ADA. 
t All school districts within the Chickasaw Cession are denoted by italic typeface. School dis-
tricts that are partially within the Chickasaw Cession are also in italic type. 
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RECEIPTS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
1984-1985 
Source of State Funds: 
State Dept. of Ed. $ 9,005,760 
Per Capita & Min. Prog. 490,568,205 
Vocational Ed. 16,269,064 
Chickasaw 61,454 
Homestead Exemption 30,916,541 
EFC Payments 2,898,692 
Severance Tax 10,290,972 
Driver Penalty Funds 555,963 
Textbook 6,110,596 
School Lunch 574,624 
Adult Ed. 35,619 
Educable Children 511,070 
Ed. Reform Act 985,796 
Other 153,766 
Total State Funds $ 568,938,122 56.1% 
Source of Federal Funds: 
State Dept. Ed. $ 6,293,149 
Vocational Ed. 3,540,422 
National Forest 3,247,726 
TVA 643,509 
P. L. 874 2,657,490 
ECIA Ch. 1 64,896,618 
ECIA Ch. 2 4,388,330 
ESEA Other 107,118 
OEO 151,860 
Soc. Sec. Tit. XX & CETA (Emp. Sec. Comm.) 1,677,019 
School Lunch & Sp. Milk & Nonfood Asst. 67,638,280 
School Lunch, Commodities, Food 12,660,094 
Adult Ed. 745,079 
Education Handicapped Act 11,347,044 
Other (e .g., CETA Governor's Office) 3,403,978 
Total Federal Funds $ 183,397,716 18.1% 
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RECEIPI'S FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS-Continued 
1984-1985 
Source of Local Funds: 
Ad V alorem Tax 
Mineral Lease Tax 
Tuition from Patrons 
Transp. Fees from Patrons 
Sixteen Section Income 
Interest on Investments 
Intermediate Source 
















Total Local Sources 
TOTAL REVENUE RECEIPI'S 
Nonrevenue Receipts: 
$ 261,122,056 25.8% 
$1,013,457,894 100.0% 
Sale of Bonds 
Sale of Assets 
Insurance Loss Recovery 
Loans 
Total Nonrevenue Receipts 

















From: Justice Powell 
UN 2 o 198 
Circulated~· _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SlWREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-499 
B. H. PAPASAN, SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCA-
TION, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. WILLIAM A. ALLAIN, 
GOVERNOR OF MISSISSIPPI, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1986) 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The public record refutes petitioners' equal protection 
claims. 1§.tatistics from the State Board of Education show 
- not on y that the allegedly deprived Chickasaw Cession dis-
tricts in fact fall throughout a ranking of expenditures per pu-
pil, but also that funds from Sixteenth Section lands, :(ar from 
~ being "a critical element of school funding in Mississippi," Pe-





v-tA'-l~ I v<.., 
all receipts. I therefore find no basis for the belief that peti-
tioners cou d prove that students in Chickasaw Cession 
districts have been denied a minimally adequate education< ) 
and I do not believe that petitioners have asserted an equal 
protection claim that can survive a motion to dismiss under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)P 2 
I 
A brief procedural history is helpful in putting this litiga-
tion in perspective. Petitioners include a group of county 
school boards, superintendents of education, and individual 
school children, all residing in the Chickasaw Cession coun-
. r """'J. t~ 1~ t ,-f n.sny-
l I agree with the Court ~at the bulk of petitioners' claims are barred by ~.;._.;'A __ _ 
the Eleventh Amendment{ I also agree that a 99w.iRliiRg4ilisparity-m t ::I /,l~ ~,v... 
·stribution of State.funds w.ou~violation of equal protection It...,_ C:.:.(;.G·~ 
would not be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. ) 
2 
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ties in North Mississippi. In June 1981, petitioners sued nu-
merous federal and state officials, attacking the difference 
between, on the one hand, payments from Sixteenth Section 
lands in other school districts (the "Chocktaw area") and, on 
the other hand, payments from the State of Mississippi's 
trust fund to Chickasaw Cession counties in place of income 
from the Chickasaw school lands. 
The complaint recounted alleged "illegalities" as far back as 
the Northwest Ordinance of 1785. It sought to have various 
federal statutes that "purport to authorize, validate or con-
firm" sales of the Sixteenth Section lands declared "unlawful, 
void and unenforceable, including but not limited to (a) the 
Act of July 4, 1936; (b) the Act of May 19, 1852; (c) the Act of 
March 3, 1857; (d) any other acts of Congress having said ef-
fect." App. 16 (citations omitted). 
The complaint also alleged that both the federal and state 
defendants had breached perpetual and binding obligations of 
"an express/constructive trust": the Federal defendants by 
permitting the State to breach the trust through various stat-
utes (e.g., the Northwest Ordinance), and the State defend-
ants by unlawfully selling the relevant properties and by ill-
advisedly investing the proceeds of that sale. The complaint 
further alleged violations of due process by denial of "free ap-
propriate education" and-of relevance to the case as it 
stands before this Court-violations of equal protecti~ ~ 
disparate distribution of certain funds and by infrin~ upon 
the "fundamental rights" of "a suspect class" to "a minimally 
adequate level of education." Finally, the complaint alleged 
impairment of obligation of contract and taking without just 
compensation. 
Petitioners sought wide-ranging relief, including convey-
ance to them of properties or money of a value equivalent to 
that of the relevant Sixteenth Section lands and compensa-
tion for the income from 1832 to present that petitioners 
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"could have been receiving ... if such lands had been subject 
to prudent use and management." Petitioners also sought to 
obtain new lands as substitution for those lost, ''which may 
include offshore oil, gas and other mineral rights." Petition-
ers additionally sought to "enjoin" and "direct" the defend-
ants to establish "a fund or funds of such value" as was neces-
sary to provide "hereafter" and ''in perpetuity'' annual 
income to Chickasaw Cession school districts. Finally, peti-
tioners demanded that the defendants take other steps to 
"[e]liminate and compensate and for the future guarantee and 
protect plaintiffs and the plaintiff class against . . . denials 
and deprivations of their rights to due process of law and to 
the equal protection of the laws." 2 
The District Court held that the claims against the Federal 
Government were barred by sovereign immunity, laches, and 
statutes of limitations. This order was not appealed. In a 
separate order, the District Court held that any monetary 
remedy was barred by the Eleventh Amendment-a holding 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court today. I 
agree with this disposition. I also would not reach the issues 
raised by allegations of the denial of "a minimally adequate 
level of education." I do not, however, agree with the 
Court's holding that petitioners' equal protection allegations 
regarding the disparate distribution of funds present a claim 
of sufficient substance to survive a motion to dismiss under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
II 
The Court begins the discussion of petitioners' equal pro-
tection claim, ante, at 16-24, by acknowledging that it is ap-
propriate for the Court to take notice of ''relevant facts ob-
tained from the public record in the light most favorable to / Q 
the petitioners." }!:.nte, at 17. The most recent figures avail- c,,,' I./ 6f ·1 ... ~ ,._. 
able from the State Board of Education of Mississippi, read 
2 One rarely sees a complaint that hu HMtu1n1le eweep in ikl aHega is Q.$ ~Wc&fl~ in ~ 
eiens and hae mi P11an; re-,1.1eses fer d1.1plieaeioe remedies. o.\\~o.t1oro o.ncl o.s d'1>"' 
~ /.co ~ { 3 Mississippi State Board of Education, Annual Report 1984-1~. ,\ . \ ic:.o.¼i'fe. vn ~,n ~~ 
,a_,"11.#Pn-->~1 =----- .... ~N.\ia. ------
7 ~ .ll "'~ /.i l 0-:f:~) ~ 1-wt::.~  
,---~ ~-,y-r; )'/J -· -
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in such a light, fatally undercut petitioners' equal protection 
claims. Even though it is alleged-and here accepted as 
true-that there is a disparity between payments from Six-
teenth Section lands in the Chocktaw districts and payments 
from the State of Mississippi's trust fund to Chickasaw Ces-
sion counties, 4 the total per pupil expenditures in petitioners' 
school districts are comparable to, and in some cases higher 
than, the State-wide average. These figures also show that 
the Sixteenth Section payments are an insignificant part of 
the total payments from all sources made to Mississippi's 
school districts. 
The "Table of School Finances," ~nt, 
shows that Chickasaw Cession school districts are in fact dis-
tributed throughout a financial ranking of all the State's 
school districts, whether the measure used is "Current Ex-
penditure per Pupil," "Current Expenditure per Pupil for In-
structional Cost," or "Current Expenditure per Pupil less 
Transportation." Specifically, the Table shows that the 
State-wide average per pupil expenditure was $1965. 78, of 
which $1,261.09 went towards "instructional cost." All but 
six of the 39 school districts within the Chickasaw Cession 
districts spent within $300 of the per pupil average expendi-
ture; all but two spent within $200 of the average per pupil 
instructional expenditure. The per pupil expenditure was 
over $1400 in the Chickasaw district with the lowest per pupil 
expenditure, and over $2400 in the Chickasaw district with 
the highest expenditure. In the light of these figures of ex-
penditures per pupil, I cannot believe that $74. 71-the al-
leged difference between the average per pupil paymen,t from 
'The Court states that this disparity is $75.34 versus $.63. The Court 
of Appeals and the Petition for Certiorari give the relevant figures as 
$31.25 and $.80. 756 F. 2d, at 1091; Petition 4. The former figures are 
derived from an unaudited aggregation of reports by individual school dis-
tricts U1iat ma1t presented in a November 1984 report on the Chickasaw 
Cession Districts from the State Auditor and the Secretary of State. App. 
35. As this is case arose from af:12(b)(6) motion, I use the disparity most 





_,us are offset 
. ~titioner's claims. The sys-
• _.,oc schools bears a substantial similarity 
_ •• gement in the State of Texas upheld by this Court . 
. ~,.io School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). In Rodri-
guez, almost half of the revenues for funding elementary and secondary 
schools came from a large state-funded program designed to provide a 
basic minimal education in every school. Each school district then would 
supplement state funds-and some federal aid-through an ad valorem tax 
on property within its jurisdiction. Similarly, Mississippi provide each 
district with funds to support a "minimum program of education." See 
Miss. Code Ann., tit. 37, ch. 19. These funds constitut~t'.-ef 
the receipts for public schools; federal funds constitute another 18%. Of 
the remaining"receipts ~or Mississippi's school districts, ad valorem taxe1/ 
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III 
Petitioners' claims of a denial of a constitutionally adequate n/ 
minimal education cannot survive a motion under Fed. R. Y 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) in the light of the ~distribution of CJ 
Chickasaw Cession districts throughout the State-wide I 
rankings of various expenditures per pupil and the insignifi-
cance of the Sixteenth Section funds relative to the total re-
ceipts for education. Accordingly, I dissent. 
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Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Natchez Adams 2,131.22 33 1,253.67 73 2,018.70 31 
Alcorn 1,694.89 132 1,270.49 63 1,585.03 129 
Corinth 1,947.49 64 1,274.92 61 1,862.16 53 
Amite 2,331.43 11 1,454.17 18 2,057.52 28 
Attala 2,109.59 36 1,298.66 48 1,936.06 40 
Kosciusko 1,877.64 88 1,104.12 139 1,727.96 90 
Benton 2,121.78 35 1,338.89 38 1,952.98 38 
Bolivar #1 * 2,082.64 39 1,339.85 36 2,012.20 34 
Bolivar #2 * 2,769.62 4 1,804.24 2 2,699.23 3 
Bolivar #3 * 1,943.55 66 1,264.60 68 1,873.11 51 
Bolivar #4 * 1,793.43 110 1,182.67 106 1,722.98 91 
Bolivar #5 * 2,027.20 45 1,309.88 45 1,956.74 37 
Bolivar #6 * 1,657.08 136 1,173.85 116 1,586.61 128 
Calhaun 1,770.32 115 1,199.18 95 1,656.17 11 
Carroll 2,014.44 51 1,295.68 49 1,821.73 69 
Chickasaw 2,158.73 29 1,438.50 21 1,901.76 47 
Houston 1,797.93 108 1,233.84 80 1,681.46 105 
Okolona 1,635.52 143 1,106.77 137 1,565.18 132 
Choctaw 1,935.99 70 1,309.67 46 1,787.92 77 
Claiborne 4,085.75 1 2,066.37 1 3,799.88 1 
Enterprise * 1,729.02 123 1,143.75 128 1,538.66 136 
Quitman Cons * 1,813.05 106 1,129.16 133 1,622.30 120 
Clay 2,307.56 13 1,482.73 13 2,161.68 13 
West Point 1,844.88 97 1,198.97 96 1,733.96 89 
Coahoma Co 2,414.77 10 1,514.98 6 2,236.92 10 
Clarksdale 1,918.05 77 1,255.92 72 1,891.53 49 
Copiah 2,168.89 28 1,162.03 122 2,064.60 25 
Hazlehurst 1,771.68 114 1,190.21 99 1,660.59 110 
Covington 1,912.97 70 1,290.85 50 1,782.63 79 
Desoto 1,565.04 148 1,021 .31 150 1,467.48 146 
Forrest 2,019.63 48 1,352.53 34 1,841.33 60 
Hattiesburg 2,215.47 25 1,465.32 15 2,145.72 14 
Petal 1,701.54 129 1,182.13 108 1,595.90 124 
-. I--x-1~ ""' I.Ji ) 
, tf g ti •• ? r; r tl 
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TABLE OF SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Franklin 2,298.67 15 1,514.75 7 2,121.11 21 
George 1,474.78 153 982.08 152 1,341.92 154 
Greene 2,056.05 42 1,278.69 58 1,834.67 65 
Grenada 1,764.73 116 1,175.11 114 1,644.66 114 
Hancock 1,750.66 119 1,011.95 151 1,566.13 131 
Bay St Louis 1,981.82 56 1,165.33 119 1,905.05 46 
Harrison 1,860.89 92 1,264.10 69 1,758.84 83 
Biloxi 2,251.56 18 1,411.45 24 2,163.00 12 
Gulfport 2,496.19 8 1,457.45 17 2,433.81 7 
Long Beach 1,920.58 74 1,257.30 71 1,843.01 59 
Pass Christian 2,965.97 2 1,628.06 3 2,874.13 2 
Hinds 1,918.64 76 1,215.27 87 1,796.81 73 
Jackson 2,429.77 9 1,422.73 22 2,293.98 9 
Clinton 1,813.93 105 1,178.70 110 1,702.73 101 
Holmes 1,854.79 95 1,223.53 85 1,713.49 94 
Durant 1,553.46 151 1,155.74 125 1,553.37 133 
Humphreys 2,132.20 32 1,193.35 97 1,959.88 36 
Itawamba 1,905.92 80 1,156.48 124 1,749.66 85 
Jackson 2,243.31 20 1,364.81 33 2,113.99 23 
Moss Point 1,878.90 87 1,249.54 75 1,796.95 71 
Ocean Springs 1,920.67 73 1,269.80 64 1,852.01 58 
Pascagoula 2,538.68 6 1,494.00 11 2,458.17 5 
East Jasper * 2,010.43 52 1,265.89 66 1,836.99 64 
West Jasper 1,866.24 89 1,244.61 79 1,693.61 103 
Jefferson 2,066.22 41 1,351.06 35 1,861.66 54 
Jefferson Davis 1,928.49 72 1,275.72 60 1,749.29 86 
Jones 1,719.42 125 1,170.06 117 1,551.87 134 
Laurel 2,639.67 5 1,590.71 4 2,581.89 4 
Kemper 2,096.15 38 1,339.34 37 1,868.72 52 
Lafayette 1,698.47 130 1,109.42 136 1,530.26 137 
Oxford 2,226.94 24 1,514.00 8 2,118.55 22 
Lamar 1,506.98 152 971.37 153 1,382.92 153 
Lumberton Line * 1,601.57 145 1,182.43 107 1,601.07 122 
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TABLE OF SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Lauderdale 1,641.60 138 1,084.88 143 1,485.10 143 
Meridian 2,136.57 31 1,398.45 26 2,064.38 26 
Lawrence 1,980.57 57 1,193.35 98 1,840.85 62 
Leake 1,720.38 124 1,132.06 132 1,574.13 130 
Lee 1,694.48 133 1,162.81 120 1,587.20 127 
Nettleton Line * 1,457.55 154 1,097.67 141 1,444.60 149 
Tupelo 2,199.64 27 1,337.87 39 2,137.07 16 
Leflore 2,148.73 30 1,384.79 29 2,022.71 30 
Greenwood 2,245.93 19 1,459.97 16 2,215.51 11 
Lincoln 1,590.44 146 1,076.05 145 1,441.20 150 
Brookhaven 2,031.92 44 1,416.07 23 1,920.57 43 
Lowndes 1,640.09 140 1,060.41 147 1,517.19 140 
Columbus 2,106.33 37 1,383.49 30 2,018.05 33 
Madison 2,125.62 34 1,301.47 47 1,912.65 45 
Canton 1,697.55 131 1,213.84 90 1,639.48 117 
Ridgeland 1,814.86 103 1,150.59 127 1,704.57 100 
Marion 2,272.92 16 1,494.76 10 2,061.49 27 
Columbia 2,240.43 23 1,448.23 19 2,132.43 18 
Marshall 1,684.23 134 1,201.21 94 1,524.60 139 
Holly S-prings 1,975.64 59 1,232.12 82 1,860.84 55 
Monroe 1,706.16 127 1,112.07 135 1,546.87 135 
Aberdeen 1,890.98 83 1,245.80 78 1,796.93 72 
Amory 1,840.11 98 1,283.43 53 1,764.71 81 
Montgomery 2,022.40 47 1,213.96 89 1,856.00 57 
Winona 2,005.07 53 1,401.42 25 1,945.24 39 
Neshoba 1,638.19 141 1,162.39 121 1,502.41 141 
Philadelphia 1,913.78 78 1,319.95 42 1,832.34 67 
Newton 1,920.07 75 1,185.90 105 1,719.76 93 
Newton Sep 1,945.74 65 1,249.46 76 1,831.42 68 
Union Sep 1,740.87 121 1,143.63 129 1,646.80 113 
Noxubee 1,939.99 69 1,289.94 51 1,749.23 87 
Oktibbeha 1,897.03 82 1,337.68 40 1,759.97 82 
Starkville 1,965.92 62 1,252.02 74 1,879.25 50 
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TABLE OF SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
North Panola * 1,864.61 90 1,215.43 86 1,705.72 99 
South Panola * 1,637.45 142 1,100.87 140 1,478.59 145 
Pearl River 1,562.46 149 966.38 154 1,418.22 152 
Picayune 1,752.85 118 1,190.01 101 1,672.13 106 
Poplarville 1,862.97 91 1,190.15 100 1,707.74 96 
Perry 2,311.91 12 1,371.84 31 2,111.50 24 
Richton 1,886.43 85 1,174.43 115 1,719.79 92 
North Pike * 1,630.22 144 1,114.71 134 1,480.55 144 
South Pike * 1,858.62 94 1,265.60 67 1,707.35 98 
McComb 1,941.21 68 1,223.67 84 1,858.82 56 
Pontotoc 1,775.64 113 1,134.82 131 1,630.30 118 
Pontotoc Sep 1,643.80 137 1,064,43 146 1,461.72 147 
Prentiss 1,884.35 86 1,316.58 43 1,756.40 84 
Baldwyn 1,859.39 93 1,206.28 92 1,783.64 78 
Booneville 1,887.23 84 1,282.05 55 1,792.72 74 
Quitman 1,988.47 55 1,335.45 41 1,893.71 48 
Rankin 1,556.15 150 1,043.08 148 1,427.91 151 
Pearl 1,711.80 126 1,151.38 126 1,594.58 125 
Scott 1,737.36 122 1,213.54 91 1,600.68 123 
Forest 1,827.34 101 1,287.52 52 1,711.70 95 
Anguilla Line * 2,018.96 49 1,187.61 103 1,921.95 42 
Sharkey Issaquena * 2,016.35 50 1,246.07 77 1,841.20 61 
Simpson 1,819.91 102 1,260.84 70 1,698.56 102 
Smith 1,941.22 67 1,232.87 81 1,739.71 88 
Stone 1,989.77 54 1,215.14 88 1,833.56 66 
Sunflower 1,978.77 58 1,283.18 54 1,840.10 63 
Drew 2,039.51 43 1,385.51 28 1,933.45 41 
Indianola 1,640.99 139 1,178.18 111 1,589.70 126 
E. Tallahatchie * 1,928.67 71 1,273.27 62 1,788.65 76 
W. Tallahatchie * 1,847.13 96 1,269.31 65 1,707.58 97 
Tate 1,786.61 112 1,176.14 112 1,648.01 112 
Senatobia 1,749.59 120 1,189.10 102 1,671.48 107 
North Tippah * 1,829.20 100 1,175.58 113 1,671.22 108 
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TABLE OF SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Coet in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
South Tiwah * 1,757.42 117 1,185.98 104 1,612.25 121 
Tishomingo 1,968.02 61 1,157.67 123 1,819.53 70 
Iuka 1,577.18 147 1,078.86 144 1,456.91 148 
Tunica 1,809.43 107 1,092.64 142 1,661.67 109 
Union 1,658.56 135 1,104.20 138 1,527.78 138 
New Albany 2,073.07 40 1,367.04 32 1,985.33 35 
Walthall 1,797.02 109 1,279.93 56 1,622.85 119 
Warren 1,951.95 63 1,166.91 118 1,791.93 75 
Vicksburg 2,209.59 26 1,388.60 27 2,128.96 19 
Hollandale * 1.898.37 81 1,313.56 44 1,778.27 80 
Leland * 2,261.80 17 1,498.17 9 2,141.71 15 
Western Line * 2,243.11 21 1,472.29 14 2,123.03 20 
Greenville 1,974.31 60 1,279.45 57 1,918.06 44 
Wayne 1,790.77 111 1,135.49 130 1,642.63 115 
Webster 1,834.83 99 1,225.69 83 1,688.89 104 
Wilkinson 2,304.75 14 1,442.19 20 2,137.07 17 
Louisville 1,814.22 104 1,181.68 109 1,639.88 116 
Coffeeville * 2,241.05 22 1,278.55 59 2,028.25 29 
Water Valley * 1,705.38 128 1,040.79 149 1,492.57 142 
Yazoo 2,845.92 3 1,490.19 12 2,333.34 8 
Holly Bluff * 2,500.03 7 1,524.17 5 2,448.57 6 
Yazoo City 2,023.38 46 1,205.28 93 2,018.31 32 
Statewide Average 1,965.78 1,261.09 1,842.94 
Chickasaw Average 1,853.52 
Chocktaw Average 1,992.92 
• County Office receipts/expenditures prorated to consolidated districts by ADA. 
t All school districts within the Chickasaw Cession are denoted by italic typeface. School dis-
tricts that are partially within the Chickasaw Cession are aleo in italic type. 
(t ) _,. 
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RECEIPTS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS K' 
1984-1985 
Source of State Funds. 
State Dept. of Ed. $ 9,005,760 
Per Capita & Min. Prog. 490,568,205 
Vocational Ed. 16,269,064 '7 
Chickasaw 61,454 
Homestead Exemption 30,916,541 
EFC Payments 2,898,692 
Severance Tax 10,290,972 
Driver Penalty Funds 555,963 
Textbook 6,110,596 
School Lunch 574,624 
Adult Ed. 35,619 
Educable Children 511,070 
Ed. Reform Act 985,796 
Other 153,766 
Total State Funds $ 568,938,122 56.1% 
Source of Federal Funds: 
State Dept. Ed. $ 6,293,149 
Vocational Ed. 3,540,422 
National Forest 3,247,726 
TVA 643,509 
P. L. 874 2,657,490 
ECIA Ch. 1 64,896,618 
ECIA Ch. 2 4,388,330 
ESEA Other 107,118 
OEO 151,860 
Soc. Sec. Tit. XX & CETA (Emp. Sec. Comm.) 1,677,019 
School Lunch & Sp. Milk & Nonfood Asst. 67,638,280 
School Lunch, Commodities, Food 12,660,094 
Adult Ed. 745,079 
Education Handicapped Act 11,347,044 
Other (e.g., CETA Governor's Office) 3,403,978 
Total Federal Funds $ 183,397,716 18.1% 
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RECEIPTS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS-Continued 
1984-1985 
Source of Local Funds: 
Ad V alorem Tax 
Mineral Lease Tax 
Tuition from Patrons 
Transp. Fees from Patrons 
Sixteen Section Income 
Interest on Investments 
Intermediate Source 
















Total Local Sources 
TOTAL REVENUE RECEIPTS 
Nonrevenue Receipts: 
$ 261,122,056 25.8% 
$1,013,457,894 100.0% 
Sale of Bonds 
Sale of Assets 
Insurance Loss Recovery 
Loans 
Total Nonrevenue Receipts 

















From: Justice Powell 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-499 
B. H. PAPASAN, SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCA-
TION, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. WILLIAM A. ALLAIN, 
GOVERNOR OF MISSISSIPPI, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1986] 
----~ iA-01'\, tr;: ~ -~~ 
JUSTICE POWELLf issenting. (~_,v,J J~ Roi\,, .. -... ~ -4- ., <-"' 
The public record refutes petitioners' equal protecti~;;r_,_,. c1°' J 
claims. Statistics from Mississippi's the State Board of Edu-
cation show the statewide ranking of school districts in terms 
of expenditures per pupil. The Chickasaw Cession districts, 
in this ranking, are scattered widely among the state's 154 
school districts. Moreover, far from being a "critical ele-
ment of school funding in Mississippi," as alleged by petition-
ers, the Cession lands account account for less than one and a 
half percent of overall funds provided for schools. 1 I there-
fore find no basis for the belief that petitioners could prove 
that students in Chickasaw Cession districts have been de-
nied a minimally adequate education, and I do not believe 
that petitioners have asserted an equal protection claim that 
can survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6). 2 
1 Mississippi State Board of Education, Annual Report, 1984-1985. Ta- , 
bles A and B, infra, are taken from this Report, pp. 144-146 and p. 48, 
respectively. 
2 I agree with the Court that most of petitioners' claims are barred by I 
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I 
A brief procedural history is helpful in putting this litiga-
tion in perspective. Petitioners include a group of county 
school boards, superintendents of education, and individual 
school children, all residing in the Chickasaw Cession coun-
ties in North Mississippi. In June 1981, petitioners sued nu-
merous federal and state officials, attacking the difference 
between, on the one hand, payments from Sixteenth Section 
lands in other school districts (the "Chocktaw area") and, on 
the other hand, payments from the State of Mississippi's 
trust fund to Chickasaw Cession counties in place of income 
from the Chickasaw school lands. 
The complaint recounted alleged "illegalities" as far back as 
the Northwest Ordinance of 1785. It sought to have various 
federal statutes that "purport to authorize, validate or con-
firm" sales of the Sixteenth Section lands declared "unlawful, 
void and unenforceable, including but not limited to (a) the 
Act of July 4, 1936; (b) the Act of May 19, 1852; (c) the Act of 
March 3, 1857; (d) any other acts of Congress having said ef-
fect." App. 16 (citations omitted). 
The complaint also alleged that both the federal and state 
defendants had breached perpetual and binding obligations of 
"an express/constructive trust": the Federal defendants by 
permitting the State to breach the trust through various stat-
utes (e.g., the Northwest Ordinance), and the State defend-
ants by unlawfully selling the relevant properties and by ill-
advisedly investing the proceeds of that sale. The complaint 
further alleged violations of due process by denial of "free ap-
propriate education" and-of relevance to the case as it 
stands before this Court-violations of equal protection by 
disparate distribution of certain funds and by infringement I 
upon the "fundamental rights" of "a suspect class" to "a mini-
mally adequate level of education." Finally, the complaint 
alleged impairment of obligation of contract and taking with-
out just compensation. 
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Petitioners sought wide-ranging relief, including convey-
ance to them of properties or money of a value equivalent to 
that of the relevant Sixteenth Section lands and compensa-
tion for the income from 1832 to present that petitioners 
"could have been receiving ... if such lands had been subject 
to prudent use and management." Petitioners also sought to 
obtain new lands as substitution for those lost, "which may 
include offshore oil, gas and other mineral rights." Petition-
ers additionally sought to "enjoin" and "direct" the defend-
ants to establish "a fund or funds of such value" as was neces-
sary to provide "hereafter" and "in perpetuity" annual 
income to Chickasaw Cession school districts. Finally, peti-
tioners demanded that the defendants take other steps to 
"[e]liminate and compensate and for the future guarantee and 
protect plaintiffs and the plaintiff class against . . . denials 
and deprivations of their rights to due process of law and to 
the equal protection of the laws." 3 
The District Court held that the claims against the Federal 
Government were barred by sovereign immunity, laches, and 
statutes of limitations. This order was not appealed. In a 
separate order, the District Court held that any monetary 
remedy was barred by the Eleventh Amendment-a holding 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court today. I 
agree with this disposition. I also would not reach the issues 
raised by allegations of the denial of "a minimally adequate 
level of education." I do not, however, agree with the 
Court's holding that petitioners' equal protection allegations 
regarding the disparate distribution of funds present a claim 
of sufficient substance to survive a motion to dismiss under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
II 
The Court begins the discussion of petitioners' equal pro-
tection claim, ante, at 16-24, by acknowledging that it is ap-
~~~ 
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propriate for the Court to take notice of "relevant facts ob-
tained from the public record in the light most favorable to 
the petitioners." Ante, at 17. The most recent figures 
available from the State Board of Education of Mississippi, 
read in such a light, fatally undercut petitioners' equal pro-
tection claims. Even though it is alleged-and here ac-
cepted as true-that there is a disparity between payments 
from Sixteenth Section lands in the Chocktaw districts and 
payments from the State of Mississippi's trust fund to Chick-
asaw Cession counties, 4 the total per pupil expenditures in 
petitioners' school districts are comparable to, and in some 
cases higher than, the State-wide average. These figures 
also show that the Sixteenth Section payments are an insig-
nificant part of the total payments from all sources made to 
Mississippi's school districts. 
Table A in the appendix, "School Finances," shows that I 
Chickasaw Cession school districts are in fact distributed 
throughout a financial ranking of all the State's school dis-
tricts, whether the measure used is "Current Expenditure 
per Pupil," "Current Expenditure per Pupil for Instructional 
Cost," or "Current Expenditure per Pupil less Transporta-
tion." Specifically, the Table shows that the State-wide 
average per pupil expenditure was $1965. 78, of which 
$1,261.09 went towards "instructional cost." All but six of 
the 39 school districts within the Chickasaw Cession districts 
spent within $300 of the per pupil average expenditure; all 
but two spent within $200 of the average per pupil instruc-
tional expenditure. The per pupil expenditure was over 
$1400 in the Chickasaw district with the lowest per pupil ex-
'The Court states that this disparity is $75.34 versus $.63. The Court 
of Appeals and the Petition for Certiorari give the relevant figures as 
$31.25 and $.80. 756 F. 2d, at 1091; Petition 4. The former figures are 
derived from an unaudited aggregation of reports by individual school dis-
tricts presented in a November 1984 report on the Chickasaw Cession Dis- 1 
tricts from the State Auditor and the Secretary of State. App. 35. As 
this is case arose from a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I use the disparity most fa- I 
vorable to the plaintiffs: $74. 71. 
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penditure, and over $2400 in the Chickasaw district with the 
highest expenditure. In the light of these figures of expen-
ditures per pupil, I cannot believe that $74. 71-the alleged 
difference between the average per pupil payment from Six-
teenth Section lands and the average per pupil payment from 
the State's trust fund in place of the Chickasaw school 
lands-creates a violation of equal protection under the ra- I 
tional relation standard. 5 
Although the figures of expenditures per pupil are fatal to 
petitioners' claims, a second set of statistics provides an addi-
tional reason to conclude that an equal protection claim con-
cerning alleged disparities in Sixteenth Section Lands should 
not survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6). As shown in Table B "Receipts for Public Schools," 
payments received from Sixteenth Section _Lands in 
1984-1985, $16,272,925, accounted for~~o ota 
"Receipts for Public Schools" throughout the State. These 
Sixteenth Section payments are dwarfed by income from 
State and Federal funds of over $752,000,000 (totaling 74% of I 
"Receipts for Public Schools"). Variations among school dis-
tricts of such a small part of the total receipts cannot support 
a claim of a violation of the equal protection clause in the pro- _ 
vision of education for the children of the Chickasaw Cession ~
districts. 6 ~~,./. 
6 The State distributes its funds equally throughout the Mississi i's l 2 ' 
school districts on the basis of "teacher unit[s]." Tran. Oral Arg. 3 -*1. J 
therefor0 may be t~crepancies from Sixteenth Section lands are ffset ) .... ~
in part or entirely b - valorem taxes. ~ f d:J._,, 
6 There is yet another reason to dismi s petitioner's claims. The sys- ~ ' 
tern of financing Mississippi's public sch ols bears a substantial similarity 
to the financing arrangement in the St te of Texas upheld by this Court. 
San Antonio School District v. Rodri uez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). In Rodri-
guez, almost half of the revenues fo funding elementary and secondary 
schools came from a large state-fu ded program designed to provide a 
basic minimal education in every s ool. Each school district then would 
supplement state · hrough an ad valorem tax 
on property within its jurisdicti . Similarly, Mississippi provid~ each 
6 
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III 
Petitioners' @lei,.. of a ,loRi&I of a oo,..IMtt-immlly adeqaate ~-~ j 
minima½ eeltte&~iaM~ annot survive a motion under Fed. R. ~ 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) in 'tne light of the distribution of Chickasaw I 
Cession districts throughout the State-wide rankings of vari-
ous expenditures per pupil and the insignificance of the Six-
teenth Section funds relative to the total receipts for educa-
tion. Accordingly, I dissent. 
district with funds to support a "minimum program of education." See 
Miss. Code Ann., tit. 37, ch. 19. These funds constitute over half of the 
receipts for public schools; federal funds constitute another 18%. Of the 
remaining receipts for Mississippi's school districts, ad valorem truce 
count for over two-thirds. See Table B.A 
Missi$s:,pp·,,s ~~ s~~~, 
1·,k4'.. 'tho't ch T~, ''[wlhU.. 
o..ss~ a. bo.si<. <l.~~ ~ '-'" u.~., ~ 4, . 
~ ~ ~~ ~J··· ~OM!~~~ 
l0>.~ tfW\,fO~""- ~ ~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Q~ 
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Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Natchez Adams 2,131.22 33 1,253.67 73 2,018.70 31 
Alcorn 1,694.89 132 1,270.49 63 1,585.03 129 
Corinth 1,947.49 64 1,274.92 61 1,862.16 53 
Amite 2,331.43 11 1,454.17 18 2,057.52 28 
Attala 2,109.59 36 1,298.66 48 1,936.06 40 
Kosciusko 1,877.64 88 1,104.12 139 1,727.96 90 
Benton 2,121.78 35 1,338.89 38 1,952.98 . 38 
Bolivar #1 * 2,082.64 39 1,339.85 36 2,012.20 34 
Bolivar #2 * 2,769.62 4 1,804.24 2 2,699.23 3 
Bolivar #3 * 1,943.55 66 1,264.60 68 1,873.11 51 
Bolivar #4 * 1,793.43 110 1,182.67 106 1,722.98 91 
Bolivar #5 * 2,027.20 45 1,309.88 45 1,956.74 37 
Bolivar #6 * 1,657.08 136 1,173.85 116 1,586.61 128 
Calhoun 1,770.32 115 1,199.18 95 1,656.17 111 x 
Carroll 2,014.44 51 1,295.68 49 1,821.73 69 
Chickasaw 2,158.73 29 1,438.50 21 1,901.76 47 
Houston 1,797.93 108 1,233.84 80 1,681.46 105 
Okolona 1,635.52 143 1,106.77 137 1,565.18 132' 
Choctaw 1,935.99 70 1,309.67 46 1,787.92 77 
Claiborne 4,085.75 1 2,066.37 1 3,799.88 1 
Enterprise * 1,729.02 123 1,143.75 128 1,538.66 136 
Quitman Cons * 1,813.05 106 1,129.16 133 1,622.30 120 
Clay 2,307.56 13 1,482.73 13 2,161.68 13 
West Point 1,844.88 97 1,198.97 96 1,733.96 89 
Coahoma Co 2,414.77 10 1,514.98 6 2,236.92 10 
Clarksdale 1,918.05 77 1,255.92 72 1,891 .53 49 
Copiah 2,168.89 28 1,162.03 122 2,064.60 25 
Hazlehurst 1,771.68 ,i¥!-- 1,190.21 99 1,660.59 110 >< Covington 1,912.97 1,290.85 50 1,782.63 79 
Desoto 1,565.04 148 1 ,021.31 150 1,467.48 146 
Forrest 2,019.63 48 1,352.53 34 1,841.33 60 n;1/ Hattiesburg 2,215.47 25 1,465.32 15 2,145.72 14 
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SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Petal 1,701.54 129 1,182.13 108 1,595.90 124 
Franklin 2,298.67 15 1,514.75 7 2,121.11 21 
George 1,474.78 153 982.08 152 1,341.92 154 
Greene 2,056.05 42 1,278.69 58 1,834.67 65 
Grenada 1,764.73 116 1,175.11 114 1,644.66 114 
Hancock 1,750.66 119 1,011.95 151 1,566.13 131 
Bay St Louis 1,981.82 56 1,165.33 119 1,905.05 46 
Harrison 1,860.89 92 1,264.10 69 1,758.84 83 
Biloxi 2,251.56 18 1,411.45 24 2,163.00 12 
Gulfport 2,496.19 8 1,457.45 17 2,433.81 7 
Long Beach 1,920.58 74 1,257.30 71 1,843.01 59 
Pass Christian 2,965.97 2 1,628.06 3 2,874.13 2 
Hinds 1,918.64 76 1,215.27 87 1,796.81 73 
Jackson 2,429.77 9 1,422.73 22 2,293.98 9 
Clinton 1,813.93 105 1,178.70 110 1,702.73 101 
Holmes 1,854.79 95 1,223.53 85 1,713.49 94 
Durant 1,553.46 151 1,155.74 125 1,553.37 133 
Humphreys 2,132.20 32 1,193.35 97 1,959.88 36 
Itawamba 1,905.92 80 1,156.48 124 1,749.66 85 
Jackson 2,243.31 20 1,364.81 33 2,113.99 23 
Moss Point 1,878.90 87 1,249.54 75 1,796.95 71 
Ocean Springs 1,920.67 73 1,269.80 64 1,852.01 58 
Pascagoula 2,538.68 6 1,494.00 11 2,458.17 5 
East Jasper * 2,010.43 52 1,265.89 66 1,836.99 64 
West Jasper t l,866.24 89 1,244.61 79 1,693.61 103 )( 
Jefferson 2,066.22 41 1,351.06 35 1,861.66 54 
Jefferson Davis 1,928.49 72 1,275.72 60 1,749.29 86 
Jones 1,719.42 125 1,170.06 117 1,551.87 134 
Laurel 2,639.67 5 1,590.71 4 2,581.89 4 
Kemper 2,096.15 38 1,339.34 37 1,868.72 52 
Lafayette 1,698.47 130 1,109.42 136 1,530.26 137 
Oxford 2,226.94 24 1,514.00 8 2,118.55 22 
Lamar 1,506.98 152 971.37 153 1,382.92 153 
85-499--APPENDIX 
PAP ASAN v. MISSISSIPPI 9 
SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Lumberton Line * 1,601.57 145 1,182.43 107 1,601.07 122 
Lauderdale 1,641.60 138 1,084.88 143 1,485.10 143 
Meridian 2,136.57 31 1,398.45 26 2,064.38 26 
Lawrence 1,980.57 57 1,193.35 98 1,840.85 62 
Leake 1,720.38 124 1,132.06 132 1,574.13 130 
Lee 1,694.48 133 1,162.81 120 1,587.20 127 
Nettleton Line * 1,457.55 154 1,097.67 141 1,444.60 149 
Tupelo 2,199.64 27 1,337.87 39 2,137.07 16 
Leflore 2,148.73 30 1,384.79 29 2,022.71 30 
Greenwood 2,245.93 19 1,459.97 16 2,215.51 11 
Lincoln 1,590.44 146 1,076.05 145 1,441.20 150 
Brookhaven 2,031.92 44 1,416.07 23 1,920.57 43 
Lowndes 1,640.09 140 1,060.41 147 1,517.19 140 
Columbus 2,106.33 37 1,383.49 30 2,018.05 33 
Madison 2,125.62 34 1,301.47 47 1,912.65 45 
Canton 1,697.55 131 1,213.84 90 1,639.48 117 
Ridgeland 1,814.86 103 1,150.59 127 1,704.57 100 
Marion 2,272.92 16 1,494.76 10 2,061.49 27 
Columbia 2,240.43 23 1,448.23 19 2,132.43 18 
Marshall 1,684.23 134 1,201.21 94 1,524.60 139 
Holly Springs 1,975.64 59 1,232.12 82 1,860.84 55 
Monroe 1,706.16 127 1,112.07 135 1,546.87 135 
Aberdeen 1,890.98 83 1,245.80 78 1,796.93 72 
Amory 1,840.11 98 1,283.43 53 1,764.71 81 
Montgomery 2,022.40 47 1,213.96 89 1,856.00 57 
Winona 2,005.07 53 1,401.42 25 1,945.24 39 
Neshoba 1,638.19 141 1,162.39 121 1,502.41 141 
Philadelphia 1,913.78 78 1,319.95 42 1,832.34 67 
Newton 1,920.07 75 1,185.90 105 1,719.76 93 
Newtoh Sep 1,945.74 65 1,249.46 76 1,831.42 68 
Union Sep 1,740.87 121 1,143.63 129 1,646.80 113 
Noxubee 1,939.99 69 1,289.94 51 1,749.23 87 
Oktibbeha 1,897.03 82 1,337.68 40 1,759.97 82 
• 
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SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Starkville 1,965.92 62 1,252.02 74 1,879.25 50 
North Panola * 1,864.61 90 1,215.43 86 1,705.72 99 
South, Panola * 1,637.45 142 1,100.87 140 1,478.59 145 
Pearl River 1,562.46 149 966.38 154 1,418.22 152 
Picayune 1,752.85 118 1,190.01 101 1,672.13 106 
Poplarville 1,862.97 91 1,190.15 100 1,707.74 96 
Perry 2,311.91 12 1,371.84 31 2,111.50 24 
Richton 1,886.43 85 1,174.43 115 1,719.79 92 
North Pike * 1,630.22 144 1,114.71 134 1,480.55 144 
South Pike * 1,858.62 94 1,265.60 67 1,707.35 98 
McComb 1,941.21 68 1,223.67 84 1,858.82 56 
Pontotoc 1,775.64 113 1,134.82 131 1,630.30 118 
Pontotoc Sep 1,643.80 137 1,064.43 146 1,461.72 147 
Prentiss 1,884.35 86 1,316.58 43 1,756.40 84 
Baldwyn 1,859.39 93 1,206.28 92 1,783.64 78 
Booneville 1,887.23 84 1,282.05 55 1,792.72 74 
Quitm(1;11, 1,988.47 55 1,335.45 41 1,893.71 48 
Rankin 1,556.15 150 1,043.08 148 1,427._91 151 
Pearl 1,711.80 126 1,151.38 126 1,594.58 125 
Scott 1,737.36 122 1,213.54 91 1,600.68 123 
Forest 1,827.34 101 1,287.52 52 1,711.70 95 
Anguilla Line * 2,018.96 49 1,187.61 103 1,921.95 42 
Sharkey Issaquena * 2,016.35 50 1,246.07 77 1,841.20 61 
Simpson 1,819.91 102 1,260.84 70 1,698.56 102 
Smith 1,941.22 67 1,232.87 81 1,739.71 88 
Stone 1,989.77 54 1,215.14 88 1,833.56 66 
Sunflower 1,978.77 58 1,283.18 54 1,840.10 63 
Drew 2,039.51 43 1,385.51 28 1,933.45 41 
Indianola 1,640.99 139 1,178.18 111 1,589.70 126 
E. Tallahatchie * 1,928.67 71 1,273.27 62 1,788.65 76 
W. Tallahatchie * 1,847.13 96 1,269.31 65 1,707.58 97 
Tate 1,786.61 112 1,176.14 112 1,648.01 112 
Senatobia 1,743.53 120 1,189.10 102 1,.671.48 107 
85-499-APPENDIX 
PAP ASAN v. MISSISSIPPI 11 
SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
North Tippah * 1,829.20 100 1,175.58 113 1,671.22 108 
South Tippah * 1,757.42 117 1,185.98 104 1,612.25 121 
Tishomingo 1,968.02 61 1,157.67 123 1,819.53 70 
Iuka 1,577.18 147 1,078.86 144 1,456.91 148 
Tunica 1,809.43 107 1,092.64 142 1,661.67 109 
Union 1,658.56 135 1,104.20 138 1,527.78 138 
New Albany 2,073.07 40 1,367.04 32 1,985.33 35 
Walthall 1,797.02 109 1,279.93 56 1,622.85 119 
Warren 1,951.95 63 1,166.91 118 1,791.93 75 
Vicksburg 2,209.59 26 1,388.60 27 2,128.96 19 
Hollandale * 1.898.37 81 1,313.56 44 1,778.27 80 
Leland * 2,261.80 17 1,498.17 9 2,141.71 15 
Western Line * 2,243.11 21 1,472.29 14 2,123.03 20 
Greenville 1,974.31 60 1,279.45 57 1,918.06 44 
Wayne 1,790.77 111 1,135.49 130 1,642.63 115 
Webster 1,834.83 99 1,225.69 83 1,688.89 104 
Wilkinson 2,304.75 14 1,442.19 20 2,137.07 17 
Louisville 1,814.22 104 1,181.68 109 1,639.88 116 
Coffeeville * 2,241.05 22 1,278.55 59 2,028.25 29 
Water Valley * 1,705.38 128 1,040.79 149 1,492.57 142 
Yazoo 2,845.92 3 1,490.19 12 2,333.34 8 
Holly Bluff * 2,500.03 7 1,524.17 5 2,448.57 6 
Yazoo City 2,023.38 46 1,205.28 93 2,018.31 32 
Statewide Average 1,965.78 l,26~ 1,842.94 
Chickasaw Average 1,853.52 1,21 .82 1,722.82 
Chocktaw Average 1,992.92 I ,l."8.\1 ,H!i! ii J; s~s s~ 1,87Cf,,7 
• County Office receipts/expenditures prorated to consolidated districts by ADA. 
t All school districts within the Chickasaw Cession are denoted by italic typeface. School dis-
tricts that are partially within the Chickasaw Cession are also in italic type. 
SoURCE: Mississippi State Board of Education Annual Report, 1984-1985, pp. 144-146. 
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TABLE B 
RECEIPTS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
1984-1985 
Source of State Funds: 
State Dept. of Ed. $ 9,005,760 
Per Capita & Min. Prog. 490,568,205 
Vocational Ed. 16,269,064 
Chickasaw 61,454 
Homestead Exemption 30,916,541 
EFC Payments 2,898,692 
Severance Tax 10,290,972 
Driver Penalty Funds 555,963 
Textbook 6,110,596 
School Lunch 574,624 
Adult Ed. 35,619 
Educable Children 511,070 
Ed. Reform Act 985,796 
Other 153,766 
Total State Funds $ 568,938,122 56.1% 
Source of Federal Funds: 
State Dept. Ed. $ 6,293,149 
Vocational Ed. 3,540,422 
National Forest 3,247,726 
TVA 643,509 
P. L. 874 2,657,490 
ECIA Ch. 1 64,896,618 
ECIA Ch. 2 4,388,330 
ESEA Other 107,118 
OEO 151,860 
Soc. Sec. Tit. XX & CETA (Emp. Sec. Comm.) 1,677,019 
School Lunch & Sp. Milk & Nonfood Asst. 67,638,280 
School Lunch, Commodities, Food 12,660,094 
Adult Ed. 745,079 
Education Handicapped Act 11,347,044 
Other (e.g., CETA Governor's Office) 3,403,978 
Total Federal Funds $ 183,397,716 18.1% 
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RECEIPTS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS-Continued 
1984-1985 
Source of Local Funds: 
Ad Valorem Tax 
Mineral Lease Tax 
Tuition from Patrons 
Transp. Fees from Patrons 
Sixteen Section Income 
Interest on Investments 
Intermediate Source 
















Total Local Sources 
TOTAL REVENUE RECEIPTS 
Nonrevenue Receipts: 
$ 261,122,056 25.8% 
$1,013,457,894 100.0% 
Sale of Bonds 
Sale of Assets 
Insurance Loss Recovery 
Loans 
Total N onrevenue Receipts 













rom: Justice Powell 
~ 
-S-DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-499 
B. H. PAPASAN, SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCA-
TION, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. WILLIAM A. ALLAIN, 
GOVERNOR OF MISSISSIPPI, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[July 1, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and l 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
The public record refutes petitioners' equal protection 
claims that the disparities in funding from various school \ 
lands detrimentally affects students and schools in school dis-
tricts within the Chickasaw Cession. Statistics from Missis-
sippi's State Department of Education show the statewide 
ranking of school districts in terms of expenditures per pupil. 
In this ranking, the Chickasaw Cession districts are scat-
tered widely among the State's 154 school districts. More-
over, far from being a "critical element of school funding in 
Mississippi," as alleged by petitioners, the Sixteenth Section \ 
lands account for only 1 ½% of overall funds provided for 
schools. 1 I therefore find no basis for the .hette t at peti-
tioners ~ prove that students in Chickasaw ession dis-
tricts have been detrimentally affected by this differential, \ 
and I do not believe that petitioners have asserted an equal 
1 Mississippi State Department of Education, Annual Report, 1984-1985 
(1986) . Tables A and B, infra, are taken from this Report, pp. 144-146 
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protection claim that can survive a motion to dismiss under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 2 
I 
A brief procedural history is helpful in putting this litiga-
tion in perspective. Petitioners include a group of county 
school boards, superintendents of education, and individual 
school children, all residing in the Chickasaw Cession coun-
ties in north Mississippi. In June 1981, petitioners sued nu-
merous federal and state officials, attacking the difference 
between, on the one hand, payments from Sixteenth Section 
lands in other school districts (the Chocktaw area) and, on 
the other hand, payments from the State of Mississippi's 
trust fund to school districts within the Chickasaw Cession \ 
counties in place of income from the Chickasaw school lands. 
The complaint recounted alleged "illegalities" as far back as 
the Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1785. It sought to 
have various federal statutes that "purport to authorize, vali-
date or confirm" sales of the Sixteenth Section lands declared 
"unlawful, void and unenforceable, including but not limited 
to (a) the Act of July 4, 1936; (b) the Act of May 19, 1852; (c) 
the Act of March 3, 1857; (d) any other acts of Congress hav-
ing said effect." App. 16 (citations omitted). 
The complaint also alleged that both the federal and state 
defendants had breached perpetual and binding obligations of 
"an express/constructive trust": the federal defendants by 
permitting the State to breach the trust through various stat-
utes (e.g., the Northwest Territory Ordinance), and the 
State defendants by unlawfully selling the relevant proper-
ties and by ill-advisedly investing the proceeds of that sale. 
The complaint further alleged violations of due process by de-
nial of "free appropriate public education" and-of relevance 
to the case as it stands before this Court-violations of equal 
2 I agree with the Court that most of petitioners' claims are barred by 
the Eleventh Amendment, and therefore join Part II of the Court's 
opinion. 
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protection by disparate distribution of certain funds and by 
infringement upon the "fundamental rights" of "a suspect 
class" to "a minimally adequate level of education." Finally, 
the complaint alleged impairment of obligation of contract 
and taking without just compensation. 
Petitioners sought wide-ranging relief, including convey-
ance to them of properties or money of a value equivalent to 
that of the relevant Sixteenth Section lands and compensa-
tion for the income from 1832 to present that petitioners 
"could have been receiving ... if such lands had been subject 
to prudent use and management." Petitioners also sought to 
obtain new lands as substitution for those lost, "which may 
include offshore oil, gas and other mineral rights." Petition-
ers additionally sought to "enjoin" and "direct" the defend-
ants to establish "a fund or funds of such value" as was neces-
sary to provide "hereafter" and "in perpetuity" annual 
income to Chickasaw Cessi(m school districts. Finally, peti-
tioners demanded that the defendants. take other steps to 
"[e]liminate and compensate and for the future guarantee and 
protect plaintiffs and the plaintiff class against . . . denials 
and deprivations of their rights to due process of law and to 
the equal protection of the laws." 3 · 
The District Court held that the claims against the Federal 
Government were barred by sovereign immunity, laches, and 
statutes of limitations. This order was not appealed. In a 
separate order, the District Court held that any monetary 
remedy was barred by the Eleventh Amendment-a holding 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court today. I 
agree with this disposition. I also would not reach the issues 
_ 
1 
l. raised by allegations of the denial of a "fundamental right" to \ 
l ~zu-Mi "a minimally adequate level of education.~ I do not, how-
3 One rarely sees a complaint that is as swe · · its allegations and as 
<.,\ duplicative in its requests for relief. · he only alleged de-l 
f""', nial of equal Protection is with resp t to the funding in the Chickasaw 
Cession school districts. As noted su ra, at 1, these funds are only 1½% 
of overall funding for elementary and s condary schools within the State. 
I ' 
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ever, agree with the Court's holding that petitioners' equal 
protection allegations regarding the disparate distribution of 
funds present a claim of sufficient substance to survive a mo-
tion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6). 
II 
The Court begins the discussion of petitioners' equal pro-
tection claim, ante, at 16-24, by acknowledging that it is ap-
propriate for the Court to take notice of "relevant facts ob-
tained from the public record in the light most favorable to 
the petitioners." Ante, at 17. The most recent figures 
available from the State Board of Education of Mississippi, 
read in such a light, fatally undercut petitioners' equal pro-
tection claims. 
It is alleged-and here accepted as true-that there is a 
disparity between the payments from the Sixteenth Section 
Lands in the Chocktaw districts and the payments from the 
state of Mississippi's trust fund to Chickasaw districts. 4 
e ou reads the complaint as alleging that this 
unequal distribution of such funds acts "to the detriment of 
the Chickasaw Cession schools and their students," ante, at 
21. The complaint, however, contains no factual assertions 
other than this disparity to support .tftisJ conclusory a ega-.--s7-tiorl nor is there any basis for believing a detriment could 
~ evet be proven. As shown in Table A, the various per pupil 
expenditures in petitioners' school districts are comparable 
to, and in some cases higher than, the average for districts 
within the Chocktaw area. And the Sixteenth Section pay-
'The Court states that this disparity is $75.34 versus $.63. The Court 
of Appeals and the Petition for Certiorari give the relevant figures as 
$31.25 and $.80. 756 F . 2d, 1087, 1091 (CA5 1985); Pet. for Cert. 4. The 
former figures are derived from an unaudited aggregation of reports by in-
dividual school districts presented in a November 1984 report on the Chick-
asaw Cession Districts from the State Auditor and the Secretary of State. 
App. 35. As this case arose from a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I use the dispar-
ity most favorable to the plaintiffs: $74. 71. 
A 
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ments-as the figures in Table B demonstrate beyond argu-
ment-are an insignificant part of the total payments from all 
sources made to Mississippi's school districts. 
The Court does not question these data. It instead states 
that petitioners "have limited themselves to challenging dis-
crimination in the Sixteenth Section" program, and, relying 
on that limitation, "decline[s] the dissent's invitation to look 
at school receipts overall." Ante, at 22, n. 17. The Court 
thereby ignores the undisputed facts concerning the funding 
of public education in the State of Mississippi, and instead 
bases its equal protection analysis on 1 ½% of the overall 
funds provided for public secondary and elementary schools 
in the State. The Equal Protection Clause, at least in the 
context of a state funding of schools, is concerned with sub-
stance, not with the de minimus variations of funding among 
the districts. 
Table A in the appendix, "School Finances," shows that 
Chickasaw Cession school districts are in fact distributed 
throughout a financial ranking of all the State's school dis-
tricts, whether the measure used is "Current Expenditure 
per Pupil ," "Current Expenditure per Pupil for Instructional 
Cost," or "Current Expenditure per Pupil less Transporta-
tion." Specifically, the Table shows that the statewide av-
erage per pupil expenditure was $1965.78, of which $1,261.09 
went towards "instructional cost." All but 6 of the 39 school 
districts within the Chickasaw Cession districts spent within 
$300 of the per pupil average expenditure; all but two spent 
within $200 of the average per pupil instructional expendi-
ture. The per pupil expenditure was over $1400 in the 
Chickasaw district with the lowest per pupil expenditure, 
and over $2400 in the Chickasaw district with the highest ex-
penditure. In the light of these figures of expenditures per 
pupil, I cannot believe that $74. 71-the alleged difference be-
tween the average per pupil payment from Sixteenth Section 
lands and the average per pupil payment from the State's 
trust fund in place of the Chickasaw school lands-creates a\ 
6 
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"detriment" to the students and schools within the Chickasaw \ 
Cession and thereby gives rise to a violation of equal protec-
tion under the rational relation standard. 5 
Although the figures of expenditures per pupil are fatal to 
petitioners' claims, a second set of statistics provides an addi-
tional reason to conclude that an equal protection claim con-
cerning alleged disparities in Sixteenth Section Lands should 
not survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6). As shown in Table B "Receipts for Pub-
lic Schools," payments received from Sixteenth Section lands 
in 1984-1985, $16,272,925, accounted for less than 1½% of 
total "Receipts for Public Schools" throughout the State. 
These Sixteenth Section payments are dwarfed by income 
from state and federal funds of over $752 million (totaling 
74% of "Receipts for Public Schools"). Variations among 
school districts of such a small part of the total receipts can-
not support a claim of a violation of the equal protection 
clause in the provision of education for the children of the 
Chickasaw Cession districts. 6 
s The State distributes its funds equally throughout Mississippi's school 
districts on the basis of "teacher unit[s]." See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 37-19-3 
and 37-19-5 (Supp. 1985); Tr. Oral Arg. 32. As in many states, total fund-
ing among districts in Mississippi varies depending upon local ad valorem 
taxes and other district sources. See Table B; see also San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 49 (1973). Discrepan-l 
cies from Sixteenth Section lands are frequently offset in part or entirely 
by ad valorem taxes , and the variations in local funding from sources other 
than Sixteenth Section lands are almost always greater than the alleged 
"disparity" relied on in this case. See Annual Report, supra, n. 1, at 
94-98 (listing revenue receipts by local sources). 
6 There is another reason to dismiss petitioner's claims. The system of 
financing Mississippi's public schools bears a substantial similarity to the 
financing arrangement in the State of Texas upheld by this Court. San 
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). In Rodriguez, 
almost half of the revenues for funding elementary and secondary schools 
came from a large state-funded program designed to provide a basic mini-
mal education in every school. Each school district then would supple-
ment state and federal funds through an ad valorem tax on property within 
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III 
7 
Petitioners' equal protection claims cannot survive a mo-
tion under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) in the light 
of the distribution of Chickasaw Cession districts throughout 
the State-wide rankings of various expenditures per pupil 
and the insignificance of the Sixteenth Section funds relative 
to the total receipts for education. Accordingly, I dissent. 
its jurisdiction. Similarly, Mississippi provides each district with funds to 
support a "minimum program of education." See Miss. Code Ann., 
§ 37-19-1 et seq. (1972 and Supp. V). These funds constitute over half of 
the receipts for public schools; federal funds constitute another 18%. Of 
the remaining receipts for Mississippi's school districts, ad valorem taxes, 
which are levied by, and vary among, the local school districts, account for 
over two-thirds. See Table B, infra. Mississippi's financing system, like 
that of Texas, "[w]hile assuring a basic education for every child in the 
State, ... permits and encourages a large measure of participation and 
control of each district's schools at the local level." Rodriguez, 411 U. S., 
at 49. 
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Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Natchez Adams 2,131.22 33 1,253.67 73 2,018.70 31 
Alcorn 1,694.89 132 1,270.49 63 1,585.03 129 
Corinth 1,947.49 64 1,274.92 61 1,862.16 53 
Amite 2,331.43 11 1,454.17 18 2,057.52 28 
Attala 2,109.59 36 1,298.66 48 1,936.06 40 
Kosciusko 1,877.64 88 1,104.12 139 1,727.96 90 
Benton 2,121.78 35 1,338.89 38 1,952.98 38 
Bolivar #1 * 2,082.64 39 1,339.85 36 2,012.20 34 
Bolivar #2 * 2,769.62 4 1,804.24 2 2,699.23 3 
Bolivar #3 * 1,943.55 66 1,264.60 68 1,873.11 51 
Bolivar #4 * 1,793.43 110 1,182.67 106 1,722.98 91 
Bolivar #5 * 2,027.20 45 1,309.88 45 1,956.74 37 
Bolivar #6 * 1,657.08 136 1,173.85 116 1,586.61 128 
Calhoun 1,770.32 115 1,199.18 95 1,656.17 111 
Carroll 2,014.44 51 1,295.68 49 1,821.73 69 
Chickasaw 2,158.73 29 1,438.50 21 1,901.76 47 
Houston 1,797.93 108 1,233.84 80 1,681.46 105 
Okolona 1,635.52 143 1,106.77 137 1,565.18 132 
Choctaw 1,935.99 70 1,309.67 46 1,787.92 77 
Claiborne 4,085.75 1 2,066.37 1 3,799.88 1 
Enterprise * 1,729.02 123 1,143.75 128 1,538.66 136 
Quitman Cons * 1,813.05 106 1,129.16 133 1,622.30 120 
Clay 2,307.56 13 1,482.73 13 2,161.68 13 
West Point 1,844.88 97 1,198.97 96 1,733.96 89 
Coahoma Co 2,414.77 10 1,514.98 6 2,236.92 10 
Clarksdale 1,918.05 77 1,255.92 72 1,891.53 49 
Copiah 2,168.89 28 1,162.03 122 2,064.60 25 
Hazlehurst 1,771.68 114 1,190.21 99 1,660.59 110 
Covington 1,912.97 79 1,290.85 50 1,782.63 79 
Desoto 1,565.04 148 1,021.31 150 1,467.48 146 
Forrest 2,019.63 48 1,352.53 34 1,841.33 60 
Hattiesburg 2,215.47 25 1,465.32 15 2,145.72 14 
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SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Petal 1,701.54 129 1,182.13 108 1,595.90 124 
Franklin 2,298.67 15 1,514.75 7 2,121.11 21 
George 1,474.78 153 982.08 152 1,341.92 154 
Greene 2,056.05 42 1,278.69 58 1,834.67 65 
Grenada 1,764.73 116 1,175.11 114 1,644.66 114 
Hancock 1,750.66 119 1,011.95 151 1,566.13 131 
Bay St Louis 1,981.82 56 1,165.33 119 1,905.05 46 
Harrison 1,860.89 92 1,264.10 69 1,758.84 83 
Biloxi 2,251.56 18 1,411.45 24 2,163.00 12 
Gulfport 2,496.19 8 1,457.45 17 2,433.81 7 
Long Beach 1,920.58 74 1,257.30 71 1,843.01 59 
Pass Christian 2,965.97 2 1,628.06 3 2,874.13 2 
Hinds 1,918.64 76 1,215.27 87 1,796.81 73 
Jackson 2,429.77 9 1,422.73 22 2,293.98 9 
Clinton 1,813.93 105 1,178.70 110 1,702.73 101 
Holmes 1,854.79 95 1,223.53 85 1,713.49 94 
Durant 1,553.46 151 1,155.74 125 1,553.37 133 
Humphreys 2,132.20 32 1,193.35 97 1,959.88 36 
Itawamba 1,905.92 80 1,156.48 124 1,749.66 85 
Jackson 2,243.31 20 1,364.81 33 2,113.99 23 
Moss Point 1,878.90 87 1,249.54 75 1,796.95 71 
Ocean Springs 1,920.67 73 1,269.80 64 1,852.01 58 
Pascagoula 2,538.68 6 1,494.00 11 2,458.17 5 
East Jasper * 2,010.43 52 1,265.89 66 1,836.99 64 
West Jasper * 1,866.24 89 1,244.61 79 1,693.61 103 
Jefferson 2,066.22 41 1,351.06 35 1,861.66 54 
Jefferson Davis 1,928.49 72 1,275.72 60 1,749.29 86 
Jones 1,719.42 125 1,170.06 117 1,551.87 134 
Laurel 2,639.67 5 1,590.71 4 2,581.89 4 
Kemper 2,096.15 38 1,339.34 37 1,868.72 52 
Lafayette 1,698.47 130 1,109.42 136 1,530.26 137 
Oxford 2,226.94 24 1,514.00 8 2,118.55 22 
Lamar 1,506.98 152 971.37 153 1,382.92 153 
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SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Lumberton Line * 1,601.57 145 1,182.43 107 1,601.07 122 
Lauderdale 1,641.60 138 1,084.88 143 1,485.10 143 
Meridian 2,136.57 31 1,398.45 26 2,064.38 26 
Lawrence 1,980.57 57 1,193.35 98 1,840.85 62 
Leake 1,720.38 124 1,132.06 132 1,574.13 130 
Lee 1,694.48 133 1,162.81 120 1,587.20 127 
Nettleton Line * 1,457.55 154 1,097.67 141 1,444.60 149 
Tupelo 2,199.64 27 1,337.87 39 2,137.07 16 
Leflore 2,148.73 30 1,384.79 29 2,022.71 30 
Greenwood 2,245.93 19 1,459.97 16 2,215.51 11 
Lincoln 1,590.44 146 1,076.05 145 1,441.20 150 
Brookhaven 2,031.92 44 1,416.07 23 1,920.57 43 
Lowndes 1,640.09 140 1,060.41 147 1,517.19 140 
Columbus 2,106.33 37 1,383.49 30 2,018.05 33 
Madison 2,125.62 34 1,301.47 47 1,912.65 45 
Canton 1,697.55 131 . 1,213.84 90 1,639.48 117 
Ridgeland 1,814.86 103 1,150.59 127 1,704.57 100 
Marion 2,272.92 t6 1,494.76 10 2,061.49 27 
Columbia 2,240.43 23 1,448.23 19 2,132.43 18 
Marshall 1,684.23 134 1,201.21 94 1,524.60 139 
Holly Springs 1,975.64 59 1,232.12 82 1,860.84 55 
Monroe 1,706.16 127 1,112.07 135 1,546.87 135 
Aberdeen 1,890.98 83 1,245.80 78 1,796.93 72 
Amory 1,840.11 98 1,283.43 53 1,764.71 81 
Montgomery 2,022.40 47 1,213.96 89 1,856.00 57 
Winona 2,005.07 53 1,401.42 25 1,945.24 39 
Neshoba 1,638.19 141 1,162.39 121 1,502.41 141 
Philadelphia 1,913.78 78 1,319.95 42 1,832.34 67 
Newton 1,920.07 75 1,185.90 105 1,719.76 93 
Newton Sep 1,945.74 65 1,249.46 76 1,831.42 68 
Union Sep 1,740.87 121 1,143.63 129 1,646.80 113 
Noxubee 1,939.99 69 1,289.94 51 1,749.23 87 
Oktibbeha 1,897.03 82 1,337.68 40 1,759.97 82 
85-499-APPENDIX 
PAP ASAN v. MISSISSIPPI 11 
SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Starkville 1,965.92 62 1,252.02 74 1,879.25 50 
North Panola * 1,864.61 90 1,215.43 86 1,705.72 99 
South Panola * 1,637.45 142 1,100.87 140 1,478.59 145 
Pearl River 1,562.46 149 966.38 154 1,418.22 152 
Picayune 1,752.85 118 1,190.01 101 1,672.13 106 
Poplarville 1,862.97 91 1,190.15 100 1,707.74 96 
Perry 2,311.91 12 1,371.84 31 2,111.50 24 
Richton 1,886.4? 85 1,174.43 115 1,719.79 92 
North Pike * 1,630.22 144 1,114.71 134 1,480.55 144 
South Pike * 1,858.62 94 1,265.60 67 1,707.35 98 
McComb 1,941.21 68 1,223.67 84 1,858.82 56 
Pontotoc 1,775.64 113 1,134.82 131 1,630.30 118 
Pontotoc Sep 1,643.80 137 1,064.43 146 1,461.72 147 
Prentiss 1,884.35 86 1,316.58 43 1,756.40 84 
Baldwyn 1,859.39 93 1,206.28 92 1,783.64 78 
Booneville 1,887.23 84 . 1,282.05 55 1,792.72 74 
Quitman 1,988.47 55 1,335.45 41 1,893.71 48 
Rankin 1,556.15 150 1,043.08 148 1,427.91 151 
Pearl 1,711.80 126 1,151.38 126 1,594.58 125 
Scott 1,737.36 122 1,213.54 91 1,600.68 123 
Forest 1,827.34 101 1,287.52 52 1,711.70 95 
Anguilla Line * 2,018.96 49 1,187.61 103 1,921.95 42 
Sharkey Issaquena * 2,016.35 50 1,246.07 77 1,841.20 61 
Simpson 1,819.91 102 1,260.84 70 1,698.56 102 
Smith 1,941.22 67 1,232.87 81 1,739.71 88 
Stone 1,989.77 54 1,215.14 88 1,833.56 66 
Sunflower 1,978.77 58 1,283.18 54 1,840.10 63 
Drew 2,039.51 43 1,385.51 28 1,933.45 41 
Indianola 1,640.99 139 1,178.18 111 1,589.70 126 
E. Tallahatchie * 1,928.67 71 1,273.27 62 1,788.65 76 
W. Tallahatchie * 1,847.13 96 1,269.31 65 1,707.58 97 
Tate 1,786.61 112 1,176.14 112 1,648.01 112 
Senatobia 1,743.53 120 1,189.10 102 1,671.48 107 
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SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
North Tippah * 1,829.20 100 1,175.58 113 1,671.22 108 
South Tippah * 1,757.42 117 1,185.98 104 1,612.25 121 
Tishomingo 1,968.02 61 1,157.67 123 1,819.53 70 
Iuka 1,577.18 147 1,078.86 144 1,456.91 148 
Tunica 1,809.43 107 1,092.64 142 1,661.67 109 
Union 1,658.56 135 1,104.20 138 1,527.78 138 
New Albany 2,073.07 40 1,367.04 32 1,985.33 35 
Walthall 1,797.02 109 1,279.93 56 1,622.85 119 
Warren 1,951.95 63 1,166.91 118 1,791.93 75 
Vicksburg 2,209.59 26 1,388.60 27 2,128.96 19 
Hollandale * 1.898.37 81 1,313.56 44 1,778.27 -80 
Leland * 2,261.80 17 1,498.17 9 2,141.71 15 
Wes tern Line * 2,243.11 21 1,472.29 14 2,123.03 20 
Greenville 1,974.31 60 1,279.45 57 1,918.06 44 
Wayne 1,790.77 111 1,135.49 130 1,642.63 115 
Webster 1,834.83 99 1,225.69 83 1,688.89 104 
Wilkinson 2,304.75 14 1,442.19 20 2,137.07 17 
Louisville 1,814.22 104 1,181.68 109 1,639.88 116 
Coffeeville * 2,241.05 22 1,278.55 59 2,028.25 29 
Water Valley * 1,705.38 128 1,040.79 149 1,492.57 142 
Yazoo 2,845.92 . 3 1,490.19 12 2,333.34 8 
Holly Bluff * 2,500.03 7 1,524.17 5 2,448.57 6 
Yazoo City 2,023.38 46 1,205.28 93 2,018.31 32 
Statewide Average 1,965.78 1,261.09 1,842.94 
Chickasaw Average 1,853.52 1,218.82 1,722.82 
Chocktaw Average 1,992.92 1,268.17 1,879.67 
• County Office receipts/expenditures prorated to consolidated districts by ADA. 
t All school districts within the Chickasaw Cession are denoted by italic typeface. School dis-
tricts that are partially within the Chickasaw Cession are also in italic type. 
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TABLE B 
RECEIPTS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
1984-1985 
Source of State Funds: 
State Dept. of Ed. $ 











Ed. Reform Act 
Other 
Total State Funds $ 
Source of Federal Funds: 




P. L. 874 
ECIA Ch. 1 
ECIA Ch. 2 
ESEA Other 
OEO 
Soc. Sec. Tit. XX & CETA (Emp. Sec. Comm.) 
School Lunch & Sp. Milk & Nonfood Asst. 
School Lunch, Commodities, Food 
Adult Ed. 
Education Handicapped Act 
Other (e.g., CETA Governor's Office) 
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RECEIPTS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS-Continued 
1984-1985 
Source of Local Funds: 
Ad Valorem Tax 
Mineral Lease Tax 
Tuition from Patrons 
Transp. Fees from· Patrons 
Sixteen Section Income 
Interest on Investments 
Intermediate Source 




Total Local Sources 
TOTAL REVENUE RECEIPTS 
N onrevenue Receipts: 
Sale of Bonds 
Sale of Assets 
Insurance Loss Recovery 
Loans 
Total N onrevenue Receipts 
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PAP ASAN v. MISSISSIPPI 
I 
A brief procedural history is helpful in putting this litiga-
tion in perspective. Petitioners include a group of county 
school boards, superintendents of education, and individual 
school children, all residing in the Chickasaw Cession coun-
tc.. - ties in;(orth Mississippi. In June 1981, petitioners sued nu-
merofis federal and state officials, attacking the difference 
between, on the one hand, payments from Sixteenth Section , 1 
lands in other school districts (the hocktaw area~ and, on D;/ ~ 
the other hand a ments from the State of Mississippi's ~ J 
trust fund to Chickasaw ess10n counties in pace ormcome \_"' ,.._ ~ 
from the Chic asaw school lands. L W'\MW,\ .v,,,.. _ 
The complaint recounted alleged "illegalities" as far back as 
the Northwes1'0rdinance of 1785. It sought to have various 
federal statutes that "purport to authorize, validate or con-
firm" sales of the Sixteenth Section lands declared "unlawful, 
void and unenforceable, including but not limited to (a) the 
Act of July 4, 1936; (b) the Act of May 19, 1852; (c) the Act of 
March 3, 1857; (d) any other acts of Congress having said ef-
fect." App. 16 (citations omitted). 
The complaint also alleged that both the federal and state 
defendants had breached perpetual and binding obligations of 
"an express/constructive trust": the f ederal defendants by ~ 
permitting the State to breach the trust through various stat-
utes (e. g., the Northwest,-.Ordinance), and the State defend-
ants by unlawfully selling the relevant properties and by ill-
advisedly investing the proceeds of that sale. The complaint 
further alleged violations of due process by denial of "free ap-
propriate education" and-of relevance to the case as it 
stands be1ore this Court-violations of equal protection by 
disparate distribution of certain funds and by infringement 
upon the "fundamental rights" of "a suspect class" to "a mini-
mally adequate level of education." Finally, the complaint 
alleged impairment of obligation of contract and taking with-
out just compensation. 
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Petitioners sought wide-ranging relief, including convey-
ance to them of properties or money of a value equivalent to 
that of the relevant Sixteenth Section lands and compensa-
tion for the income from 1832 to present that petitioners 
"could have been receiving ... if such lands had been subject 
to prudent use and management." Petitioners also sought to 
obtain new lands as substitution for those lost, "which may 
include offshore oil, gas and other mineral rights." Petition-
ers additionally sought to "enjoin" and "direct" the defend-
ants to establish "a fund or funds of such value" as was neces-
sary to provide "hereafter" and "in perpetuity" annual 
income to Chickasaw Cession school districts. Finally, peti-
tioners demanded that the defendants take other steps to 
"[e]liminate and compensate and for the future guarantee and 
protect plaintiffs and the plaintiff class against . . . denials 
and deprivations of their rights to due process of law and to 
the equal protection of the laws." 3 
The District Court held that the claims against the Federal 
Government were barred by sovereign immunity, laches, and 
statutes of limitations. This order was not appealed. In a 
separate order, the District Court held that any monetary 
remedy was barred by the Eleventh Amendment-a holding 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court today. I 
agree with this disposition. I also would not reach the issues 
raised by allegations of the denial of f 'a minimally adequate 
level of education." I do not, however, agree with the 
Court's holding that petitioners' equal protection allegations 
regarding the disparate distribution of funds present a claim 
of sufficient substance to survive a motion to dismiss under 
~;....!,!;....;;::.!.:~ ........ b)(6). 
II 
The Court begins the discussion of petitioners' equal pro-
tection claim, ante, at 16-24, by acknowledging that it is ap-
3 One rarely sees a complaint that is as sweeping in its allegations and as 
duplicative in its requests for relief. 
"L \i.L. \"A r. i 
I ~ '' tUMJ.0-me..n\o! 
)\.\\\« of> -\b 
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propriate for the Court to take notice of "relevant facts ob-
tained from the public record in the light most favorable to 
the petitioners." Ante, at 17. The most recent figures 
available from the State Board of Education of Mississippi, . 
read in such a Ii ht fatall ndercut etitioners' lillual ro-
tection claims. Even though it is alleged-and here ac-
cepted as true-that there is a disparity between payments 
from Sixteenth Section lands in the Chocktaw districts and 
payments from the State of Mississippi's trust fund to Chick-
saw Cession counties, 4 the total per pupil expenditures in 
etitioners' school districts are comparable to, and in some 
ases higher than, the State-wide average. These figures 
lso show that the Sixteenth Section payments are an insig-
" ficant part of the total paYII!ents from all..sources_made t 
· · · ., al districts f. 
Table A in the appendix, "School Finances," shows that 
Chickasaw Cession school districts are in fact distributed 
throughout a financial ranking of all the State's school dis-
tricts, whether the measure used is "Current Expenditure 
per Pupil," "Current Expenditure per Pupil for Instructional 
Cost," or "Current Expenditure per Pupil less Transporta-
tion." Specifically, the Table shows that the ,tatec)wide 
average per pupil expenditure was $1965. 78, of which 
$1,261.09 went towards "instructional cost." All but 1 of 
the 39 school districts within the Chickasaw Cession districts 
spent within $300 of the per pupil average expenditure; all 
but two spent within $200 of the average per pupil instruc-
tional expenditure. The per pupil expenditure was over 
$1400 in the Chickasaw district with the lowest per pupil ex-
'The Court states that this disparity is $75.34 versus $.63. The Court 
of Appeals and the Petition for Certiorari give the relevant figures as 
$31.25 and $.80. 756 F. 2d,@ 109\; Petrtmi) 4. The former figures are 
derived from an unaudited aggregatf~n of reports by individual school dis-
tricts presented in a November 1984 report on the Chickasaw Cession Dis-
tricts from the State Auditor and the Secretary of State. App. 35. As 
this @)case arose from a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I use the disparity most fa-
vorable to the plaintiffs: $74. 71. 
I 081 > / (CP\S 1%S) / 0 ~ 
C • 
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penditure, and over $2400 in the Chickasaw district with the 
highest expenditure. In the light of these figures of expen-
ditures per pupil, I cannot believe that $74. 71-the alleged 
difference between the average per pupil payment from Six-
teenth Section lands and the average per pupil payment from 
the State's trust fund in lace of the Chickasaw school 
lands reates a violation of equal protection un er the ra-
tional re ation standard. 5 
Although the figures of expenditures per pupil are fatal to 
petitioners' claims, a second set of statistics provides an addi-
tional reason to conclude that an equal protection claim con-
cerning alleged disparities in Sixteenth Section Lands should 
not survive a mo 10n o 1sm1ss un er lt_ed. :FL Civ. e:, 
12(b)(6). As shown in Table B "Receipts for Public Schools," 
'---------~~~ ayments received from Sixteenth Section ands in 
1984-1985, $16,272,925, accounted for ess t an % of total 
"Receipts for Public Schools" throughout the State. These 
Sixteenth Section payments are dwarfed by income from 
j_tate and federal funds of over $753;000,0Qffi(totaling 74% of 
"Receipts for Public Schools"). Variations among school dis-
tricts of such a small part of the total receipts cannot support 
a claim of a violation of the equal protection clause in the pro-
vision of education for the children of the Chickasaw Cession 
districts. 6 
6 There ~ another reason to dismiss petitioner's claims. The sys-
'"2:J"'"7em of financing Mississippi's public schools bears a substantial similarity 
to the financing arrangement in the State of Texas upheld by this Court. 
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). In Rodri-
guez, almost half of the revenues for funding elementary and secondary 
schools came from a large state-funded program designed to provide a 
basic minimal education in every school. Each school district then would \ v,Md,, l.. ~ L ~ j 
supplement state {unas-ana some fed ral 14:--inrough an ad valorem tax . I: _r:: _ 
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III 
Petitioners' ·el&ims Oi a 9onial 9f a ooo.;~e 
minimal etieeMien~ annot survive a motion under e°fO"'\. ?>o\c.c.~ c:>.o-irms 
r--i±:it'· v::--i~ 12(b)(6) in the light of the distribution of Chickasa 
ession districts throughout the State-wide rankings of vari-
ous expenditures per pupil and the insignificance of the Six-
teenth Section funds relative to the total receipts for educa-
tion. Accordingly, I dissent. 
district with funds to support a "minimum program of education." See 
Miss. Code Ann., <tit . 37, ch. ID These funds constitute over half of the 
receipts for public schools; federal funds constitute another 18%. Of the 
remainin recei ts for Mississi i's school districts, ad . valorem truces ac-
count for over two-thirds. See Table B. J\.l~ w/ PAPA3 
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Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Natchez Adams 2,131.22 33 1,253.67 73 2,018.70 31 
Alcorn 1,694.89 132 1,270.49 63 1,585.03 129 
Corinth 1,947.49 64 1,274.92 61 1,862.16 53 
Amite 2,331.43 11 1,454.17 18 2,057.52 28 
Attala 2,109.59 36 1,298.66 48 1,936.06 40 
Kosciusko 1,877.64 88 1,104.12 139 1,727.96 90 
Benton 2,121.78 35 1,338.89 38 1,952.98 38 
Bolivar #1 * 2,082.64 39 1,339.85 36 2,012.20 34 
Bolivar #2 * 2,769.62 4 1,804.24 2 2,699.23 3 
Bolivar #3 * 1,943.55 66 1,264.60 68 1,873.11 51 
Bolivar #4 * 1,793.43 110 1,182.67 106 1,722.98 91 
Bolivar #5 * 2,027.20 45 1,309.88 45 1,956.74 37 
Bolivar #6 * 1,657.08 136 1,173.85 116 1,586.61 128 ~ cfac-1~ Calhoun 1,770.32 115 1,199.18 95 1,656.17 ~~ Carroll 2,014.44 51 1,295.68 49 1,821.73 
Chickasaw 2,158.73 29 1,438.50 21 1,901.76 47 
Houston 1,797.93 108 1,233.84 80 1,681.46 105 
Okolona 1,635.52 143 1,106.77 137 1,565.18 132 
Choctaw 1,935.99 70 1,309.67 46 1,787.92 77 
Claiborne 4,085.75 1 2,066.37 1 3,799.88 1 
Enterprise * 1,729.02 123 1,143.75 128 1,538.66 136 
Quitman Cons * 1,813.05 106 1,129.16 133 1,622.30 120 
Clay 2,307.56 13 1,482.73 13 2,161.68 13 
West Point 1,844.88 97 1,198.97 96 1,733.96 89 
Coahoma Co 2,414.77 10 1,514.98 6 2,236.92 10 
Clarksdale 1,918.05 77 1,255.92 72 1,891.53 49 
Copiah 2,168.89 28 1,162.03 122 2,064.60 25 
Hazlehurst 1,771.68 114 1,1~.21 llil 1,-660.W-1-l ---\2lJ Covington 1,912.97 ®"" 1,290.85 50 1,782.63 79 
Desoto 1,565.04 148 1,021.31 150 1,467.48 146 
Forrest 2,019.63 48 1,352.53 34 1,841.33 60 
Hattiesburg 2,215.47 25 1,465.32 15 2,145.72 14 
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SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Petal 1,701.54 129 1,182.13 108 1,595.90 124 
Franklin 2,298.67 15 1,514.75 7 2,121.11 21 
George 1,474.78 153 982.08 152 1,341.92 154 
Greene 2,056.05 42 1,278.69 58 1,834.67 65 
Grenada 1,764.73 116 1,175.11 114 1,644.66 114 
Hancock 1,750.66 119 1,011.95 151 1,566.13 131 
Bay St Louis 1,981.82 56 1,165.33 119 1,905.05 46 
Harrison 1,860.89 92 1,264.10 69 1,758.84 83 
Biloxi 2,251.56 18 1,411.45 24 2,163.00 12 
Gulfport 2,496.19 8 1,457.45 17 2,433.81 7 
Long Beach 1,920.58 74 1,257.30 71 1,843.01 59 
Pass Christian 2,965.97 2 1,628.06 3 2,874.13 2 
Hinds 1,918.64 76 1,215.27 87 1,796.81 73 
Jackson 2,429.77 9 1,422.73 22 2,293.98 9 
Clinton 1,813.93 105 1,178.70 110 1,702.73 101 
Holmes 1,854.79 95 1,223.53 85 1,713.49 94 
Durant 1,553.46 151 1,155.74 125 1,553.37 133 
Humphreys 2,132.20 32 1,193.35 97 1,959.88 36 
Itawamba 1,905.92 80 1,156.48 124 1,749.66 85 
Jackson 2,243.31 20 1,364.81 33 2,113.99 23 
Moss Point 1,878.90 87 1,249.54 75 1,796.95 71 
Ocean Springs 1,920.67 73 1,269.80 64 1,852.01 58 
Pascagoula 2,538.68 6 1,494.00 11 2,458.17 5 
East Jasper 
c!}Ol0.43 
52 1,265.89 66 1,836.99 64 / West Jasper ,866.24 89 1,244.61 79 1,693.61 103 
Jefferson 2,066.22 41 1,351.06 35 1,861.66 54 
Jefferson Davis 1,928.49 72 1,275.72 60 1,749.29 86 
Jones 1,719.42 125 1,170.06 117 1,551.87 134 
Laurel 2,639.67 5 1,590.71 4 2,581.89 4 
Kemper 2,096.15 38 1,339.34 37 1,868.72 52 
Lafayette 1,698.47 130 1,109.42 136 1,530.26 137 
Oxford 2,226.94 24 1,514.00 8 2,118.55 22 
Lamar 1,506.98 152 971.37 153 1,382.92 153 
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SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Lumberton Line * 1,601.57 145 1,182.43 107 1,601.07 122 
Lauderdale 1,641.60 138 1,084.88 143 1,485.10 143 
Meridian 2,136.57 31 1,398.45 26 2,064.38 26 
Lawrence 1,980.57 57 1,193.35 98 1,840.85 62 
Leake 1,720.38 124 1,132.06 132 1,574.13 130 
Lee 1,694 ,48 133 1,162.81 120 1,587.20 127 
Nettleton Line * 1,457.55 154 1,097.67 141 1,444.60 149 
Tupelo 2,199.64 27 1,337.87 39 2,137.07 16 
Leflore 2,148.73 30 1,384.79 29 2,022.71 30 
Greenwood 2,245.93 19 1,459.97 16 2,215.51 11 
Lincoln 1,590.44 146 1,076.05 145 1,441.20 150 
Brookhaven 2,031.92 44 1,416.07 23 1,920.57 43 
Lowndes 1,640.09 140 1,060.41 147 1,517.19 140 
Columbus 2,106.33 37 1,383.49 30 2,018.05 33 
Madison 2,125.62 34 1,301.47 47 1,912.65 45 
Canton 1,697.55 131 1,213.84 90 1,639.48 117 
Ridgeland 1,814.86 103 1,150.59 127 1,704.57 100 
Marion 2,272.92 16 1,494.76. 10 2,061.49 27 
Columbia 2,240.43 23 1,448.23 19 2,132.43 18 
Marshall 1,684 .23 134 1,201.21 94 1,524.60 139 
Hally Springs 1,975.64 59 1,232.12 82 1,860.84 55 
Monroe 1,706.16 127 1,112.07 135 1,546.87 135 
Aberdeen 1,890.98 83 1,245.80 78 1,796.93 72 
Amory 1,840.11 98 1,283.43 53 1,764.71 81 
Montgomery 2,022.40 47 1,213.96 89 1,856.00 57 
Winona 2,005.07 53 1,401.42 25 1,945.24 39 
Neshoba 1,638.19 141 1,162.39 121 1,502.41 141 
Philadelphia 1,913.78 78 1,319.95 42 1,832.34 67 
Newton 1,920.07 75 1,185.90 105 1,719.76 93 
Newton Sep 1,945.74 65 1,249.46 76 1,831.42 68 
Union Sep 1,740.87 121 1,143.63 129 1,646.80 113 
Noxubee 1,939.99 69 1,289.94 51 1,749.23 87 
Oktibbeha 1,897.03 82 1,337.68 40 1,759.97 82 
• 
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SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Starkville 1,965.92 62 1,252.02 74 1,879.25 50 
North Panola * 1,864.61 90 1,215.43 86 1,705.72 99 
South Panola * 1,637.45 142 1,100.87 140 1,478.59 145 
Pearl River 1,562.46 149 966.38 154 1,418.22 152 
Picayune 1,752.85 118 1,190.01 101 1,672.13 106 
Poplarville 1,862.97 91 1,190.15 100 1,707.74 96 
Perry 2,311.91 12 1,371.84 31 2,111.50 24 
Richton 1,886.43 85 1,174.43 115 1,719.79 92 
North Pike * 1,630.22 144 1,114.71 134 1,480.55 144 
South Pike * 1,858.62 94 1,265.60 67 1,707.35 98 
McComb 1,941.21 68 1,223.67 84 1,858.82 56 
Pontotoc 1,775.64 113 1,134.82 131 1,630.30 118 
Pontotoc Sep 1,643.80 137 1,064.43 146 1,461.72 147 
Prentiss 1,884.35 86 1,316.58 43 1,756.40 84 
Baldwyn 1,859.39 93 1,206.28 92 1,783.64 78 
Booneville 1,887.23 84 1,282.05 55 1,792.72 74 
Quitman 1,988.47 55 1,335.45 41 1,893.71 48 
Rankin 1,556.15 150 1,043.08 148 1,427.91 151 
Pearl 1,711.80 126 1,151.38 126 1,594.58 125 
Scott 1,737.36 122 1,213.54 91 1,600.68 123 
Forest 1,827.34 101 1,287.52 52 1,711.70 95 
Anguilla Line * 2,018.96 49 1,187.61 103 1,921.95 42 
Sharkey Issaquena * 2,016.35 50 1,246.07 77 1,841.20 61 
Simpson 1,819.91 102 1,260.84 70 1,698.56 102 
Smith 1,941.22 67 1,232.87 81 1,739.71 88 
Stone 1,989.77 54 1,215.14 88 1,833.56 66 
Sunflower 1,978.77 58 1,283.18 54 1,840.10 63 
Drew 2,039.51 43 1,385.51 28 1,933.45 41 
Indianola 1,640.99 139 1,178.18 111 1,589.70 126 
E. Tallahatchie * 1,928.67 71 1,273.27 62 1,788.65 76 
W. Tallahatchie * 1,847.13 96 1,269.31 65 1,707.58 97 
Tate 1,786.61 112 1,176.14 112 1,648.01 112 
Senatobia 1,743.53 120 1,189.10 102 1,671.48 107 
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SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
North Tippah * 1,829.20 100 1,175.58 113 1,671.22 108 
South Tippah * 1,757.42 117 1,185.98 104 1,612.25 121 
Tishomingo 1,968.02 61 1,157.67 123 1,819.53 70 
Iuka 1,577.18 147 1,078.86 144 1,456.91 148 
Tunica 1,809.43 107 1,092.64 142 1,661 .67 109 
Union 1,658.56 135 1,104.20 138 1,527.78 138 
New Albany 2,073.07 40 1,367.04 32 1,985.33 35 
Walthall 1,797.02 109 1,279.93 56 1,622.85 119 
Warren 1,951.95 63 1,166.91 118 1,791.93 75 
Vicksburg 2,209.59 26 1,388.60 27 2,128.96 19 
Hollandale * 1.898.37 81 1,313.56 44 1,778.27 80 
Leland * 2,261.80 17 1,498.17 9 2,141.71 15 
Western Line * 2,243.11 21 1,472.29 14 2,123.03 20 
Greenville 1,974.31 60 1,279.45 57 1,918.06 44 
Wayne 1,790.77 111 1,135.49 130 1,642.63 115 
Webster 1,834.83 99 1,225.69 83 1,688.89 104 
Wilkinson 2,304.75 14 1,442.19 20 2,137.07 17 
Louisville 1,814.22 104 1,181.68 109 1,639.88 116 
Coffeeville * 2,241.05 22 1,278.55 59 2,028.25 29 
Water Valley * 1,705.38 128 1,040.79 149 1,492.57 142 
Yazoo 2,845.92 3 1,490.19 12 2,333.34 8 
Holly Bluff * 2,500.03 7 1,524.17 5 2,448.57 6 
Yazoo City 2,023.38 46 1,205.28 93 2,018.31 32 
Statewide Average 1,965.78 1,261.09 11842.94 ~ Chickasaw Average 1,853.52 1,21@82 1,722.82 
1;,~.~1/ \ > ,._,,~fb x>J Chocktaw Average 1,992.92 ~'1'1~ 1,863.65 
• County Office receipts/expenditures prorated to consolidated districts by ADA. 
t All school districts within the Chickasaw Cession are denoted by italic typeface. School dis 
tricts that are partially within the Chickasaw Cession are also in italic type. 
SOURCE: Mississippi State Board of Education Annual Report, 1984-1985, pp. 144-146. 
. 85-499-APPENDIX 
12 PAPASAN v. MISSISSIPPI 
TABLE B 
RECEIPTS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
1984-1985 
Source of State Funds: 
State Dept. of Ed. $ 9,005,760 
Per Capita & Min. Prog. 490,568,205 
Vocational Ed. 16,269,064 
Chickasaw 61,454 
Homestead Exemption 30,916,541 
EFC Payments 2,898,692 
Severance Tax 10,290,972 
Driver Penalty Funds 555,963 
Textbook 6,110,596 
School Lunch 574,624 
Adult Ed. 35,619 
Educable Children 511,070 
Ed. Reform Act 985,796 
Other 153,766 
Total State Funds $ 568,938,122 56.1% 
Source of Federal Funds: 
State Dept. Ed. $ 6,293,149 
Vocational Ed. 3,540,422 
National Forest 3,247,726 
TVA 643,509 
P. L. 874 2,657,490 
ECIA Ch. 1 64,896,618 
ECIA Ch. 2 4,388,330 
ESEA Other 107,118 
OEO 151,860 
Soc. Sec. Tit. XX & CETA (Emp. Sec. Comm.) 1,677,019 
School Lunch & Sp. Milk & Nonfood Asst. 67,638,280 
School Lunch, Commodities, Food 12,660,094 
Adult Ed. 745,079 
Education Handicapped Act 11,347,044 
Other (e.g., CETA Governor's Office) 3,403,978 
Total Federal Funds $ 183,397,716 18.1% 
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RECEIPTS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL&-Continued 
1984-1985 
Source of Local Funds: 
Ad Valorem Tax 
Mineral Lease Tax 
Tuition from Patrons 
Transp. Fees from Patrons 
Sixteen Section Income 
Interest on Investments 
Intermediate Source 
















Total Local Sources 
TOTAL REVENUE RECEIPTS 
Nonrevenue Receipts: 
$ 261,122,056 25.8% 
$1,013,457,894 100.0% 
Sale of Bonds 
Sale of Assets 
Insurance Loss Recovery 
Loans 
Total N onrevenue Receipts 







SOURCE: Mississippi State Board of Education Annual Report, 1984-1985, 
p. 48. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-499 
B. H. PAPASAN, SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCA-
TION, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. WILLIAM A. ALLAIN, 
GOVERNOR OF MISSISSIPPI, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED ST ATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[July 1, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
The public record refutes petitioners' equal protection 
claims that the disparities in funding from various school 
lands detrimentally affects students and schools in school dis-
tricts within the Chickasaw Cession. Statistics from Missis-
sippi's State Department of Education show the statewide 
ranking of school districts in terms of expenditures per pupil. 
In this ranking, the Chickasaw Cession districts are scat-
tered widely among the State's 154 school districts. More-
over, far from being a "critical element of school funding in 
Mississippi," as alleged by petitioners, the Sixteenth Section 
lands account for only 1½% of. overall funds provided for 
.. 
~ 
schools. 1 I therefore find no basis for the ~ that peti- ~~ 
COM tioners ~ prove that students in Chickasaw Cession dis-
tricts have been detrimentally affected by this differential, 
and I do not believe that petitioners have asserted an equal 
1 Mississippi State Department of Education, Annual Report, 1984-1985 
(1986). Tables A and B, infra, are taken from this Report, pp. 144-146 
and p. 48, respectively. 
2 
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protection claim that can survive a motion to dismiss under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 2 
I 
A brief procedural history is helpful in putting this litiga-
tion in perspective. Petitioners include a group of county 
school boards, superintendents of education, and individual 
school children, all residing in the Chickasaw Cession coun-
ties in north Mississippi. In June 1981, petitioners sued nu-
merous federal and state officials, attacking the difference 
between, on the one hand, payments from Sixteenth Section 
lands in other school districts (the Chocktaw area) and, on 
the other hand, payments from the State of Mississippi's 
trust fund to school districts within the Chickasaw Cession 
counties in place of income from the Chickasaw school lands. 
The complaint recounted alleged "illegalities" as far back as 
the Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1785. It sought to 
have various federal statutes that "purport to authorize, vali-
date or confirm" sales of the Sixteenth Section lands declared 
"unlawful, void and unenforceable, including but not limited 
to (a) the Act of July 4, 1936; (b) the Act of May 19, 1852; (c) 
the Act of March 3, 1857; (d) any other acts of Congress hav-
ing said effect." App. 16 (citations omitted). 
The complaint also alleged that both the federal and state 
defendants had breached perpetual and binding obligations of 
"an express/constructive trust": the federal defendants by 
permitting the State to breach the trust through various stat-
utes (e.g., the Northwest Territory Ordinance), and the 
State defendants by unlawfully selling the relevant proper-
ties and by ill-advisedly investing the proceeds of that sale. 
The complaint further alleged violations of due process by de-
nial of "free appropriate public education" and-of relevance 
to the case as it stands before this Court-violations of equal 
2 I agree with the Court that most of petitioners' claims are barred by 
the Eleventh Amendment, and therefore join Part II of the Court's 
opinion. 
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protection by disparate distribution of certain funds and by 
infringement upon the "fundamental rights" of "a suspect 
class" to "a minimally adequate level of education." Finally, 
the complaint alleged impairment of obligation of contract 
and taking without just compensation. 
Petitioners sought wide-ranging relief, including convey-
ance to them of properties or money of a value equivalent to 
that of the relevant Sixteenth Section lands and compensa-
tion for the income from 1832 to present that petitioners 
"could have been receiving ... if such lands had been subject 
to prudent use and management." Petitioners also sought to 
obtain new lands as substitution for those lost, "which may 
include offshore oil, gas and other mineral rights." Petition-
ers additionally sought to "enjoin" and "direct" the defend-
ants to establish "a fund or funds of such value" as was neces-
sary to provide "hereafter" and "in perpetuity" annual 
income to Chickasaw Cession school districts. Finally, peti-
tioners demanded that the defendants take other steps to 
"[e]liminate and compensate and for the future guarantee and 
protect plaintiffs and the plaintiff class against ... denials 
and deprivations of their rights to due process of law and to 
the equal protection of the laws." 3 
The District Court held that the claims against the Federal 
Government were barred by sovereign immunity, laches, and 
statutes of limitations. This order was not appealed. In a 
separate order, the District Court held that any monetary 
remedy was barred by the Eleventh Amendment-a holding 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court today. I 
agree with this disposition. I also would not reach the issues 
raised by allegations of the denial of a "fundamental right" to 
"a minimally adequate level of education." 1' I do not, how-
3 One rarely sees a complaint that is as sweeping in its allegations and as 
duplicative in its requests for relief. n et, m eUi:\ en~)lhe only alleged de-
nial of equal Protection is with respect to the funafng in the Chickasaw 
Cession school districts. As noted supra, at 1, these funds are only 1½% 
of overall funding for elementary and secondary schools within the State. 
4 
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ever, agree with the Court's holding that petitioners' equal 
protection allegations regarding the disparate distribution of 
funds present a claim of sufficient substance to survive a mo-
tion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6). 
II 
The Court begins the discussion of petitioners' equal pro-
tection claim, ante, at 16-24, by acknowledging that it is ap-
propriate for the Court to take notice of "relevant facts ob-
tained from the public record in the light most favorable to 
the petitioners." Ante, at 17. The most recent figures 
available from the State Board of Education of Mississippi, 
read in such a light, fatally undercut petitioners' equal pro-
tection claims. 
It is alleged-and here accepted as true-that there is a 
disparity between the payments from the Sixteenth Section ~ 
Lands in the Chocktaw districts and the payments from the o..cLl & 
state of Mississippi's trust fund to Chickasaw districts.~ MoRENew 
The Court FWM11@r reads the complaint as alleging that this .A., 
unequal distribution of such funds acts "to the detriment of 
the Chickasaw Cession schools and their students," ante, at 
21. The complaint, however, contains no factual assertions 
other than this disparity to support tffl8- conclusory allega- ~ 
.S tiol)y nor is there any basis for believing a detriment could 
evef be proven. As shown in Table A, the various per pupil 
expenditures in petitioners' school districts are comparable 
to, and in some cases higher than, the average for districts 
within the Chocktaw area. And the Sixteenth Section pay-
'The Court states that this disparity is $75.34 versus $.63. The Court 
of Appeals and the Petition for Certiorari give the relevant figures as 
$31.25 and $.80. 756 F. 2d, 1087, 1091(CA51985); Pet. for Cert. 4. The 
former figures are derived from an unaudited aggregation of reports by in-
dividual school districts presented in a November 1984 report on the Chick-
asaw Cession Districts from the State Auditor and the Secretary of State. 
App. 35. As this case arose from a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I use the dispar-
ity most favorable to the plaintiffs: $74. 71. 
.. 
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ments-as the figures in Table B demonstrate beyond argu-
ment-are an insignificant part of the total payments from all 
sources made to Mississippi's school districts. 
The Court does not question these data. It instead states 
that petitioners "have limited themselves to challenging dis-
crimination in the Sixteenth Section" program, and, relying 
on that limitation, "decline[s] the dissent's invitation to look 
at school receipts overall." Ante, at 22, n. 17. The Court 
thereby ignores the undisputed facts concerning the funding 
of public education in the State of Mississippi, and instead 
bases its equal protection analysis on 1 ½% of the overall 
funds provided for public secondary and elementary schools 
in the State. The Equal Protection Clause, at least in the 
context of a state funding of schools, is concerned with sub-
stance, not with the de minimus variations of funding among 
the districts. 
Table A in the appendix, "School Finances," shows that 
Chickasaw Cession school districts are in fact distributed 
throughout a financial ranking of all the State's school dis-
tricts, whether the measure used is "Current Expenditure 
per Pupil," "Current Expenditure per Pupil for Instructional 
Cost," or "Current Expenditure per Pupil less Transporta-
tion." Specifically, the Table shows that the statewide av-
erage per pupil expenditure was $1965.78, of which $1,261.09 
went towards "instructional cost." All but 6 of the 39 school 
districts within the Chickasaw Cession districts spent within 
$300 of the per pupil average expenditure; all but two spent 
within $200 of the average per pupil instructional expendi-
ture. The per pupil expenditure was over $1400 in the 
Chickasaw district with the lowest per pupil expenditure, 
and over $2400 in the Chickasaw district with the highest ex-
penditure. In the light of these figures of expenditures per 
pupil, I cannot believe that $74. 71-the alleged difference be-
tween the average per pupil payment from Sixteenth Section 
lands and the average per pupil payment from the State's 
trust fund in place of the Chickasaw school lands-creates a 
6 
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"detriment" to the students and schools within the Chickasaw 
Cession and thereby gives rise to a violation of equal protec-
tion under the rational relation standard. 5 
Although the figures of expenditures per pupil are fatal to 
petitioners' claims, a second set of statistics provides an addi-
tional reason to conclude that an equal protection claim con-
cerning alleged disparities in Sixteenth Section Lands should 
not survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedur_e 12(b)(6). As shown in Table B "Receipts for Pub-
lic Schools," payments received from Sixteenth Section lands 
in 1984-1985, $16,272,925, accounted for less than 1½% of 
total "Receipts for Public Schools" throughout the State. 
These Sixteenth Section payments are dwarfed by income 
from state and federal funds of over $752 million (totaling 
74% of "Receipts for Public Schools"). Variations among 
school districts of such a small part of the total receipts can-
not support a claim of a violation of the equal protection 
clause in the provision of education for the children of the 
Chickasaw Cession districts. 6 
$The State distributes its funds equally throughout Mississippi's school 
districts on the basis of "teacher unit[s]." See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 37-19-3 
and 37-19-5 (Supp. 1985); Tr. Oral Arg. 32. As in many states, total fund-
ing among districts in Mississippi varies depending upon local ad valorem 
taxes and other district sources. See Table B; see also San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 49 (1973). Discrepan-
cies from Sixteenth Section lands are frequently offset in part or entirely 
by ad valorem taxes, and the variations in local funding from sources other 
than Sixteenth Section lands are almost always greater than the alleged 
"disparity" relied on in this case. See Annual Report, supra, n. 1, at 
94-98 (listing revenue receipts by local sources). 
6 There is another reason to dismiss petitioner's claims. The system of 
financing Mississippi's public schools bears a substantial similarity to the 
financing arrangement in the State of Texas upheld by this Court. San 
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). In Rodriguez, 
almost half of the revenues for funding elementary and secondary schools 
came from a large state-funded program designed to provide a basic mini-
mal education in every school. Each school district then would supple-
ment state and federal funds through an ad valorem tax on property within 
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III 
7 
Petitioners' equal protection claims cannot survive a mo-
tion under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) in the light 
of the distribution of Chickasaw Cession districts throughout 
the State-wide rankings of various expenditures per pupil 
and the insignificance of the Sixteenth Section funds relative 
to the total receipts for education. Accordingly, I dissent. 
its jurisdiction. Similarly, Mississippi provides each district with funds to 
support a "minimum program of education." See Miss. Code Ann. , 
§ 37-19-1 et seq. (1972 and Supp. V). These funds constitute over half of 
the receipts for public schools; federal funds constitute another 18%. Of 
the remaining receipts for Mississippi's school districts , ad valorem taxes, 
which are levied by, and vary among, the local school districts , account for 
over two-thirds. See Table B, infra. Mississippi's financing system, like 
that of Texas, "[w]hile assuring a basic education for every child in the 
State, ... permits and encourages a large measure of participation and 
control of each district's schools at the local level. " Rodriguez, 411 U. S. , 
at 49. ""[ o6d. \e t\.U'aSU~ 
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Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Natchez Adams 2,131.22 33 1,253.67 73 2,018.70 31 
Alcorn 1,694.89 132 1,270.49 63 1,585.03 129 
Corinth 1,947.49 64 1,274.92 61 1,862.16 53 
Amite 2,331.43 11 1,454.17 18 2,057.52 28 
Attala 2,109.59 36 1,298.66 48 1,936.06 40 
Kosciusko 1,877.64 88 1,104.12 139 1,727.96 90 
Benton 2,121.78 35 1,338.89 38 1,952.98 38 
Bolivar #1 * 2,082.64 39 1,339.85 36 2,012.20 34 
Bolivar #2 * 2,769.62 4 1,804.24 2 2,699.23 . 3 
Bolivar #3 * 1,943.55 66 1,264.60 68 1,873.11 51 
Bolivar #4 * 1,793.43 110 1,182.67 106 1,722.98 91 
Bolivar #5 * 2,027.20 45 1,309.88 45 1,956.74 37 
Bolivar #6 * 1,657.08 136 1,173.85 116 1,586.61 128 
Calhoun 1,770.32 115 1,199.18 95 1,656.17 111 
Carroll 2,014.44 51 1,295.68 49 1,821.73 69 
Chickasaw 2,158.73 29 1,438.50 21 1,901.76 47 
Houston 1,797.93 108 1,233.84 80 1,681.46 105 
Okolona 1,635.52 143 1,106.77 137 1,565.18 132 
Choctaw 1,935.99 70 1,309.67 46 1,787.92 77 
Claiborne 4,085.75 1 2,066.37 1 3,799.88 1 
Enterprise * 1,729.02 123 1,143.75 128 1,538.66 136 
Quitman Cons * 1,813.05 106 1,129.16 133 1,622.30 120 
Clay 2,307.56 13 1,482.73 13 2,161.68 13 
West Point 1,844.88 97 1,198.97 96 1,733.96 89 
Coahoma Co 2,414.77 10 1,514.98 6 2,236.92 10 
Clarksdale 1,918.05 77 1,255.92 72 1,891.53 49 
Copiah 2,168.89 28 1,162.03 122 2,064.60 25 
Hazlehurst 1,771.68 114 1,190.21 99 1,660.59 110 
Covington 1,912.97 79 1,290.85 50 1,782.63 79 
Desoto 1,565.04 148 1,021.31 150 1,467.48 146 
Forrest 2,019.63 48 1,352.53 34 1,841.33 60 
Hattiesburg 2,215.47 25 1,465.32 15 2,145.72 14 
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Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Petal 1,701.54 129 1,182.13 108 1,595.90 124 
Franklin 2,298.67 15 1,514.75 7 2,121.11 21 
George 1,474.78 153 982.08 152 1,341.92 154 
Greene 2,056.05 42 1,278.69 58 1,834.67 65 
Grenada 1,764.73 116 1,175.11 114 1,644.66 114 
Hancock 1,750.66 119 1,011.95 151 1,566.13 131 
Bay St Louis 1,981.82 56 1,165.33 119 1,905.05 46 
Harrison 1,860.89· 92 1,264.10 69 1,758.84 83 
Biloxi 2,251.56 18 1,411.45 24 2,163.00 12 
Gulfport 2,496.19 8 1,457.45 17 2,433.81 7 
Long Beach 1,920.58 74 1,257.30 71 1,843.01 59 
Pass Christian 2,965.97 2 1,628.06 3 2,874.13 2 
Hinds 1,918.64 76 1,215.27 87 1,796.81 73 
Jackson 2,429.77 9 1,422.73 22 2,293.98 9 
Clinton 1,813.93 105 1,178.70 110 1,702.73 101 
Holmes 1,854.79 95 1,223.53 85 1,713.49 94 
Durant 1,553.46 151 1,155.74 125 1,553.37 133 
Humphreys 2,132.20 32 1,193.35 97 1,959.88 36 
Itawamba 1,905.92 80 1,156.48 124 1,749.66 85 
Jackson 2,243.31 20 1,364.81 33 2,113.99 23 
Moss Point 1,878.90 87 1,249.54 75 1,796.95 71 
Ocean Springs 1,920.67 73 1,269.80 64 1,852.01 58 
Pascagoula 2,538.68 6 1,494.00 11 2,458.17 5 
East Jasper * 2,010.43 52 1,265.89 66 1,836.99 64 
West Jasper * 1,866.24 89 1,244.61 79 1,693.61 103 
Jefferson 2,066.22 41 1,351.06 35 1,861.66 54 
Jefferson Davis 1,928.49 72 1,275.72 60 1,749.29 86 
Jones 1,719.42 125 1,170.06 117 1,551.87 134 
Laurel 2,639.67 5 1,590.71 4 2,581.89 4 
Kemper 2,096.15 38 1,339.34 37 1,868.72 52 
Lafayette 1,698.47 130 1,109.42 136 1,530.26 137 
Oxford 2,226.94 24 1,514.00 8 2,118.55 22 
Lamar 1,506.98 152 971.37 153 1,382.92 153 
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SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Lumberton Line * 1,601.57 145 1,182.43 107 1,601.07 122 
Lauderdale 1,641.60 138 1,084.88 143 1,485.10 143 
Meridian 2,136.57 31 1,398.45 26 2,064.38 26 
Lawrence 1,980.57 57 1,193.35 98 1,840.85 62 
Leake 1,720.38 124 1,132.06 132 1,574.13 130 
Lee 1,694.48 133 1,162.81 120 1,587.20 127 
Nettleton Line * 1,457.55 154 1,097.67 141 1,444.60 149 
Tupelo 2,199.64 27 1,337.87 39 2,137.07 16 
Leflore 2,148.73 30 1,384.79 29 2,022.71 30 
Greenwood 2,245.93 19 1,459.97 16 2,215.51 11 
Lincoln 1,590.44 146 1,076.05 145 1,441.20 150 
Brookhaven 2,031.92 44 1,416.07 23 1,920.57 43 
Lowndes 1,640.09 140 1,060.41 147 1,517.19 140 
Columbus 2,106.33 37 1,383.49 30 2,018.05 33 
Madison 2,125.62 34 1,301.47 47 1,912.65 45 
Canton 1,697.55 131 1,213.84 90 1,639.48 117 
Ridgeland 1,814.86 103 1,150.59 127 1,704.57 100 
Marion 2,272.92 16 1,494.76 10 2,061.49 27 
Columbia 2,240.43 23 1,448.23 19 2,132.43 18 
Marshall 1,684.23 134 1,201.21 94 1,524.60 139 
Hally Springs 1,975.64 59 1,232.12 82 1,860.84 55 
Monroe 1,706.16 127 1,112.07 135 1,546.87 135 
Aberdeen 1,890.98 83 1,245.80 78 1,796.93 72 
Amory 1,840.11 98 1,283.43 53 1,764.71 81 
Montgomery 2,022.40 47 1,213.96 89 1,856.00 57 
Winona 2,005.07 53 1,401.42 25 1,945.24 39 
Neshoba 1,638.19 141 1,162.39 121 1,502.41 141 
Philadelphia 1,913.78 78 1,319.95 42 1,832.34 67 
Newton 1,920.07 75 1,185.90 105 1,719.76 93 
Newton Sep 1,945.74 65 1,249.46 76 1,831.42 68 
Union Sep 1,740.87 121 1,143.63 129 1,646.80 113 
Noxubee 1,939.99 69 1,289.94 51 1,749.23 87 
Oktibbeha 1,897.03 82 1,337.68 40 1,759.97 82 
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Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Starkville 1,965.92 62 1,252.02 74 1,879.25 50 
North Panola * 1,864.61 90 1,215.43 86 1,705.72 99 
South Panola * 1,637.45 142 1,100.87 140 1,478.59 145 
Pearl Riv.er 1,562.46 149 966.38 154 1,418.22 152 
Picayune 1,752.85 118 1,190.01 101 1,672.13 106 
Poplarville 1,862.97 91 1,190.15 100 1,707.74 96 
Perry 2,311.91 12 1,371.84 31 2,111.50 24 
Richton 1,886.43 85 1,174.43 115 1,719.79 92 
North Pike * 1,630.22 144 1,114.71 134 1,480.55 144 
South Pike * 1,858.62 94 1,265.60 67 1,707.35 98 
McComb 1,941.21 68 1,223.67 84 1,858.82 56 
Pontotoc 1,775.64 113 1,134.82 131 1,630.30 118 
Pontotoc Sep 1,643.80 137 1,064.43 146 1,461.72 147 
Prentiss 1,884.35 86 1,316.58 43 1,756.40 84 
Baldwyn 1,859.39 93 1,206.28 92 1,783.64 78 
Booneville 1,887.23 84 1,282.05 55 1,792.72 74 
Quitman 1,988.47 55 1,335.45 41 1,893.71 48 
Rankin 1,556.15 150 1,043.08 148 1,427.91 151 
Pearl 1,711.80 126 1,151.38 126 1,594.58 125 
Scott 1,737.36 122 1,213.54 91 1,600.68 123 
Forest 1,827.34 101 1,287.52 52 1,711.70 95 
Anguilla Line * 2,018.96 49 1,187.61 103 1,921.95 42 
Sharkey Issaquena * 2,016.35 50 1,246.07 77 1,841.20 61 
Simpson 1,819.91 102 1,260.84 70 1,698.56 102 
Smith 1,941.22 67 1,232.87 81 1,739.71 88 
Stone 1,989.77 54 1,215.14 88 1,833.56 66 
Sunflower 1,978.77 58 1,283.18 54 1,840.10 63 
Drew 2,039.51 43 1,385.51 28 1,933.45 41 
Indianola 1,640.99 139 1,178.18 111 1,589.70 126 
E. Tallahatchie * 1,928.67 71 1,273.27 62 1,788.65 76 
W. Tallahatchie * 1,847.13 96 1,269.31 65 1,707.58 97 
Tate 1,786.61 112 1,176.14 112 1,648.01 112 
Senatobia 1,743.53 120 1,189.10 102 1,671.48 107 
85-49~APPENDIX 
12 P APASAN v. MISSISSIPPI 
SCHOOL FINANCES-Continued 
Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
North Tippah * 1,829.20 100 1,175.58 113 1,671.22 108 
South Tippah * 1,757.42 117 1,185.98 104 1,612.25 121 
Tishomingo 1,968.02 61 1,157.67 123 1,819.53 70 
Iuka 1,577.18 147 1,078.86 144 1,456.91 148 
Tunica 1,809.43 107 1,092.64 142 1,661.67 109 
Union 1,658.56 135 1,104.20 138 1,527.78 138 " 
New Albany 2,073.07 40 1,367.04 32 1,985.33 35 
Walthall 1,797.02 109 1,279.93 56 1,622.85 119 
Warren 1,951.95 63 1,166.91 118 1,791.93 75 
Vicksburg 2,209.59 26 1,388.60 27 2,128.96 19 
Hollandale * 1.898.37 81 1,313.56 44 1,778.27 -80 
Leland * 2,261.80 17 1,498.17 9 2,141.71 15 
Western Line * 2,243.11 21 1,472.29 14 2,123.03 20 
Greenville 1,974.31 60 1,279.45 57 1,918.06 44 
Wayne 1,790.77 111 1,135.49 130 1,642.63 115 
Webster 1,834.83 99 1,225.69 83 1,688.89 104 
Wilkinson 2,304.75 14 1,442.19 20 2,137.07 17 
Louisville 1,814.22 104 1,181.68 109 1,639.88 116 
Coffeeville * 2,241.05 22 1,278.55 59 2,028.25 29 
Water Valley * 1,705.38 128 1,040.79 149 1,492.57 142 
Yazoo 2,845.92 3 1,490.19 12 2,333.34 8 
Holly Bluff * 2,500.03 7 1,524.17 5 2,448.57 6 
Yazoo City 2,023.38 46 1,205.28 93 2,018.31 32 
Statewide Average 1,965.78 1,261.09 1,842.94 
Chickasaw Average 1,853.52 1,218.82 1,722.82 
Chocktaw Average 1,992.92 1,268.17 1,879.67 
• County Office receipts/expenditures prorated to consolidated districts by ADA. 
t All school districts within the Chickasaw Cession are denoted by italic typeface. School dis-
tricts that are partially within the Chickasaw Cession are also in italic type. 
SOURCE: Mississippi State Board of Education Annual Report, 1984-1985, pp. 144-146. 
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TABLE B 
RECEIPTS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
1984-1985 
Source of State Funds: 
State Dept. of Ed. $ 9,005,760 
Per Capita & Min. Prog. 490,568,205 
Vocational Ed. 16,269,064 
Chickasaw 61 ,454 
Homestead Exemption 30,916,541 
EFC Payments 2,898,692 
Severance Tax 10,290,972 
Driver Penalty Funds 555,963 
Textbook 6,110,596 
School Lunch 574,624 
Adult Ed. 35,619 
Educable Children 511 ,070 
Ed. Reform Act 985,796 
Other 153,766 
Total State Funds $ 568,938,122 56.1% 
Source of Federal Funds: 
State Dept. Ed. $ 6,293,149 
Vocational Ed. 3,540,422 
National Forest 3,247,726 
TVA 643,509 
P. L. 874 2,657,490 
ECIA Ch. 1 64,896,618 
ECIA Ch. 2 4,388,330 
ESEA Other 107,118 
OEO 151,860 
Soc. Sec. Tit. XX & CETA (Emp. Sec. Comm.) 1,677,019 
School Lunch & Sp. Milk & Nonfood Asst. 67,638,280 
School Lunch, Commodities, Food 12,660,094 
Adult Ed. 745,079 
Education Handicapped Act 11,347,044 
Other (e.g. , CETA Governor's Office) 3,403,978 
Total Federal Funds $ 183,397,716 18.1 % 
14 
85-499-APPENDIX 
PAPASAN v. MISSISSIPPI 
RECEIPTS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS-Continued 
1984-1985 
Source of Local Funds: 
Ad Valorem Tax 
Mineral Lease Tax 
Tuition from Patrons 
Transp. Fees from· Patrons 
Sixteen Section Income 
Interest on Investments 
Intermediate Source 




Total Local Sources 
TOTAL REVENUE RECEIPTS 
N onrevenue Receipts: 
Sale of Bonds 
Sale of Assets 
Insurance Loss Recovery 
Loans 
Total Nonrevenue Receipts 




















SOURCE: Mississippi State Board of Education Annual Report, 1984-1985, 
p. 48. 
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From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated:---i~.,_.uttv,.ALJ._..,,,.___,'3"""--"'O!e.-__ _ 
3rd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-499 
B. H. PAPASAN, SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCA-
TION, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. WILLIAM A. ALLAIN, 
GOVERNOR OF MISSISSIPPI, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[July 1, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
The public record refutes petitioners' equal protection 
claims that the disparities in funding from various school 
lands detrimentally affects students and schools in school dis-
tricts within the Chickasaw Cession. Statistics from Missis-
sippi's State Department of Education show the statewide 
ranking of school districts in terms of expenditures per pupil. 
In this ranking, the Chickasaw Cession districts are scat-
tered widely among the State's 154 school districts. More-
over, far from being a "critical element of school funding in 
Mississippi," as alleged by petitioners, the Sixteenth Section 
lands account for only 1 ½% of overall funds provided for 
schools. 1 I therefore find no basis for the assumption that I 
petitioners can prove that students in Chickasaw Cession dis-
tricts have been detrimentally affected by this differential, 
and I do not believe that petitioners have asserted an equal 
1 Mississippi State Department of Education, Annual Report, 1984-1985 
(1986). Tables A and B, infra, are taken from this Report, pp. 144-146 
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protection claim that can survive a motion to dismiss under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 2 
I 
A brief procedural history is helpful in putting this litiga-
tion in perspective. Petitioners include a group of county 
school boards, superintendents of education, and individual 
school children, all residing in the Chickasaw Cession coun-
ties in north Mississippi. In June 1981, petitioners sued nu-
merous federal and state officials, attacking the difference 
between, on the one hand, payments from Sixteenth Section 
lands in other school districts (the Chocktaw area) and, on 
the other hand, payments from the State of Mississippi's 
trust fund to school districts within the Chickasaw Cession 
counties in place of income from the Chickasaw school lands. 
The complaint recounted alleged "illegalities" as far back as 
the Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1785. It sought to 
have various federal statutes that "purport to authorize, vali-
date or confirm" sales of the Sixteenth Section lands declared 
"unlawful, void and unenforceable, including but not limited 
to (a) the Act of July 4, 1936; (b) the Act of May 19, 1852; (c) 
the Act of March 3, 1857; (d) any other acts of Congress hav-
ing said effect." App. 16 (citations omitted). 
The complaint also alleged that both the federal and state 
defendants had breached perpetual and binding obligations of 
"an express/constructive trust": the federal defendants by 
permitting the State to breach the trust through various stat-
utes (e. g., the Northwest Territory Ordinance), and the 
State defendants by unlawfully selling the relevant proper-
ties and by ill-advisedly .investing the proceeds of that sale. 
The complaint further alleged violations of due process by de-
nial of "free appropriate public education" and-of relevance 
to the case as it stands before this Court-violations of equal 
2 I agree with the Court that most of petitioners' claims are barred by 
the Eleventh Amendment, and therefore join Part II of the Court's 
opinion. 
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protection by disparate distribution of certain funds and by 
infringement upon the "fundamental rights" of "a suspect 
class" to "a minimally adequate level of education." Finally, 
the complaint alleged impairment of obligation of contract 
and taking without just compensation. 
Petitioners sought wide-ranging relief, including convey-
ance to them of properties or money of a value equivalent to 
that of the relevant Sixteenth Section lands and compensa-
tion for the income from 1832 to present that petitioners 
"could have been receiving ... if such lands had been subject 
to prudent use and management." Petitioners also sought to 
obtain new lands as substitution for those lost, "which may 
include offshore oil, gas and other mineral rights." Peti-
tioners additionally sought to "enjoin" and "direct" the de-
fendants to establish "a fund or funds of such value" as was 
necessary to provide "hereafter" and "in perpetuity" annual 
income to Chickasaw Cession school districts. Finally, peti-
tioners demanded that the defendants take other steps to 
"[e]liminate and compensate and for the future guarantee and 
protect plaintiffs and the plaintiff class against . . . denials 
and deprivations of their rights to due process of law and to 
the equal protection of the laws." 3 
The District Court held that the claims against the Federal 
Government were barred by sovereign immunity, laches, and 
statutes of limitations. This order was not appealed. In a 
3 One rarely sees a complaint that is as sweeping in its allegations and as 
duplicative in its requests for relief. Apparently, no question was raised 
by respondents or the District Court as to whether in signing this com-
plaint, counsel for petitioners complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. That rule reads in pertinent part: "The signature of an 
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that 
to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground 
to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay." 
Despite the wide ranging complaint, the only alleged denial of equal Pro-
tection is with respect to the funding in the Chickasaw Cession school dis-
tricts. As noted SU'[YY"a, at 1, these funds are only 1 ½% of overall funding 
for elementary and secondary schools within the State. 
4 
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separate order, the District Court held that any monetary 
remedy was barred by the Eleventh Amendment-a holding 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court today. I 
agree with this disposition. I also would not reach the issues 
raised by allegations of the denial of a "fundamental right" to 
"a minimally adequate level of education." See ante, at 19. 
I do riot, however, agree with the Court's holding that peti-
tioners' equal protection allegations regarding the disparate 
distribution of funds present a claim of sufficient substance to 
survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 12(b)(6). 
II 
The Court begins the discussion of petitioners' equal pro-
tection claim, ante, at 16-24, by acknowledging that it is 
appropriate for the Court to take notice of "relevant facts 
obtained from the public record in the light most favorable to 
the petitioners." Ante, at 17. The most recent figures 
available from the State Board of Education of Mississippi, 
read in such a light, fatally undercut petitioners' equal pro-
tection claims. 
It is alleged-and here accepted as true-that there is a 
disparity between the payments from the Sixteenth Section 
Lands in the Chocktaw districts and the payments from the 
state of Mississippi's trust fund to Chickasaw districts. 4 
The complaint characterizes this disparity as an "unjust, in- · 
equitable and unconstitutional deprivation of the rights of the 
children of the Chickasaw Cession counties." App. 2. The 
Court reads the complaint as alleging that this unequal distri-
' The Court states that this disparity is $75.34 versus $.63. The Court 
of Appeals and the Petition for Certiorari give the relevant figures as 
$31.25 and $.80. 756 F . 2d, 1087, 1091 (CA5 1985); Pet. for Cert. 4. The 
former figures are derived from an unaudited aggregation of reports by in-
dividual school districts presented in a November 1984 report on the Chick-
asaw Cession Districts from the State Auditor and the Secretary of State. 
App. 35. As this case arose from a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I use the dis-
parity most favorable to the plaintiffs: $74. 71. 
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bution of such funds acts "to the detriment of the Chickasaw 
Cession schools and their students," ante, at 21. The com- 1 
plaint, however, contains no factual assertions other than this 
disparity to support these conclusory allegations, nor is there 
any basis for believing a detriment could ever be proven. As 
shown in Table A, the various per pupil expenditures in peti-
tioners' school districts are comparable to, and in some cases 
higher than, the average for districts within the Chocktaw 
area. And the Sixteenth Section payments-as the figures 
in Table B demonstrate beyond argument-are an insignifi-
cant part of the total payments from all sources made to Mis-
sissippi's school districts. 
The Court does not question these data. It instead states 
that petitioners "have limited themselves to challenging dis-
crimination in the Sixteenth Section" program, and, relying 
on that limitation, "decline[s] the dissent's invitation to look 
at school receipts overall." Ante, at 22, n. 17. The Court 
thereby ignores the undisputed facts concerning the funding 
of public education in the State of Mississippi, and instead 
bases its equal protection analysis on 1½% of the overall 
funds provided for public secondary and elementary schools 
in the State. The Equal Protection Clause, at least in the 
context of a state funding of schools, is concerned with sub-
stance, not with the de minimus variations of funding among 
the districts. 
Table A in the appendix, "School Finances," shows that 
Chickasaw Cession school districts are in fact distributed 
throughout a financial ranking of all the State's school dis-
tricts, whether the measure used is "Current Expenditure 
per Pupil," "Current Expenditure per Pupil for Instructional 
Cost," or "Current Expenditure per Pupil less Transporta-
tion." Specifically, the Table shows that the statewide aver-
age per pupil expenditure was $1965. 78, of which $1,261.09 
went towards "instructional cost." All but 6 of the 39 school 
districts within the Chickasaw Cession districts spent within 
$300 of the per pupil average expenditure; all but two spent 
6 
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within $200 of the average per pupil instructional expendi-
ture. The per pupil expenditure was over $1400 in the 
Chickasaw district with the lowest per pupil expenditure, 
and over $2400 in the Chickasaw district with the highest ex-
penditure. In the light of these figures of expenditures per 
pupil, I cannot believe that $74. 71-the alleged difference be-
tween the average per pupil payment from Sixteenth Section 
lands and the average per pupil payment from the State's 
trust fund in place of the Chickasaw school lands-creates a 
"detriment" to the students and schools within the Chickasaw 
Cession and thereby gives rise to a violation of equal protec-
tion under the rational relation standard. 5 
Although the figures of expenditures per pupil are fatal to 
petitioners' claims, a second set of statistics provides an addi-
tional reason to ·conclude that an equal protection claim con-
cerning alleged disparities in Sixteenth Section Lands should 
not survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6). As shown in Table B "Receipts for Pub-
lic Schools," payments received from Sixteenth Section lands 
in 1984-1985, $16,272,925, accounted for less than 1½% of 
total "Receipts for Public Schools" throughout the State. 
These Sixteenth Section payments are dwarfed by income 
from state and federal funds of over $752 million (totaling 
74% of "Receipts for Public Schools"). Variations among 
school districts of such a small part of the total receipts can-
not support a claim of a violation of the equal protection 
5 The State distributes its funds equally throughout Mississippi's school 
districts on the basis of"teacher unit[s]." See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 37-19-3 
and 37-19-5 (Supp. 1985); Tr. Oral Arg. 32. As in many states, total fund-
ing among districts in Mississippi varies depending upon local ad valorem 
taxes and other district sources. See Table B; see also San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 49 (1973). Discrepan-
cies from Sixteenth Section lands are frequently offset in part or entirely 
by ad valorem taxes, and the variations in local funding from sources other 
than Sixteenth Section lands are almost always greater than the alleged 
"disparity" relied on in this case. See Annual Report, supra, n. 1, at 
94-98 (listing revenue receipts by local sources). · 
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clause in the provision of education for the children of the 
Chickasaw Cession districts. 6 
III 
Petitioners' equal protection claims cannot survive a mo-
tion under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) in the light 
of the distribution of Chickasaw Cession districts throughout 
the State-wide rankings of various expenditures per pupil 
and the insignificance of the Sixteenth Section funds relative 
to the total receipts for education. Accordingly, I dissent. 
6 There is another reason to dismiss petitioner's claims. The system of 
financing Mississippi's public schools bears a substantial similarity to the 
financing arrangement in the State of Texas upheld by this Court. San 
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). In Rodriguez, 
almost half of the revenues for funding elementary and secondary schools 
came from a large state-funded program designed to provide a basic mini-
mal education in every school. Each school district then would supple-
ment state and federal funds through an ad valorem tax on property within 
its jurisdiction. Similarly, Mississippi provides each district with funds 
to support a "minimum program of education." See Miss. Code Ann., 
§ 37-19-1 et seq. (1972 and Supp. V). These funds constitute over half of 
the receipts for public schools; federal funds constitute another 18%. Of 
the remaining receipts for Mississippi's school districts, ad valorem taxes, 
which are levied by, and vary among, the local school districts, account for 
over two-thirds. See Table B, infra. Mississippi's financing system, like 
that of Texas, "[ w ]hile assuring a basic education for every child in the 
State, ... permits and encourages a large measure of participation and 
contre}-.pf each district's schools at the local level." Rodriguez, 411 U. S., 
at 49.['/I also note that Mississippi has taken numerous steps to ensure the 
adequacy of the most important single factor in education: the quality of 
the teachers. The State has established a Commission on Teacher and Ad-
ministrator Education to oversee the training, certification, and evaluation 
of public school teachers throughout Mississippi. Miss. Code Ann. 
§ 37-3-2. There is a guaranteed minimum for teachers' salaries that may 
be augmented by the local districts,§§ 37-19-7 and 37-19-15, a scale of pay 
increases based on tenure and merit,§ 37-19-7, a guarantee ofno reduction 
in any local supplements to salary, § 37-19-11, a set of minimum standards 
for teachers' competency, § 37-19-9, and a requirement that all teachers 
employed after July 1, 1975, take the "national teachers examination," 
§ 37-19-13. 
85-499-APPENDIX 




Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Natchez Adams 2,131.22 33 1,253.67 73 2,018.70 31 
Alcorn 1,694.89 132 1,270.49 63 1,585.03 129 
Corinth 1,947.49 64 1,274.92 61 1,862.16 53 
Amite 2,331.43 11 1,454.17 18 2,057.52 28 
Attala 2,109.59 36 1,298.66 48 1,936.06 40 
Kosciusko 1,877.64 88 1,104.12 139 1,727.96 90 
Benton 2,121.78 35 1,338.89 38 1,952.98 38 
Bolivar #1 * 2,082.64 39 1,339.85 36 2,012.20 34 
Bolivar #2 * 2,769.62 4 1,804.24 2 2,699.23 3 
Bolivar #3 * 1,943.55 66 1,264.60 68 1,873.11 51 
Bolivar #4 * 1,793.43 110 1,182.67 106 1,722.98 91 
Bolivar #5 * 2,027.20 45 1,309.88 45 1,956.74 37 
Bolivar #6 * 1,657.08 136 1,173.85 116 1,586.61 128 
Calhoun 1,770.32 115 1,199.18 95 1,656.17 111 
Carroll 2,014.44 51 1,295.68 49 1,821.73 69 
Chickasaw 2,158.73 29 1,438.50 21 1,901.76 47 
Houston 1,797.93 108 1,233.84 80 1,681.46 105 
Okolona 1,635.52 143 1,106.77 137 1,565.18 132 
Choctaw 1,935.99 70 1,309.67 46 1,787.92 77 
Claiborne 4,085.75 1 2,066.37 1 3,799.88 1 
Enterprise * 1,729.02 123 1,143.75 128 1,538.66 136 
Quitman Cons * 1,813.05 106 1,129.16 133 1,622.30 120 
Clay 2,307.56 13 1,482.73 13 2,161.68 13 
West Point 1,844.88 97 1,198.97 96 1,733.96 89 
Coahoma Co 2,414.77 10 1,514.98 6 2,236.92 10 
Clarksdale 1,918.05 77 1,255.92 72 1,891.53 49 
Copiah 2,168.89 28 1,162.03 122 2,064.60 25 
Hazlehurst 1,771.68 114 1,190.21 99 1,660.59 110 
Covington 1,912.97 79 1,290.85 50 1,782.63 79 
Desoto 1,565.04 148 1,021.31 150 1,467.48 146 
Forrest 2,019.63 48 1,352.53 34 1,841.33 60 
Hattiesburg 2,215.47 25 1,465.32 15 2,145.72 14 
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Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Petal 1,701.54 129 1,182.13 108 1,595.90 124 
Franklin 2,298.67. 15 1,514.75 7 2,121.11 21 
George 1,474.78 153 982.08 152 1,341.92 154 
Greene 2,056.05 42 1,278.69 58 1,834.67 65 
Grenada 1,764.73 116 1,175.11 114 1,644.66 114 
Hancock 1,750.66 119 1,011.95 151 1,566.13 131 
Bay St Louis 1,981.82 56 1,165.33 119 1,905.05 46 
Harrison 1,860.89 92 1,264.10 69 1,758.84 83 
Biloxi 2,251.56 18 1,411.45 24 2,163.00 12 
Gulfport 2,496.19 8 1,457.45 17 2,433.81 7 
Long Beach 1,920.58 74 1,257.30 71 1,843.01 59 
Pass Christian 2,965.97 2 1,628.06 3 2,874.13 2 
Hinds 1,918.64 76 1,215.27 87 1,796.81 73 
Jackson 2,429.77 9 1,422.73 22 2,293.98 9 
Clinton 1,813.93 105 1,178.70 110 1,702.73 101 
Holmes 1,854.79 95 1,223.53 85 1,713.49 94 
Durant 1,553.46 151 1,155.74 125 1,553.37 133 
Humphreys 2,132.20 32 1,193.35 97 1,959.88 36 
Itawamba 1,905.92 80 1,156.48 124 1,749.66 85 
Jackson 2,243.31 20 1,364.81 33 2,113.99 23 
Moss Point 1,878.90 87 1,249.54 75 1,796.95 71 
Ocean Springs 1,920.67 73 1,269.80 64 1,852.01 58 
Pascagoula 2,538.68 6 1,494.00 11 2,458.17 5 
East Jasper * 2,010.43 52 1,265.89 66 1,836.99 64 
West Jasper * 1,866.24 89 1,244.61 79 1,693.61 103 
Jefferson 2,066.22 41 1,351.06 35 1,861.66 54 
Jefferson Davis 1,928.49 72 1,275.72 60 1,749.29 86 
Jones 1,719.42 125 1,170.06 117 1,551.87 134 
Laurel 2,639.67 5 1,590.71 4 2,581.89 4 
Kemper 2,096.15 38 1,339.34 37 1,868.72 52 
Lafayette 1,698.47 130 1,109.42 136 1,530.26 137 
Oxford 2,226.94 24 1,514.00 8 2,118.55 22 
Lamar 1,506.98 152 971.37 153 1,382.92 153 
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.. Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Lumberton Line * 1,601.57 145 1,182.43 107 1,601.07 122 
Lauderdale 1,641.60 138 1,084.88 143 1,485.10 143 
Meridian 2,136.57 31 1,398.45 26 2,064.38 26 
Lawrence 1,980.57 57 1,193.35 98 1,840.85 62 
Leake 1,720.38 124 1,132.06 132 1,574.13 130 
Lee 1,694.48 133 1,162.81 120 1,587.20 127 
Nettleton Line * 1,457.55 154 1,097.67 141 1,444.6Q 149 
Tupelo 2,199.64 27 1,337.87 39 2,137.07 16 
Leflore 2,148.73 30 1,384.79 29 2,022.71 30 
Greenwood 2,245.93 19 1,459.97 16 2,215.51 11 
Lincoln 1,590.44 146 1,076.05 145 1,441.20 150 
Brookhaven 2,031.92 44 1,416.07 23 1,920.57 43 
Lowndes 1,640.09 140 1,060.41 147 1,517.19 140 
Columbus 2,106.33 37 1,383.49 30 2,018.05 33 
Madison 2,125.62 34 1,301.47 47 1,912.65 45 
Canton 1,697.55 131 1,213.84 90 1,639.48 117 
Ridgeland 1,814.86 103 1,150.59 127 1,704.57 100 
Marion 2,272.92 16 1,494.76 10 2,061.49 27 
Columbia 2,240.43 23 1,448.23 19 2,132.43 18 
Marshall 1,684.23 134 1,201.21 94 1,524.60 139 
Holly Springs 1,975.64 59 1,232.12 82 1,860.84 55 
Monroe 1,706.16 127 1,112.07 135 1,546.87 135 
Aberdeen 1,890.98 83 1,245.80 78 1,796.93 72 
Amory 1,840.11 98 1,283.43 53 1,764.71 81 
Montgomery 2,022.40 47 1,213.96 89 1,856.00 57 
Winona 2,005.07 53 1,401.42 25 1,945.24 39 
Neshoba 1,638.19 141 1,162.39 121 1,502.41 141 
Philadelphia 1,913.78 78 1,319.95 42 1,832.34 67 
Newton 1,920.07 75 1,185.90 105 1,719.76 93 
Newton Sep 1,945.74 65 1,249.46 76 1,831.42 68 
Union Sep 1,740.87 121 1,143.63 129 1,646.80 113 
Noxubee 1,939.99 69 1,289.94 51 1,749.23 87 
Oktibbeha 1,897.03 82 1,337.68 40 1,759.97 82 
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Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
Starkville 1,965.92 62 1,252.02 74 1,879.25 50 
North Panola * 1,864.61 90 1,215.43 86 1,705.72 99 
South Panola * 1,637.45 142 1,100.87 140 1,478.59 145 
Pearl River 1,562.46 149 966.38 154 1,418.22 152 
Picayune 1,752.85 118 1,190.01 101 1,672.13 106 
Poplarville 1,862.97 91 1,190.15 100 1,707.74 96 
Perry 2,311.91 12 1,371.84 31 2,111.50 24 
Richton 1,886.43 85 1,174.43 115 1,719.79 92 
North Pike * 1,630.22 144 1,114.71 134 1,480.55 144 
South Pike * 1,858.62 94 1,265.60 67 1,707.35 98 
McComb 1,941.21 68 1,223.67 84 1,858.82 56 
Pontotoc 1,775.64 113 1,134.82 131 1,630.30 118 
Pontotoc Sep 1,643.80 137 1,064.43 146 1,461.72 147 
Prentiss 1,884.35 86 1,316.58 43 1,756.40 84 
Baldwyn 1,859.39 93 1,206.28 92 1,783.64 78 
Booneville 1,887.23 84 1,282.05 55 1,792.72 74 
Quitman 1,988.47 55 1,335.45 41 1,893.71 48 
Rankin 1,556.15 150 1,043.08 148 1,427.91 151 
Pearl 1,711.80 126 1,151.38 126 1,594.58 125 
Scott 1,737.36 122 1,213.54 91 1,600.68 123 
Forest 1,827.34 101 1,287.52 52 1,711.70 95 
Anguilla Line * 2,018.96 49 1,187.61 103 1,921.95 42 
Sharkey Issaquena * 2,016.35 50 1,246.07 77 1,841.20 61 
Simpson 1,819.91 102 1,260.84. 70 1,698.56 102 
Smith 1,941.22 67 1,232.87 81 1,739.71 88 
Stone 1,989.77 54 1,215.14 88 1,833.56 66 
Sunflower 1,978.77 58 1,283.18 54 1,840.10 63 
Drew 2,039.51 43 1,385.51 28 1,933.45 41 
Indianola 1,640.99 139 1,178.18 111 1,589.70 126 
E. Tallahatchie * 1,928.67 71 1,273.27 62 1,788.65 76 
W. Tallahatchie * 1,847.13 96 1,269.31 65 1,707.58 97 
Tate 1,786.61 112 1,176.14 112 1,648.01 112 
Senatobia 1,743.53 120 1,189.10 102 1,671.48 107 
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Average Average 
Average Current Current 
Current Expenditure Expenditure 
Expenditure per Pupil for per Pupil 
per Pupil Instruction in ADA Less 
in ADA Cost in ADA Transportation 
(1983-1984) (1983-1984) (1983-1984) 
District Amount Rank Amount Rank Amount Rank 
North Tippah * 1,829.20 100 1,175.58 113 1,671.22 108 
South Tippah * 1,757.42 117 1,185.98 104 1,612.25 121 
Tishomingo 1,968.02 61 1,157.67 123 1,819 .53 70 
Iuka 1,577.18 147 1,078.86 144 1,456.91 148 
Tunica 1,809.43 107 1,092.64 142 1,661.67 109 
Union 1,658.56 135 1,104.20 138 1,527.78 138 
New Albany 2,073.07 40 1,367.04 32 1,985.33 35 
Walthall 1,797.02 109 1,279.93 56 1,622.85 119 
Warren 1,951.95 63 1,166.91 118 1,791.93 75 
Vicksburg 2,209.59 26 1,388.60 27 2,128.96 19 
Hollandale * 1.898.37 81 1,313.56 44 1,778.27 80 
Leland * 2,261.80 17 1,498.17 9 2,141.71 15 
Western Line * 2,243.11 21 1,472.29 14 2,123.03 20 
Greenville 1,974.31 60 1,279.45 57 1,918.06 44 
Wayne 1,790.77 111 1,135.49 130 1,642.63 115 
Webster 1,834 .83 99 1,225.69 83 1,688.89 104 
Wilkinson 2,304.75 14 1,442.19 20 2,137.07 17 
Louisville 1,814.22 104 1,181.68 109 1,639.88 116 
Coffeeville * 2,241.05 22 1,278.55 59 2,028.25 29 
Water Valley * 1,705.38 128 1,040.79 149 1,492.57 142 
Yazoo 2,845.92 3 1,490.19 12 2,333.34 8 
Holly Bluff * 2,500.03 7 1,524.17 5 2,448.57 6 
Yazoo City 2,023.38 46 1,205.28 93 2,018.31 32 
Statewide Average 1,965.78 1,261.09 1,842.94 
Chickasaw Average 1,853.52 1,218.82 1,722.82 
Chocktaw Average 1,992.92 1,268.17 1,879.67 
• County Office receipts/expenditures prorated to consolidated districts by ADA. 
t All school districts within the Chickasaw Cession are denoted by italic typeface. School dis-
tricts that are partially within the Chickasaw Cession are also in italic type. 
SOURCE: Mississippi State Board of Education Annual Report, 1984-1985, pp. 144-146. 
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TABLE B 
RECEIPTS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
1984-1985 
Source of State Funds: 
State Dept. of Ed. $ 9,005,760 
Per Capita & Min. Prog. 490,568,205 
Vocational Ed. 16,269,064 
Chickasaw 61,454 
Homestead Exemption 30,916,541 
EFC Payments 2,898,692 
Severance Tax 10,290,972 
Driver Penalty Funds 555,963 
Textbook 6,110,596 
School Lunch 574,624 
Adult Ed. 35,619 
Educable Children 511 ,070 
Ed. Reform Act 985,796 
Other 153,766 
Total State Funds $ 568,938,122 56.1% 
Source of Federal Funds: 
State Dept. Ed. $ 6,293,149 
Vocational Ed. 3,540,422 
National Forest 3,247,726 
TVA 643,509 
P . L. 874 2,657,490 
ECIA Ch. 1 64,896,618 
ECIA Ch. 2 4,388,330 
ESEA Other 107,118 
OEO 151,860 
Soc. Sec. Tit. XX & CETA (Emp. Sec. Comm.) 1,677,019 
School Lunch & Sp. Milk & Nonfood Asst. 67,638,280 
School Lunch, Commodities, Food 12,660,094 
Adult Ed. 745,079 
Education Handicapped Act 11,347,044 
Other (e.g. , CETA Governor's Office) 3,403,978 
Total Federal Funds $ 183,397,716 18.1% 
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RECEIPTS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS-Continued 
1984-1985 
Source of Local Funds: 
Ad Valorem Tax 
Mineral Lease Tax 
Tuition from Patrons 
Transp. Fees from Patrons 
Sixteen Section Income 
Interest on Investments 
Intermediate Source 




Total Local Sources 
TOTAL REVENUE RECEIPTS 
N onrevenue Receipts: 
Sale of Bonds 
Sale of Assets 
Insurance Loss Recovery 
Loans 
Total N onrevenue Receipts 




















SOURCE: Mississippi State Board of Education Annual Report, 1984-1985, 
p. 48. 
